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This grammar of Kenyan Sign Language (KSL) phonology adds to a sparse literature on the units of categorical form in the world's sign languages. At the same time, it brings descriptive and theoretical research on sign language phonology into better alignment by systematically evaluating current models of sign language phonology for each of the main parameters - handshape, location, and movement - against the KSL data. This grammar also makes a methodological contribution by using a unique dataset of KSL minimal pairs in the analysis, demonstrating that minimal pairs are not as infrequent in sign languages as previously thought. The main content of the book is found in five chapters on handshape, location, core articulatory movement, manner of movement, and other distinctive features (e.g., orientation, mouth actions). The book also contains two large appendices that document the phonological evidence for each of the 44 handshapes and 37 locations. This book will be a key reference for descriptive and typological studies of sign phonology, as well as a helpful resource for linguists interested in understanding the similarities and differences between current models of sign phonology and identifying promising avenues for future research.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- 2. From Intermittence To Permanence -- 3. The FBI in Cold War and Social Turbulence -- 4. Other Domestic Intelligence Operations -- 5. Covert Techniques -- 6. Is Domestic Intelligence Unconstitutional? -- 7. The Dangers and the Needs: Weights in the Balance -- 8. Further Reform? -- Notes -- Index

Early German nationalism -- The development of Weber's adult style -- Romantic transformations -- Why London? Why Wieland? Why Oberon? -- Planch? and the libretto -- Sir Huon?s adventure -- Sir Huon and Reiz's bond of love -- Fulfillment of the oath -- The reception of Oberon -- Epilogue. The decline of cosmopolitan nationalism

Space stability is a fundamental U.S. national security interest. Unfortunately, that stability may be eroding. Potential enemies understand the high degree to which space systems enhance U.S. conventional warfighting capabilities, and a growing number of them are acquiring the ability to degrade or destroy those systems. However, the risk is not the same for all space systems in all types of crises or at all levels of war. Some systems are more vulnerable than others, and different types of attacks offer different cost-benefit payoffs to attackers. Therefore, each space system has a different threshold at which efforts to deter attacks on it could fail. The United States can raise the thresholds of deterrence failure in crises and at some levels of limited war by implementing a coordinated national space deterrence strategy designed to operate on both sides of a potential adversary's cost-benefit decision calculus simultaneously. This strategy should begin with a national space policy that declares that the United States will punish space aggressors in ways, times, and places of its choosing. The United States should also take steps to reduce the benefits an enemy might expect to gain in attacking U.S. space systems. Future research will determine the most effective and affordable mix of strategies, policies, and systems for strengthening space deterrence