Suchergebnisse

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has had a profound effect on the European Union, whose response is defining its trajectory.

The reignition of the conflict should have surprised no one, had not so many eyes—including in Europe—been averted.

In autumn 2022, the electoral victory of the right-centre coalition led by Giorgia Meloni's Fratelli d'Italia (FdI, Brothers of Italy) and the subsequent establishment of her government caused scepticism and apprehension among international commentators. Concerns stemmed not only from it being the first administration in the history of post-war Italy whose majority partner, FdI, is rooted in the post-fascist tradition; more concretely, the inclusion within the coalition of parties such as Matteo Salvini's Lega (League) and Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia (Come on Italy), which had entertained political and personal relations with Vladimir Putin's Russia prior to the invasion of Ukraine, raised doubts about Italy's continuing support for Kyiv and the Western coalition. In reality, unwavering Atlanticist and pro-Ukraine views were repeatedly voiced by Meloni during the election campaign already, and – apart from a few unfortunate remarks by single individuals – this stance has been unambiguously upheld by the new government since it took office, as sealed by the Prime Minister's visit to Kyiv in February and to Washington in July 2023.[1]
A more complex picture emerges regarding relations with the European Union and European partners. Historically, in the post-war period, European integration has been a crucial dimension of Italy's foreign policy, along with Atlanticism and strong support for multilateralism. Rome was one of the founders of the European communities, and European integration was long seen by ruling and opposition parties alike as key to Italy's economic, cultural and social modernisation. Since the 1990s, however, criticism of the European project began to emerge in Italy, especially among the new centre-right parties, which developed a so-called "Euro-realist" approach when in government, whereby Italy's national interest would not necessarily coincide with deeper European integration.[2] Outright Euroscepticism became more apparent since the Eurozone and migration "crises" of the 2010s, leading to the emergence of so-called "sovereigntist" narratives depicting the EU as an "antagonist", which found resonance especially among populist parties.[3] This narrative, however, lost momentum as a result of the unprecedented level of funding granted to Italy through the NextGenerationEU programme in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. In the aftermath of the 2022 election, managing relations with Europe was thus a crucial task for the newly elected Italian government.Meloni the Eurorealist
Against this backdrop, Meloni's approach to Europe was centred on the vindication of Italy's "national interests" but within the framework of European integration and with a self-declared ambition to play a protagonist role. In the run-up to the 2022 election, FdI's electoral programme jettisoned some populist tones of the past (especially regarding the euro). Instead, the emphasis was placed on the need for Italy to "return as a protagonist in Europe" and to "relaunch the system of European integration, for a Europe of homelands, founded on peoples' interests".[4] In a similar vein, in her inaugural address to the Chamber of Deputies, Meloni stressed the desire for Italy to stand "with head high" in Europe and the other international fora, "with a constructive spirit, but without subordination or inferiority complexes". The emphasis on the "national interest" was accompanied by the acknowledgement of "a common European and Western destiny" – as well as of the importance of a frank dialogue within the European institutions, taking a "pragmatic" approach.[5] As a matter of fact, Meloni's first mission abroad as Italy's prime minister was to Brussels.
In its first months of government, the Meloni administration adopted a Eurorealist stance in line with that of previous centre-rights governments from the early 2000s. While expressing a strong preference for an intergovernmental view of Europe, the Italian government acted within the framework of EU rules and governance. Meloni tried to bring forward, with mixed results, the Italian point of view on the main issues under discussion in European fora – from energy to migration. In terms of economic policy, despite a few contentious measures, the 2023 budget law on the whole met Brussels' expectations.[6] The management of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan funds and related reforms was instead more troubled, marked by sluggish implementation, delays and subsequent requests for revision by the Italian government.[7]Migration and the economy: Dark clouds ahead
One year after the establishment of Giorgia Meloni's government, dark clouds are gathering on the horizon of Italy–EU relations. In the realm of policy, Rome is faced with increasing challenges, although these have often been concealed, belittled or even denied in the past months. This is especially true for two key areas: migration and the economy.
On migration, while unauthorised arrivals to Italy through the Central Mediterranean route were soaring, in June, Meloni tried to put on a good face by declaring that Europe was eventually addressing the external dimension of migration, which according to her had previously been "unthinkable".[8] However, as the agreement reached between the EU and Turkey in 2016 at the height of the "migration crisis" shows,[9] there is actually nothing new in this approach. For many years now, the Union has systematically failed to address the migration issue in a holistic way – that is, considering the internal, external and border management dimensions together – and has instead tried to shift the responsibility onto countries of origin and transit through a transactional approach – with the latter being called upon to keep, readmit or repatriate migrants in exchange for economic support.[10] Agreements reached on paper, however, amount to very little when the counterparts do not duly implement them. The memorandum of understanding between the EU and Tunisia signed amid great optimism on 16 July seems to be a case in point: arrivals from the North African country to Italy increased by almost 60 per cent in the eight weeks after the agreement, while a group of members of European Parliament who wanted to monitor the situation in the country was recently refused entry.[11] The reality is that Meloni is focusing on the external dimension of EU migration policies because, while migration flows are on the rise under her government, Italy has so far failed to achieve anything on the internal dimension. This is true even for the bland agreement on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum reached at the Justice and Home Affairs Council in early June, which – in spite of Meloni's failed mediation efforts – has been strongly opposed by her supposed allies in Poland and Hungary.[12]
If the Italian government has already failed in migration policy, the key area of economic policy looks increasingly troubled too. Having very little fiscal room for manoeuvre, Italy is unable to benefit from any relaxation of state aid rules; hence, Rome supported the establishment of a new European sovereignty fund as the backbone for an EU-wide industrial policy.[13] Many member states are sceptical,[14] though, and Italy's apparent troubles in spending existing NextGenerationEU funds provides a very good argument against it. Indeed, for the time being, ambitions for a new fund have been scaled back drastically, with a "platform" on strategic technologies being established instead. Added to this are the dilemmas in the negotiation of the new Stability and Growth Pact. Germany, in particular, is stonewalling on the European Commission's proposal, which would significantly benefit Italy by bringing greater flexibility to the old rules. Indeed, Italy's priority should be the creation of a common front along the lines of the Commission's proposal, which may well include member states such as Spain and France. But some postures of the Italian government are instead weakening Italy's credibility and negotiating strength: so far, it has been unable to compose an internal quarrel over the ratification of the European Stability Mechanism (already ratified by all other Eurozone states), while its campaign for excluding certain types of public investment from EU deficit targets is unlikely to be successful. There is a real risk that, in the end, the new Pact will be well below Italian expectations and needs.[15]Italy's true national interest: A stronger Europe
The coming months will most likely see Meloni intensify her efforts to prepare the ground for a change of majority at the European level after the June 2024 election, working towards a coalition inclusive of conservative and nationalist forces. However, the political cohesion of a supranational alliance between movements, leaders and governments whose watchword is the vindication of their respective national interests "first and foremost" would be likely put to the test over and over again. Even domestically, in the run up to next year's European Parliament elections, Meloni now faces increasing opposition from within her own government, pushed to run a populist-nationalist race against Matteo Salvini. Whatever affinities European conservatives and nationalists may find in the realm of values, the extent to which they would be able to find common ground on issues pertaining, among others, to migration – as has already been evidenced in the past months – or economic governance seems uncertain, to say the least.
There's the rub: an international context riven by multiple crises and increased competition, even assuming that one follows the logic of merely protecting the national interest, for a country like Italy – with the second-highest government debt-to-GDP ratio in the European Union and the highest old-age dependency ratio of all EU member states[16] – the priority should be further promoting European integration, advancing Italian demands in a frank and constructive manner within strengthened EU fora and institutions. National ambitions must always confront international realities. An overestimation of one's own means, any attempts to water down the system of supranational governance, or a resurfacing confrontational attitude would damage not only the European project, but Italy first and foremost.Nathalie Tocci is Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and Honorary Professor at the University of Tübingen. Leo Goretti is Head of the Italian Foreign Policy programme at IAI.[1] Nona Mikhelidze, "Italy's Response to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine", in IAI Commentaries, No. 23|06 (February 2023), https://www.iai.it/en/node/16643.[2] Lucia Quaglia, "The Role of Italy in the European Union: Between Continuity and Change", in Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 9, No. 2 (August 2007), p. 133-148, DOI 10.1080/14613190701414426.[3] Fabrizio Coticchia, "A Sovereignist Revolution? Italy's Foreign Policy under the 'Yellow–Green' Government", in Comparative European Politics, Vol. 19, No. 6 (December 2021), p. 739-759, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-021-00259-0.[4] Fratelli d'Italia, Il programma. Pronti a risollevare l'Italia. Elezioni politiche 25 settembre 2022, August 2022, point 25, https://www.fratelli-italia.it/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Brochure_programma_FdI_qr_def.pdf.[5] Italian Government, President of the Council of Ministers Giorgia Meloni's Parliamentary Address on the Government Programme, 25 October 2022, https://www.governo.it/en/node/21000.[6] Nicoletta Pirozzi, "I rapporti Italia-Ue", in Ferdinando Nelli Feroci and Leo Goretti (eds), L'Italia dal governo Draghi al governo Meloni. Rapporto sulla politica estera italiana. Edizione 2022, Roma, IAI, January 2023, p. 25-31, https://www.iai.it/en/node/16471.[7] Giuseppe Fonte, "Italy Struggling to Meet Reform Policy Targets Agreed for EU for Post-COVID Funds", in Reuters, 8 June 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italy-struggling-meet-reform-policy-targets-agreed-eu-post-covid-funds-2023-06-08.[8] Italian Government, President Meloni's Doorstep Following the European Council Meeting of 29-30 June, 30 June 2023, https://www.governo.it/en/node/23062.[9] European Council, EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016, http://europa.eu/!Uv88TM.[10] Luca Barana and Asly Okyay, "Shaking Hands with Saied's Tunisia: The Paradoxes and Trade-offs Facing the EU", in IAI Commentaries, No. 23|40 (August 2023), node/17362.[11] Alessandra Ziniti, "L'intesa flop con la Tunisia, sbarchi aumentati del 60%. Salvini: è un atto di guerra", in Repubblica, 14 September 2023; Lisa O'Carroll, "MEPs Refused Entry to Tunisia Two Months after Signing of Migration Deal", in The Guardian, 14 September 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/p/zq9me.[12] "Meloni 'Not Disappointed' with Poland, Hungary over Migrant Deadlock", in Ansa, 30 June 2023, https://www.ansa.it/english/news/politics/2023/06/30/migrants-meloni-not-disappointed-with-poland-hungary_ec2352bb-02d2-4860-97bc-04780f6d58ba.html.[13] Italian Government, President Meloni's Introduction at Her Press Conference following the Special European Council Meeting, 10 February 2023, https://www.governo.it/en/node/21805.[14] Jan Strupczewski, "Seven EU Countries Oppose New EU Funding as Response to U.S. Subsidy Plan – Letter", in Reuters, 27 January 2023, http://reut.rs/3Jgftt6.[15] Ferdinando Nelli Feroci, "L'incrocio pericoloso fra legge di bilancio e riforma del Patto di Stabilità", in AffarInternazionali, 29 August 2023, https://www.affarinternazionali.it/?p=104942.[16] Eurostat, "Government Debt Down to 91.2% of GDP in Euro Area", in Euro Indicators, No. 83/2023 (21 July 2023), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-euro-indicators/w/2-21072023-ap; Eurostat, Half of EU's Population Older than 44.4 Years in 2022, 22 February 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/DDN-20230222-1.

Since the horrific attack launched by Hamas on Israeli citizens on 7 October and the brutal ongoing Israeli military response, European governments and publics have rallied behind two diametrically opposite worldviews: unconditional support for Israel's right to self-defence versus solidarity with Palestinians massacred by Israel's military operation in Gaza. Europe should work proactively to chart its way in this inflammatory debate, rather than passively buying into the polarising narratives from Israeli and Arab public debates and allowing these to sow divisions, paralyse action, hamper credibility and poison democracies.Europe's baffling response to the war
Europe has been shooting itself in the foot in three interrelated ways. First, it has been hopelessly absent in the attempts to put out the fire in this brutal war. The European Council's attempts to strike a balance, acknowledging Israel's right to defend itself "in line" with international humanitarian law came after days of European cacophony and sounded weak; furthermore, they were almost immediately superseded by a threefold European split at the United Nations General Assembly over a resolution calling for a humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza. Sure, the United States' approach has not been a stellar success either. Not only does the US role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict represent a structural element that took us where we are today, but it has also so far failed to moderate Israel in any meaningful way. Its public embrace of Israel while nudging and asking tough questions behind closed doors hasn't yielded any significant results thus far, while the death toll in Gaza rises by the hour. But the Biden administration, starting with the President himself and the tireless work of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, must be credited at least for trying, rather than simply stopping at the public shows of solidarity towards Israel as seen in the case of the string of European leaders travelling to Israel in the first days after the attack without any meaningful impact then and ever since. Europe is a passive spectator of this conflict and a passive recipient of its polarising narratives, which undermine European security and ambitions to play a global role.
Second, European divisions over the Middle East suddenly made the show of a united foreign policy front over Russia's invasion of Ukraine look fragile. War in the Middle East and the divisions it has caused in Europe have not directly triggered division or "fatigue" over the war against Ukraine. They did, however, expose and magnify the "fatigue" narrative that has latched especially on those in Europe who had always been only half-heartedly committed to Kyiv's cause for freedom.[1]
Third, the overarching backing by European governments and institutions for Israel, and consequently for its military response in Gaza, has literally wiped out the (already dented) European credibility in large parts of the world. As known, Israel's military onslaught is translating into unspeakable Palestinian deaths, dispossession and destruction, violating those norms of international law that Europe wished to uphold denouncing Russia's aggression on Ukraine. As a result, to Russia and China's delight, Europe's claims to be on the right side of history and international law now appear painfully hollow and hypocritical in the eyes of countries in the Global South. Although for Europe (unlike the US, which provides military assistance to Israel), there is no policy tradeoff between support for Ukraine and for Israel, the tradeoff in the public and political debate exists. Never has there been such a sorry display of European double standards than in the parallel wars unfolding in Ukraine and the Middle East today, confirming all the criticism and stereotypes about Europe, from its racism to its Eurocentrism and neocolonial practices.A war fuelling divisions in European societies and politics
Europe's response is baffling. It is neither principled nor interest-driven. It undermines European security and credibility in the world. But why are the European Union and most member states so manifestly shooting themselves in the foot?
Beholden to a binary view of the conflict, Europe has trapped itself in a corner. European societies are deeply divided over the Israeli-Palestinian question, with expressions of antisemitism and islamophobia reaching unprecedented heights. Right-leaning governments, parties and sectors of society support unconditionally Israel's military response in Gaza, buying into the Israeli narrative that what happened on 7 October in Israel could take place in European societies too – thus totally erasing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the equation, Hamas' attack is portrayed as the product of Islamist radicalism and terror, analogous to the terrorist attacks in Europe and the United States in past years, just at an entirely different scale and gravity. As many recalled in the early days after Hamas' attack, 7 October was not "just" Israel's 9/11 – in relative terms, given Israel's size, it was far greater. The "Hamas is al-Qaeda or ISIS" slogan propagated by Israel and bought by many in the West has reawakened the "war on terror" narrative as well as Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" prism for viewing the world, in which, faced with an existential danger, all means are possible and legitimate. For those who have bought into this story, the mounting number of Palestinian casualties is quickly brushed over as an unfortunate inconvenience. If these are unavoidable victims of an existential war – given that Hamas uses them as human shields, so the narrative goes – there is little to be done about them. And if the rest of the world disagrees, then so be it too. It is a matter of life or death; therefore, going with the global flow is not an option.
Those who read the unfolding drama in the Middle East through this lens tend to erase the political context of the conflict, viewing it as secondary at best and an unpalatable expression of antisemitism at worst. The problem is political Islam and terrorism. Therefore, given the growing presence of Muslim communities in Europe, European countries should counter migration, double down on anti-terrorism and unconditionally back Israel as the frontline state in a civilisational battle for survival.
On the other side of the spectrum, left-leaning groups as well as migrant communities have backed the Palestinian cause unconditionally, to the point of papering over Hamas' war crimes, if not legitimising them as an unfortunate yet necessary act of resistance against Israel's 56-year-old occupation. Legitimate criticism of Israel's occupation and its brutal war on Gaza rapidly spills into and is overtaken by broader ethnic, religious and class grievances against the political establishment, increasingly targeting the existence of Israel and even degenerating into episodes of antisemitism. Governments, at a loss over what to do, have gone as far as banning pro-Palestinian demonstrations tout court, in an unprecedented restriction of democratic freedoms.
While happening miles away from Europe, this conflict drives at the core of European politics and society, exposing and accentuating the risk of a backsliding of its democracies. Space for European citizens to denounce both Hamas and Israel's killings is shrinking. Polarising worldviews have gained traction fuelled by rising populism on the right and on the left, eroding the basic principles of coexistence.Europe's need for a political solution
To counter this binary framework, there is no other place to start than to rekindle the fraying European consensus over a genuine two-state solution and, above all, actually begin, for the first time, to use the limited instruments at the EU's disposal to promote such a goal. The route that Europeans have embarked on to date – passive support for Israel, camouflaged as a European variant of Washington's "hugging Israel close" – can only lead to greater catastrophe. If a true friend to Israel, Europe should be a good counsellor. Hamas' brutality and Israel's unprecedented intelligence failure have undermined the credibility of Benjamin Netanyahu's government and prompted it to focus on revenge, eliminating Hamas and maintaining indefinitely a security control of Gaza, with no political plan in sight. A focus on the military objective with no credible political plan for Palestine and Israel-Arab relations is a recipe for disaster, as much for Israeli security as for Palestinian rights.
Meanwhile, the collective punishment of Palestinians has mobilised the Middle East against Israel and shelved its normalisation in the region, while bolstering Iran's legitimacy and that of pro-Iranian groups as the true defenders of the Palestinian cause. With every day of death and destruction in Gaza, Israel is less secure.
Together with the United States, Europe needs to deliver a political plan for the Israel-Palestinian conflict rather than remain trapped in polarising worldviews generated by violence. That starts with actively supporting Arab diplomacy and engaging with states in the region that have a stake in the Palestinian question (Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia), while countering Iran's support for Hamas' military actions. The US and Europe should reinvest in a political plan that aims at embedding a two-state solution in Israel-Arab normalisation. Expecting Israel-Arab normalisation to move forward by turning a blind eye to the Palestinian question has already been tried, and 7 October was the result. It is high time to acknowledge this and reinvest seriously in Israeli-Palestinian peace. What is at stake is not only Middle Eastern stability but Europe's own future.Maria Luisa Fantappiè is Head of the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and a Visiting Fellow at the London School of Economics' Middle East Centre. Nathalie Tocci is Director of IAI and Part-time Professor at the Transnational School of Government, European University Institute.[1] The Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, in a telephone conversation with two pro-Putin self-professed "comedians" whom she believed were the President of the African Union, explicitly referred to "fatigue". That conversation took place on 18 September. It is no coincidence that the recording was released after the outbreak of war in the Middle East, when the debate over Western distraction and fatigue started mounting.

A technology- and policy-driven transition -- A green and global Europe -- Structure of this book -- 1 A Green and Political Europe -- The EU as a global climate leader -- From European energy security to the European Green Deal -- The political rationale underpinning the European Green Deal -- 2 A Green Europe and the Future of Liberal Democracy -- The internal and external opponents of liberal democracy, and of the European Union -- Picking on the fragilities of liberal democracies

Foreword -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Chapter 1 Introduction -- How It All Began -- The Aim of This Book -- References -- Chapter 2 Why Have a Strategy? -- The Political Rationale for the European Security Strategy -- The Political Rationale for the EU Global Strategy -- Policy Direction: Providing a Chart to Navigate Troubled Waters -- Political Unity: Bridging Over Multiple Divides -- The Bureaucratic Rationale: A Joined-up Union -- References -- Chapter 3 How to Make a Strategy? -- Strategy-Making in 2003 and 2008: The Lessons Learned -- First Steps -- A Two-Phase Process of Strategic Reflection -- Towards a Common Narrative -- Public Outreach and Consultation -- Member States and EU Institutions -- A Dramatic Finale -- References -- Chapter 4 What Is a Strategy? -- The Journey from the ESS to the EUGS -- The Title -- The Interests -- The Principles -- The Priorities of the EUGS -- The Security of the Union -- The Resilience of States and Societies in Our Surrounding Regions -- An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises -- Cooperative Regional Orders -- Global Governance -- From Vision to Action -- References -- Chapter 5 What Next After a Strategy? -- The European Security Strategy as a Strategic Concept -- Launching the EU Global Strategy -- The Implementation of the EUGS -- Towards a European Security and Defence Union? -- Growing Insecurity -- United Over Defence? -- The Brexit: Fact and Fiction -- A Political Commission -- Final Thoughts: Lessons Learned from the EU Global Strategy -- References -- Annex A: The European Union in a Changing Global Environment: A More Connected, Contested and Complex World -- Annex B: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy -- Bibliography -- Index

This book tells the story of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS). By reflecting back on the 2003 European Security Strategy, this book uncovers the background, the process, the content and the follow-up of the EUGS thirteen years later. By framing the EUGS in this broader context, this book is essential for anyone wishing to understand European foreign policy. The author, who drafted the EUGS on behalf of High Representative and Vice President of the Commission (HRVP) Federica Mogherini, uses the lens of the EUGS to provide a broader narrative of the EU and its functioning. Tocci's hybrid role as a scholar and adviser has given her unique access to and knowledge of a wide range of complex structures and actors, all the while remaining sufficiently detached from official processes to retain an observer's eye. This book reflects this hybrid nature: while written by and for scholars, it is not a classic scholarly work, but will appeal to anyone wishing to learn more about the EUGS and European foreign policy more broadly.--

1. The European Union, civil society and conflict : an analytical framework / Nathalie Tocci -- 2. The EU and civil society in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict / Nicu Popescu -- 3. Are civil society organizations the missing link? : assessing EU engagement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict / Licinia Simao -- 4. The EU and Moldova's third sector : partners in solving the Transnistrian conflit? / George Dura -- 5. Coming too late? : the EU's mixed approaches to transforming the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through civil society / Benoit Challand -- 6. The EU, civil society and conflict transformation in Western Sahara : the failure of disengagement / Hakim Darbouche and Silvia Colombo -- 7. The EU, civil society and conflict : a comparative analysis / Nathalie Tocci and Nona Mikhelidze.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Abbreviations -- Chronology -- Acknowledgments -- Preface -- 1 Squaring the Triangle -- 2 The View from Washington -- 3 Behind the Scenes of the EU -- 4 Transatlantic Debates -- 5 Influencing Europe through the Back Door -- 6 Global Implications -- 7 Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- About the Author

A rapidly-changing nation and a key player in the Middle East, Turkey has long been centrally important to both the United States and the European Union. A major partner both of the EU and Turkey, the US has also been the most ardent and committed supporter of closer ties between them. Yet while Turkey's relations with the US and the EU have been intimately linked, they have not proceeded along two parallel planes. Nathalie Tocci tells the story of this dynamic triangular relationship, exploring how and why the US has shaped the course of relations among its allies. An empirical study with strong policy relevance, this volume draws on in-depth interviews and official documents to provide a succinct overview of the issues and stakeholders. Tocci argues that the Turkish situation can be viewed as a quintessential case study, tackling broader questions about US foreign policy in the region as a whole.

"Until recently, the European Union tended to view violent mass conflicts predominantly through the lens of negotiations between conflict leaders and powerful external actors. Today, the EU has begun to recognize the imperative of understanding and influencing developments on the ground in conflict situations by engaging with local civil society. The European Union, Civil Society and Conflict explores the EU's relations with civil society organizations at the local level, in an effort to improve the effectiveness and relevance of its conflict and peace strategies. Looking in particular at the eastern and southern neighbourhoods, the volume analyses five case studies of EU and local civil society interaction in: Georgia & Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Moldova & Transnistria, Israel & Palestine and Morocco & Western Sahara. Through the comparative examination of these cases, this volume draws broad policy guidelines tailored to governmental and non-governmental action. Exploring the impact of the European Union in conflicts beyond its borders through its engagement with civil society, this book will be of interest to students and scholars of the EU, civil society and conflict"--Provided by publisher.

Through the study of five ethno-political conflicts lying on, or just beyond, Europe's borders, this book analyzes the impact and effectiveness of EU foreign policy on conflict resolution.