Suchergebnisse

Judicial Politics in the United States examines the role of courts as policymaking institutions and their interactions with the other branches of government and other political actors in the U.S. political system. Not only does this book cover the nuts and bolts of the functions, structures and processes of our courts and legal system, it goes beyond other judicial process books by exploring how the courts interact with executives, legislatures, and state and federal bureaucracies. It also includes a chapter devoted to the courts' interactions with interest groups, the media, and general public opinion and a chapter that looks at how American courts and judges interact with other judiciaries around the world.Judicial Politics in the United States balances coverage of judicial processes with discussions of the courts' interactions with our larger political universe, making it an essential text for students of judicial politics.

Scholars who study American political institutions have tended to
specialize in a single body such as the U.S. Congress or the federal
courts. However, a growing movement among judicial scholars argues that
the courts cannot be understood in isolation, but instead must be
understood as a part of the larger system of government. As Neustadt
(1980, 26) has reminded us, in reality the U.S. system of government
features "separated institutions sharing powers." Alexander
Bickel (1962) was one of the first voices in what one could label the
Governance as Dialogue movement. Bickel said that the courts must engage
in a "continuing colloquy" with the more political branches of
government and with other political actors, refuting the judicial
supremacy approach that was popular at that time. In Constitutional
Dialogues (1988) and in his other writings, Louis Fisher has argued
that the courts, and especially the U.S. Supreme Court, do not have the
sole responsibility of interpreting the U.S. Constitution, but that
constitutional interpretation involves a very complicated dialogue among
various political actors. Others, such as William N. Eskridge (1991a;
1991b), have argued that the interactions between the courts, the
executive, and Congress are a highly complex multiple-player game. Recent
literature on the interactions between courts and Congress has been
growing steadily, and includes, among others, works by Geyh (2006); Devins
and Whittington (2005); Barnes (2004); Pickerill (2004); Miller and Barnes
(2004); and Lovell (2003).

Based on over 75 personal interviews with members of Congress and their staffs, this article examines how three House authorization committees differ in their reactions to federal court decisions versus their reactions to federal agency decisions. In general, Congress holds the courts in higher esteem than it does the agencies. The courts are generally seen as less political than the agencies, and committee reactions to court decisions are seen as much more unusual than reactions to agency decisions. The attitudes of the three committees toward decisions of the other institutions vary in ways consonant with their institutional roles, the committees' political cultures, and the primary goals of the committee members. The domination of lawyer members on the policy oriented Judiciary Committee results in that committee being the most deferential to the courts. The constituency focused Interior Committee is oriented to local interests and members' reelection goals, and it responds to the courts or to agencies only when constituency pressures force it to do so. The power oriented Energy and Commerce Committee treats the courts and the agencies just like any other political actors.