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One of the paradoxes of formal spatial voting models is the robustness of the theoretical result that candidates will converge toward centrists positions and the empirical observation of persistent policy divergence of candidates. A solution is that candidates are ideological (have policy preferences). When candidates have policy preferences and incomplete information about voter preferences, then platform divergence is theoretically predicted. Experimental tests of the ideological model are presented. It is shown that platform divergence is significant when candidates are ideological and have incomplete information about voter preferences. However, candidate positions are more convergent, on average, than the theory predicts, suggesting that subjects value winning independently of the expected payment.

A model of the strategic calculus of voting that incorporates the behavior of groups is presented. If candidates choose different positions, positive turnout is possible in (partial) equilibrium & is generally larger than that without group rationality. Nevertheless, if candidates are probability maximizers & a unique (general) equilibrium exists, the candidates will choose equivalent positions & turnout will be zero, even with group rationality. However, if candidates care about both policy & winning, they will choose different positions & cause positive turnout, which will be larger than would occur without group rationality. Group rationality, alone, cannot explain positive turnout in a (general) equilibrium theory of elections; it does imply larger turnout in conjunction with policy-oriented candidates than would be predicted solely by individualistic rational behavior. 5 Figures, 33 References. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractOne argument against secret ballots is that such procedures lead to more selfish voting behavior and that public voting can increase prosocial voting and the likelihood of prosocial outcomes when voters are not subject to intimidation and coercion from outside interests. We investigate this supposition as well as voter preferences over observability in voting in this context. We find that voters are significantly more likely to choose unselfishly when voting is public. These differences in behavior advantage prosocial choices in elections (by 27%) when voting is public. Moreover, voters appear to recognize these differences and a substantial minority of voters whose selfish preference is not the prosocial choice willingly choose public voting even though the likely outcome will be costly to themselves.

It is hard to believe that we have been at this for four years, but our term as editors is coming to a close. During this time, JEPS has gone from being little more than an idea in a few people's minds to a full fledged journal with robust submissions, excellent reviewers, and valuable published research from a wide range of scholars featuring all different types of experimental analyses employed in the study of politics. We are extremely excited by what JEPS has become, and we hope you share our enthusiasm!

It is with great pleasure that we welcome readers to the inaugural issue of the Journal of Experimental Politics (JEPS). JEPS is the official journal of the Organized Section of the American Political Science Association (APSA) on Experimental Research. We are greatly honored to have been selected by the section as the first editors of the journal, and wanted to take this opportunity to briefly share with readers our vision for the journal, some interesting new—dare we say experimental?—policies that we have put in place for the journal, as well as the content in this first issue.