Suchergebnisse

AbstractModern contract law generally does not allow property rights or similar claims to be made against employees. This undermines a claim on the return on the employer's investments in recruiting and training a worker, making them vulnerable to possible infringement from a bystander. Accordingly, employers' investment in recruiting and training might become deficient. Therefore, protecting an employer's investment, balanced against the mobility of the labour market for better employer/employee matches, has emerged as an issue during the transition towards a market‐based economy. This article explores how the Japanese state court in its early period addressed this issue in the tight labour market of the silk‐reeling industry, which was the leading industry at that time. Initially, the court directly protected the interests of employers whose employees were poached, at the expense of workers' mobility. Then, it seemed to govern transactions between employers indirectly as a shadow off‐the‐equilibrium path. Thus, an employer whose employee was poached and an employer who carried out the poaching would privately negotiate to settle the dispute, using a possible suit as a threat against the poacher. An examination of the suits that were actually filed supports this hypothesis. This indirect governance facilitated labour market mobility with some protection of the original employer's claim.

Campaign finance and other political reforms often have redistributive consequences when they improve the position of one group over another. When potentially redistributive reforms are debated or passed, groups may resist or support such reforms depending on their belief about whether the reforms will be advantageous or not to their own position. In dominant party systems such as Japan, we expect that major reforms will have heterogeneous effects for different factions within Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In 1975 and 1994, reformers in Japan introduced major changes that they hoped would reduce corruption and strengthen political parties over factions. In this article, we empirically investigate the asymmetrical impact of the reforms on the total amount of revenue and contributions disclosed by factions in the LDP. We find that the 1975 reform had significant redistributive effects, including a relatively adverse impact on the faction linked to Tanaka Kakuei in terms of total revenue. The 1994 reforms, in contrast, reveal that the Tanaka faction did the best among the factions in collecting revenues and consolidating its power.

We study the tenancy contract choice and its impact on productivity in the prewar Japanese agriculture, where a unique contractual form, the rent‐reduction contract, was predominant. Theoretically, this contract is more efficient than share tenancy or fixed‐rent contract in terms of provision of incentives and risk‐sharing, and thus raises the question of why such an efficient contract was uncommon outside Japan. We argue that transaction costs on the execution of rent reduction were the key element in the adoption of this contract. In prewar Japan, local communities played some role in governing the process of rent reduction and mitigated such costs. Thus the study proposes transaction costs and institutions as additional determinant of tenancy contract choice. We also find that higher prevalence of tenancy was associated with lower average rice yield at the prefectural level and such correlation was stronger in prefectures with a greater proportion of share tenancy.

AbstractSurvey experiments have shown mixed results about the effect of information provision on attitudes toward controversial policies. We argue that one reason is varied receptiveness to different modes of information. Prior research suggests that people selectively ignore factual, statistical information that contradicts prior beliefs but are more attentive to narrative information that describes individual experiences. We test this in the context of Japanese attitudes toward poverty relief programs, which are less popular than other welfare expenditures. Using a conjoint survey, we show that there is a "narrative premium": Respondents who are shown a narrative story about the plight of a single mother are more likely to support higher expenditures on poverty relief than those who are shown statistical information about the share of single parents living in poverty. This premium is particularly effective in strengthening the convictions of those who are already aware of levels of societal poverty.

AbstractNew estimates on the premodern economic growth of Japan, based on more concrete evidence, have been presented. We revise the estimates of Japan's gross domestic product (GDP) from the mid-eighth century to the mid-19th century and its population in the 12th century and describe the institutional transformations that correspond to the output changes. The revision of output and population results in updated estimates of per capita GDP for the medieval period and extension of the growth estimates in the early modern period to the annual series for 1651–1841. This study employs the techniques of quantitative inference and descriptive interpretation of the estimated performance. The findings show that: (a) Both the GDP and population significantly declined towards the 12th century, stagnated and experienced recovery from the 13th century onwards, and then continued to grow through the 17th century; (b) GDP growth accelerated in the 18th and 19th centuries; and (c) per capita GDP growth began to rise in the 13th century after a sharp decline from the 10th to 12th centuries. It continued to rise through the 16th century but declined again in the mid-17th century and finally rose again from the late 17th century onwards.