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AbstractThe Eurozone sovereign debt crisis began in the spring of 2010. Seven years on seems like an appropriate point at which to critique how the crisis has been handled and to assess whether policy changes will be required should it flare up again. In particular, there are a number of lessons to be learned from the Greek debt restructuring of 2012.

The doctrine of state succession requires that governments honor the international commitments of their predecessors. Even if a dictator borrows to oppress his own citizens, future generations are required to service the debts and commitments contracted by the dictator. This paper starts by briefly describing possible exceptions to this doctrine by focusing on war and hostile debts. Next, the paper reviews the literature on odious debt and discusses two proposals that could address this issue by using domestic legal principles.

For over a century, legal scholars have debated the question of what to do about the debts incurred by despotic governments; asking whether successor non-despotic governments should have to pay them. That debate has gone nowhere. This paper examines whether an Op Ed written by Harvard economist, Ricardo Hausmann, in May 2017, may have shown an alternative path to the goal of increasing the cost of borrowing for despotic governments. Hausmann, in his Op Ed, had sought to produce a pricing penalty on the entire Venezuelan debt stock by trying to shame JPMorgan into removing Venezuelan bonds from its emerging market index. JPMorgan did not comply, but there was a pricing penalty. Intriguingly, the penalty hit only one bond; an issue by Venezuela's state-owned oil company that went on the market two days prior to the Hausmann's piece. That bond then began to carry the name in the market of "Hunger Bond." Using quantitative data and interviews with investors, we try to understand the causes of the Hunger Bond penalty and ask whether there are lessons for policy makers.

For multiple decades, activists have sought to institute an international legal regime that limits the ability of despotic governments to borrow money and then shift those obligations onto more democratic successor governments. Our goal in this article is to raise the possibility of an alternate legal path to raising the costs of borrowing for despotic regimes. All countries have systems of domestic laws that regulate agency relationships and try to deter corruption; otherwise the domestic economy would not function. Despotic governments, we conjecture, are especially likely to engage in transactions that are legally problematic. The reason being that despotic governments, by definition, lack the support of the populace; meaning that there is a high likelihood that actions that they take on behalf of the populace can be challenged as unrepresentative and contrary to the interests of the true principals. The foregoing conditions, if one translates them into the context of an ordinary principal-agent relationship, would constitute a voidable transaction in most modern legal systems. That means that if opposition parties in countries with despotic governments today were to monitor and make public the potential problems with debt issuances by their despotic rulers under their own local laws, it would raise the cost of capital for those despots. To support our argument, we use both the concrete example of the debt issuance shenanigans of the Maduro government in Venezuela and a more general analysis of the relationship between corruption, democracy and a nation's borrowing costs.

The past few decades have witnessed the growth of an exciting debate in the legal academy about the tensions between economic pressures to commodify and philosophical commitments to the market inalienability of certain items. Sex, organs, babies, and college athletics are among the many topics that have received attention. The debates often have proceeded, however, as if they involve markets on one side and the state on the other, with the relevant question being the ways in which the latter can or should try to facilitate, restrict, or rely on the former. In this article, we approach the relationship between markets and sovereign control from a different perspective, and contemplate more radical versions of their relationship. What would it mean for governing authority itself to be market alienable? And what would it mean if the people—rather than the state—were the ones who set the prices and controlled the transfers? Could a 'market for sovereign control' contribute to welfare-enhancing changes in governance?

The few years since the U.S. incursion into Iraq in 2003 have witnessed an explosion in the literature on odious debts - that is, debts incurred (a) without the consent of the people (e.g., by a despotic regime); (b) from which no benefits accrued to the people; and (c) when the creditors had knowledge of the foregoing. The key question in the literature is whether successors to the despotic regime are obligated to pay the debts of the despot. That is, whether the newly democratic nation of Iraq is obligated to pay the debts of Saddam Hussein. The starting point for almost every discussion - scholarly or popular - of this doctrine is an obscure legal scholar named Alexander Nahum Sack, variously described as the pre-eminent scholar on public debts of his time, a former minister to Tsar Nicholas II, and a Russian professor of law who penned the doctrine of odious debts while teaching in Paris. This Article excavates the background of Alexander Sack, separating the reality of his life from the myth perpetuated in the odious debts literature. Instead of the heroic and eminent Tsarist exile, the evidence reveals a peripatetic legal scholar who taught in five different universities on two continents, and after being fired from a tenured position, ended his life penniless. We are left then with these questions: What does the reality of Sack mean for the legal status of the odious debts doctrine? And how is it that he achieved this iconic status when even minimal inquiry would have revealed a far more murky reality?

This article revisits a recent shift in standard form sovereign bond contracts to promote collective action among creditors. Major press outlets welcomed the shift as a milestone in fighting financial crises that threatened the global economy. Officials and academics said it was a triumph of market forces. We turned to it for insights on contract change and crisis management. Our research suggests that the incident might have broader implications. The contracting parties and others involved in the shift apparently used private contract terms to send public signals in ways that are rarely discussed in contracts literature. This article is based on our work in the sovereign debt community, including over eighty interviews with investors, lawyers, economists and government officials. Despite widespread public enthusiasm for contract reform, in private, few participants described the substantive change as an effective response to financial crises; many said it was simply unimportant. Most explained their own participation in the shift as a mix of symbolic gesture and political maneuver, designed to achieve goals apart from solving the technical problems for which the new contract terms offered a fix.

In 1997, a developing country defied convention. It issued New York law bonds that let 75% of the bondholders change key financial terms. Until then, standard form New York law contracts required unanimous consent. But no one seemed to notice the innovation, and just about no one followed suit. In 2003, another developing country issued New York law bonds with a 75% amendment threshold. The world of international finance erupted in applause and criticism. Major press outlets, finance ministers and senior executives publicly pondered the shift. Other countries adopted similar provisions under the rubric of "collective action clauses" or "CACs". Academic study of sovereign debt contracts took on new importance. This chapter reports on an effort to understand what happened and what it means.

The impetus for the Article was frustration with the current judicial appointments process. Both sides claim that their candidates are the "most meritorious," and yet there is seldom any real discussion regarding merit (or even what should constitute merit). Instead, the discussion moves almost immediately to the candidates' likely positions on a set of hot button political issues like abortion, gun control, and the death penalty. One side (these days, the Republicans) claims that it is proposing certain candidates based on merit, while the other (the Democrats) claims that the real reason for pushing those candidates is their ideology and, in particular, their likely votes on certain key hot button issues. With one side arguing merit and the other side arguing ideology, the two sides talk past each other and the end result is often an impasse. To get past the impasse, we propose placing judges in a tournament based on relatively objective measures of judicial merit and productivity. A tournament allows the public to test the politicians' claims of merit. Being able to test those claims helps make transparent when the real debate is over ideology. It is harder to disguise a purely ideological candidate as the best from a "merit" standpoint when the candidate performs poorly relative to many other judges based on objective factors. Indeed, once merit-based arguments have been isolated (or at least reduced in scope) to factors related to the tournament, it should be possible to have a transparent and meaningful debate over ideology. The Article runs such a tournament using data on opinions authored by active federal circuit court judges from one common time period: the beginning of 1998 to the end of 2000. The focus on a common time period helps put judges in the tournament on a level playing field. We then generate a series of plausible measures of merit focusing on (a) productivity, (b) opinion quality, and (c) judicial independence. While not perfect, our measures do not have to meet this standard to prove useful. They only need to interject a greater focus on merit in the current nomination process (thereby flushing out previously non-transparent motives based on ideology). With our data, we are able to test the claims of merit that the next President will inevitably make when he announces one or the other of his favorite circuit court judges to be his nominee for the Supreme Court.