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The mechanisms of stimulation in a centrally-planned economy
In a centrally-planned economy, the decentralization of information is an obstacle to achieving optimal allocation of resources. Indeed enterprises on the periphery have an interest in underestimating their production capacity, in relaying information to the Centre, so as to be assigned low targets, which can be fulfilled with little effort.
This article is a study of the mechanisms which the central authorities employ in order to encourage enterprises to tell the truth, and to carry out their given plan with the maximum effort. The various bonus/penalty procedures (Fan, Bonin, Ellman, Weitzman) are analysed and compared in the context of a bilateral Centre-enterprise relationship. When machinery and equipment are to be allocated among n enterprises, it is shown that the optimal procedure belongs to the Groves category of mechanisms. In the two hypotheses, the dual problem of choice of objective, and fulfilment of the objective, is studied in the light of recent results in incentive theory. Thus, it appears that while certain bonus mechanisms, in use in the USSR since the end of the 1960's, are such as to solve the problem of the manipulation of information where an enterprise is concerned, the optimal mechanisms for resource allocation among n peripheral figures are very far removed from actual practice.

Address. Summary in English. Proposes introducing a competitive bidding process in the health care system.