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1. Introduction -- Part I. Concepts and Tools: 2. Choice and freedom; 3. Measuring autonomy freedom; 4. The empirical measure of autonomy -- Part II. Autonomy Freedom and the Welfare State: 5. Why redistribute?; 6. Autonomy freedom and redistribution; 7. Autonomy freedom and welfare spending; 8. Choice, freedom, and the good society

This paper provides an empirical investigation of electoral participation and communicative voting in 14 European countries. We estimate a multi-level voting process where individuals face a participation decision (whether to vote or abstain) and a voting decision (whether to vote strategically for a likely winner party or as communicating for a sure loser party). Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, individuals who are either independent or uninformed are less likely to turnout. However, being both independent and uninformed does not have any statistically significant effect on electoral participation. Thus, our results question the empirical relevance of the swing voter's curse theory in large elections. Second, the probability of voting as communicating is positively related with the level of education and the degree of dissatisfaction with the political system. Finally, political preferences and institutional features characterizing the functioning of the political system and of the media market have a significant effect both on electoral participation and on the voting decision. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

In this essay we ground the theoretical foundations of an empirical measure of the degree of freedom perceived by individuals on the Millian view of affirmation and development of individuality. We then discuss the implications of such a measure for policy and institutional design.

In this paper, we analyze how parties form electoral coalitions in multiparty systems with mixed systems of representation. We stress that these electoral systems are created in the attempt to balance governance & representation by assigning a portion of the legislature's seats on the basis of plurality (PL) & the remaining seats on proportional (PR) basis. This is operationalized through double-ballot-voting: a PL ballot for the allocation of the seats won by the candidates in single-member-college races & a PR ballot for the proportional allocation of the remaining seats among the competing parties. The aim of the paper is to formulate a general theory to describe the electoral incentives that mixed electoral rules provide to political agents in multiparty systems. Italian 1994 & 1996 national elections are used as a case study to test the validity of our theory. 10 Tables, 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 60 References. [Copyright 2004 Elsevier B.V.]

Political representation in the national assemblies is geographic, & elected representatives care about who gains & who loses in their electoral districts. Since legislators are re-election oriented, their chances of electoral success are directly associated with the net benefits delivered to their constituents. From this perspective, geography is not only the basis for political organization & representation, but also the hallmark of distributive politics. In this context, it is likely that locally elected politicians & party leaders standing in national elections would tend to cooperate in pre-election dates. In this paper, we argue that local administrators have an incentive to manipulate local government outlays in connection with national election dates to enhance the re-election prospects of their national party leaders. In particular, given the matching character of national grants with local investment spending, we expect that, in pre-election dates, local policymakers would be induced to raise investment outlays beyond their standard growth rate. This would determine inefficient local public spending as a result of the geographically based system of democratic representation. The case study under investigation is the behavior of Italian local policymakers in connection with national election dates. 1 Table, 30 References. Adapted from the source document.

Argues that apparently divergent policies of the two main left-wing parties could mask an electoral strategy to capture the moderate electorate. The more moderate Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) and the more leftist Communist Refoundation Party (RF).

This book is about the relationship between different concepts of freedom and happiness. The book's authors distinguish three concepts for which an empirical measure exists: opportunity to choose (negative freedom), capability to choose (positive freedom), and autonomy to choose (autonomy freedom). They also provide a comprehensive account of the relationship between freedom and well-being by comparing channels through which freedoms affect quality of life. The book also explores whether the different conceptions of freedom complement or replace each other in the determination of the level of well-being. In so doing, the authors make freedoms a tool for policy making and are able to say which conception is the most effective for well-being, as circumstances change. The results have implications for a justification of a free society: maximizing freedoms is good for its favorable consequences upon individual well-being, a fundamental value for the judgment of human advantage