Suchergebnisse

El trabajo, situado en el marco de las relaciones regionales, tiene como objetivo explicar las razones por las cuales Uruguay define su politica de limites con Argentina y Brasil en el ano 1910. Para ello, el autor estudia la saga de tratados suscritos en el siglo XIX y destaca la "estrategia de equilibrio", jugada por los paises limitrofes en su relacion con Uruguay, de la cual no solo surgio la Convencion Preliminar de Paz, en 1828, sino tambien la completa reposicion de los derechos del pais sobre la margen oriental del rio Yaguaron y la laguna Merin, y el fin de la Doctrina Zeballos en 1910. (Cuad CLAEH/DÜI)

El presente articulo se propone replantear la polemica sobre los llamados "partidos de ideas" en el siglo XIX en el Uruguay. Mas concretamente, pretende revisar los postulados clasicos y juicios historicos que, contagiosamente, se han reproducido en la literatura que versa sobre los partidos politicos. Se presenta un estudio de caso, cuya pretension final se centra en la posibilidad de evaluar el proceso del Partido Constitucional, 1880-1903. La tarea de reconstruccion reposa en la valorizacion del proceso politico decimononico, al tiempo que procura acercarse al analisis de los aspectos organizativos de los partidos, sin por ello descuidar los componentes ideologicos y las relaciones con el contexto. (Cuad CLAEH/DÜI)

AbstractExtant studies have documented a positive correlation between country participation in International Monetary Fund–sponsored programs and collective protests in Latin America. However, anecdotal evidence indicates that there is a great deal of variation in the number of protests in recipient countries across the region. This article provides a theoretical argument that explains how the fund interacts with the level of party system institutionalization to affect the level of protest. The main prediction is that the level of protest decreases in recipient countries when the level of party system institutionalization is high. Empirical results from a sample of 16 Latin American democracies observed from 1982 to 2007 provide strong statistical and substantive support for the main hypothesis.

We investigate bill passage by party factions in Uruguay and show that those joining cabinet coalitions earn policy influence. The policy advantage of coalition is therefore not collected by the president alone, as often implied: partners acquire clout in law-making and use it to pass bills of their own and to strike deals with outside factions. Analysis of all bills initiated between 1985 and 2005 reveals that the odds of passing a bill sponsored alone by a majority cabinet faction was about 0.5, up from about 0.15 otherwise. Contingent upon the cabinet status of factions involved, the odds of co-sponsored bills conform well to patterns expected by a view that policy rewards are a fundamental part of the politics of coalition in presidentialism.