Suchergebnisse

"The book explains why Indonesia's presidential system turned from an extraordinarily unstable polity one into one of the world's most solid. It did so, the book argues, because constitutional changes incentivized the creation of coalitional presidentialism arrangements that bind a wide variety of political forces to the status quo"--

Based on a decade of research in Indonesia, this book provides an in-depth account of the military's struggle to adapt to the new democratic system after the downfall of Suharto's authoritarian regime in 1998. Unlike other studies of the Indonesian armed forces, which focus exclusively on internal military developments, Mietzner's study emphasizes the importance of conflicts among civilians in determining the extent of military involvement in political affairs. Analysing disputes between Indonesia's main Muslim groups, Mietzner argues that their intense rivalry between 1998 and 2004 allowed the military to extend its engagement in politics and protect its institutional interests. The stabilization of the civilian polity after 2004, in contrast, has led to an increasing marginalization of the armed forces from the power centre. Drawing broader conclusions from these events for Indonesia's ongoing process of democratic consolidation, the book shows that the future role of the armed forces in politics will largely depend on the ability of civilian leaders to maintain functioning democratic institutions and procedures

Prabowo Subianto's victory in Indonesia's 2024 presidential elections was decisive, and it is widely accepted that incumbent President Joko Widodo's de facto endorsement of him played a significant role in this outcome. But the motivations of Widodo (commonly known as "Jokowi") for picking his former adversary as his heir, and the reasons for his determination to get Prabowo elected in a landslide, remain poorly understood. This article demonstrates that Jokowi selected Prabowo after other options had fallen through, and that he made his choice with full awareness of the risks and uncertainties involved. By implication, he also tolerated the danger a Prabowo presidency could pose to Indonesian democracy. Tempted by Prabowo's offer to make Jokowi's son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, his vice-presidential candidate, Jokowi went all-in and mobilized state resources to secure their triumph. Based on interviews with key actors, this article delivers a detailed picture of the factors that made Prabowo president—and that gave Jokowi few guarantees of continued influence. (Contemp Southeast Asia / GIGA)

In 1998, Indonesia endeavoured to civilianise its defence department after decades of military-dominated rule. This civilianisation project was widely seen as a crucial element of democratisation itself. But the initiative ended in disillusionment: by 2014, the ministry was again placed under a conservative former general, and in 2019, it came under the control of Prabowo Subianto, an ambitious ex-military leader with strong ties to the pre-1998 autocratic regime. As a result, the reform drive in the ministry came to a halt, and civilians were marginalised again. This article argues that several factors account for this reform failure: first, the ministry's long subordination to the military prior to 1998; second, the lack of will and power on the part of civilian ministers between 1999 and 2014 to pursue meaningful reforms; and third, a larger roll-back of democratic reforms beginning in the 2010s. Embedding these latest developments in a larger historical context, the article demonstrates that the defence ministry has been a barometer of Indonesia's fluctuating democratic quality over time.

There is widespread agreement that compared to most other states in Southeast Asia, Indonesia's central government has offered a poor response to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak. The government of President Joko Widodo initially ignored the threat, and when it did react, the crisis policies were piecemeal and confusing. But what explains this outcome? It would be easy to attribute Indonesia's response to its lower middle-income status or its democratic governance structures that lack strong repressive capacity. With countries poorer and more democratic than Indonesia performing better, however, this explanation is unsatisfactory. Going beyond simple development and regime categories, this article proposes that Indonesia's COVID-19 response was the result of its specific process of democratic decline in the last decade. This backsliding produced intensifying populist anti-scientism, religious conservatism, religio-political polarisation, corruption and clientelism, as well as assertiveness among anti-democratic actors. Ultimately, these segmental factors combined into a toxic mix that severely constrained Indonesia's ability to effectively respond to a massive external shock such as COVID-19. (JCSA/GIGA)