Suchergebnisse

2.2.2 Dominance2.2.3 Significantly impeding competition; 2.3 Institutions; 3 The demands of a workable competition policy; 3.1 Predictability and a narrow approach to competition law; 3.2 Rules and standards; 4 Conclusion; 2 The core values of EC competition law in flux; 1 Introduction; 2 Competition as economic freedom; 2.1 Competing concepts of competition; 2.2 The concept of competition in Article 81 EC; 2.3 The rule of reason distraction; 2.4 The contribution of the European Courts; 2.4.1 Measuring restrictions of economic freedom; 2.4.2 Ancillary restraints.

Twenty-two years after the first complaint against Intel's distribution strategy was received by the European Commission, the saga continues. In January 2022, the General Court annulled the Commission's infringement decision because it had not shown that Intel's practices foreclosed market access, but this ruling has been appealed against by the Commission. This paper reviews the General Court's 2022 judgment, explaining the introduction of a new approach to analysing rebates, its operationalization, and what this new approach means for the application of Article 102 TFEU to the conduct of dominant undertakings.
abuse of dominant position, distribution strategy, rebates, market access foreclosure

This paper offers a comparative account of how the European Union and the United States surveil dominant internet players in light of recent enforcement efforts by U.S. antitrust agencies and ongoing discussions about regulating digital giants in both jurisdictions. After setting out themes for comparative analysis, the paper turns to the two actions initiated in the United States against Google: the one filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ) is similar in focus to the European Commission's Android decision and the one led by the State of Texas focuses on advertising markets in a manner similar to the European Commission's AdSense decision. We observe that while there are similar intuitions about anticompetitive conduct in the manner both jurisdictions address the issues, the framing of the competition problem by the U.S. agencies is more sophisticated in relation to the understanding of the markets, the theories of harm, and the design of forward-looking remedies. The paper then compares the Commission's proposal for a Digital Markets Act with several Bills proposing platform regulation presently discussed in the United States, examining what the two systems have in common, what they may learn from each other, and what regulatory gaps remain.