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Over the past twenty years, the global spread of online social networking and communication tools has inspired a lot of research on the connections between media revolutions and political innovations. Whereas in the twentieth century the question of media effects was mainly investigated in psychological and social research, political philosophers have been increasingly engaged in the current debate. Focusing on the hypothesis according to which innovative information and communication technologies imply premises and promises of a new balance of political power, this article aims to clarify its multidimensional nature from the perspective of some of the classic thinkers on politics, with particular reference to the political and cognitive impact of printing technologies. Though only dealing with ideas that were formulated before the twentieth century, the author identifies some general principles and implications applicable to contemporary research concerning the structural changes in political organizing, that we should expect as outcome of the recent evolution of information and communication technologies.

When we study the history of political philosophy, we find that the notion of 'consent' has been and is still crucial with respect to the definition of key concepts in almost all areas of inquiry: yet despite, or perhaps exactly because of its extension and centrality, the relevance of the concept of 'consent' is both persistent and elusive, and its meaning remains contested. As a consequence, the term is not included in some authoritative lexicons of political thought. This article aims to contribute to a survey of the uses philosophers have made of the concept of 'consensus' and related locutions, and suggests a strategy for delineating a semantic and theoretical field in which the main variants of meaning can be linked by gradual transitions on a single continuous scale, from pre-intentional sympathy to rationally motivated agreement under ideal conditions. The resulting configuration suggests that consent based on explicit arguments plays a limited role in regulating and coordinating human interactions.

In his last political writings, Max Weber developed his concept of leader democracy (Führerdemokratie) while observing the plebiscitarian and Caesarist trends in the context of early twentieth-century mass democracy. There is an extensive secondary literature on the topic, and a number of critics have emphasized a problematic overlap in Weber's account of the two figures of President-elect and charismatic-plebiscitarian leader. This article argues that the tensions within Weber's account of plebiscitary leadership must be reconsidered against the background of the evolution of mass democracy. Masses contribute to the legitimacy of government by voting, but they are exposed to many potential sources of emotional influence: as a consequence, the modern politician has to use the means of mass demagogy to gain their confidence. Max Weber investigates the conditions to maintain a some sort of dynamic equilibrium between the charismatic leaders (with their party machine), and the opposing forces of state bureaucracies and of a "strong" parliament composed of responsible parties. Whereas the domination of charismatic leaders rests on the confidence of the masses – that they evoke through the use of demagogy – a well-organized parliamentary democracy requires frames and mechanisms for the systematic selection, testing, and accountability of leaders under institutional constraints, in order to be able to implement continuous and consistent policies. The blind spot of Weber's discourse on leadership remains the internal consistency of a politician who is called to be mass leader, party leader, and responsible statesman.

Not everyone would agree with Norberto Bobbio that Max Weber is a classic in political philosophy. Assuming that the "ethical neutrality" in sociology and economics involves Weber's dismissal of classical philosophical questions concerning the good society and the best form of government, the aim of this paper is to demonstrate that Weber's call for coherence and decency – beyond the distinction of the ethic of conviction (Gesinnungsethik) and the ethic of responsibility (Verantwortungsethik) – is still relevant for political philosophy and philosophers who reflect on the relations between ethics and politics.