Suchergebnisse

This study examines whether participating in governmental decisions influences taxpayers' cooperation. The results of experiment 1 show that participants tend to contribute more when they can vote on different rules for a public good game. Experiment 2 reveals that tax payments are lowest in a tax simulation when participants benefit from tax payments and can not vote. However, when the participants did not benefit from tax payments, voting had no impact and cooperation was about the same as when participants benefited and could vote. Furthermore, voting increases procedural fairness and trust mediates the effect of procedural fairness on tax payments.

A representative sample of 471 Austrian self-employed taxpayers was investigated and types of taxpayers selected on the basis of their motivational postures were extracted. By means of a cluster analysis four basic clusters of taxpayers were identified. 'Solidary' taxpayers pay their taxes because they perceive the tax system as fair. 'Non-solidary' taxpayers experience their tax burden as unfair. 'Critical' taxpayers feel unfairly treated and show high resistance but do not necessarily react by evading taxes. 'Strategic' taxpayers feel fairly treated but still try to reduce their tax burden if they perceive the opportunity to do so. The results show that positive and negative attitudes, respectively, to taxes do not necessarily lead to tax compliance or tax evasion. Cooperative and uncooperative behaviour originates from different motives.

Is the effort invested to achieve taxable income a relevant factor for tax compliance? If the value of income increases with the effort exerted, reluctance to pay taxes should be high. On the other hand, if income is perceived as compensation for one's endeavor, there is too much at stake to take the risk of being audited and paying a fine. Consequently, tax evasion should be more likely if income was obtained easily. These contradicting predictions were tested in a questionnaire study with samples from eight countries (Australia, Austria, England, France, Italy, New Zealand, Spain and Switzerland; N = 1,223). Results show that the effort exerted to obtain taxable income and the aspiration level matter in compliance decisions. Hard-earned money is more likely to be reported honestly to tax authorities, particularly if the aspiration level can be satisfied by honest tax reporting.