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The book attempts to give a comprehensive description and testable theory of the complicated, but not unintelligible system of bank-firm relationships in the dynamic environment of a gradually deregulated financial market. It provides both theory and empirical evidence that close bank-firm relationships lead to a lower fraction of bank finance. Furthermore it is shown that since the mid 1980s it has been increasingly dependent on the nature of a relationship whether or not it is a benefit for the competitiveness of a firm. These findings make it necessary to redefine the image of Japan's financial system in general and bank-firm relationships in particular

The paper is a first step to tests the impact of bank-firm-relationships on corporate performance under changing economic conditions. Using a data set of standardized annual financial statements of 100 Japanese corporations all listed at the First Section of the Tokyo stock exchange, at the current stage of analysis we find empirical evidence that: (1) investment is determined by output expectations. (2) Q is a significant variable for investment behavior. (3) Investment is restricted by debt-equity ratio, (4) therefore the much claimed signaling effect of a high debt-equity ratio does not hold. (5) In contrast to Germany though, banks allow firms with bank-relationships higher short term debt to total finance and long term loans to total finance ratios, whereas firms with no relationships have a higher equity ratio. (6) Banks influence firms with bank-relationships to decide on low risk investment decisions. Therefore they are able to allow a higher debt-equity ratio (in contrast to Germany). (7) Non-bank-related firms are much more profitable than bank-related firms. The difference is even stronger than in Germany. Yet they also have to bear a higher amount of risk. (8) Apparently the policy of banks in Japan is much different to German banks: Banks force bank-affiliated firms to follow an investment policy, which is much more cautious and therefore leads to less profitability. This again leads to a bank-policy that allows to supply these firms with higher amounts of borrowings. ; Gegenstand dieses Beitrages ist die Untersuchung des Einflusses von Bank-Firmen- Beziehungen auf die Unternehmensleistung bei sich ändernden wirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen. Unter Verwendung eines Datensatzes von standardisierten Geschäftsberichten 100 japanischer Unternehmen, welche an der ersten Sektion der Börse in Tokio notiert sind, kommt die empirische Untersuchung zu folgenden Ergebnissen: (1) Investitionen werden von Output-Erwartungen bestimmt, (2) Q ist eine signifikante Variable in Bezug auf Investitionsverhalten (3) Investitionen werden durch den Verschuldungsgrad beschränkt, (4) daher gilt der so oft herangezogene signaling effect eines hohen Verschuldungsgrades nicht. (5) Im Gegensatz zu Deutschland gewähren die Banken den Unternehmen mit Bankbeziehungen jedoch höhere Quoten kurzfristiger und langfristiger Verschuldung. Die Unternehmen ohne Bankbeziehungen haben hingegen einen höheren Eigenkapitalanteil. (6) Bei Investitionsentscheidungen beeinflussen japanische Banken die Unternehmen mit Bankbeziehungen dahingehend, Investitionen mit geringem Risiko zu tätigen. Daher sind sie bereit, einen höheren Verschuldungsgrad zu gewähren als dies in Deutschland der Fall ist. (7) Unternehmen ohne Bankbeziehungen sind erheblich profitabler als Unternehmen mit Bankbeziehungen. Die unterschiedliche Höhe der Rentabilität beider Gruppen ist noch ausgeprägter als in Deutschland, die japanischen Unternehmen ohne Bankbeziehungen haben jedoch auch ein höheres Risiko zu tragen. (8) Offenbar ist die Politik japanischer Banken sehr unterschiedlich im Vergleich zu der Politik deutscher Banken: Banken zwingen Unternehmen mit Bankbeziehungen eine Investitionspolitik zu betreiben, die viel vorsichtiger ist und daher zu einer geringeren Rentabilität führt. Dies wiederum gestattet den Banken eine Politik zu verfolgen, die es erlaubt den Unternehmen in höherem Maße Kredite zu gewähren.

"Our analysis highlights central aspects of the role of Japanese bank-firm relationships in times of deregulation. Comparing our results with earlier findings, it becomes evident that financial deregulation has triggered dramatic changes concerning the position of banks in the financial market and their relationships with large manufacturing firms. Since deregulation has opened up domestic as well as foreign capital markets, easy access to capital is not limited to bank-affiliated firms. While in earlier years firms with close banking ties may have been more profitable or used their advantages to enhance their growth or the compensation of employees, now whether such a relationship benefits a firm or acts as an obstacle depends largely upon the nature of that relationship. Hence, there are two general points made in this paper. First, in order to assess the economic role of bank affiliations, it is of eminent importance to differentiate between the various ways of establishing and maintaining bank-firm relationships. Second, the rapid development of the Japanese financial market over the last two decades has reduced the monopoly power of banks in a wide range of areas, which has caused dramatic changes concerning the benefits and costs of bank-firm relationships." (author's abstract)

"This documentation provides an overview of the Kaisha Database, a database consisting of annual accounts data of Japanese manufacturing firms. The documentation is aimed at enabling the researcher interested in the database to work independently. The structure as well as the procedures used to create time series and to take account of the reforms in the accounting system are described. The excursuses give information on the Japanese accounting system and several data sources. In the appendix all firms are listed according to their security as well as industry code. Furthermore, all primary variables are presented in three languages (German, English, Japanese), and the calculation formulae of the workfiles are given." (author's abstract)