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An evaluation of three theories of internal interest-group dynamics that vary in their predictions concerning the degree of belief congruence between group leaders & members. Exchange theory expects to find substantial congruence, except when selective incentives are important. Commitment theory argues that leaders should be more extreme in their views than ordinary members, while the moderating elite approach suggests they should be less extreme. Questionnaire survey data obtained at 2 times from leaders & members of an environmental & an economic interest group in Lake Tahoe, Calif (N = 518 & 538, respectively), provide some support for exchange theory, even more support for commitment theory, & no support for the moderating elites approach. A synthesis involving elements of the supported theories & additional factors, eg, level of conflict in the policy subsystem, is suggested. 4 Tables, 75 References. Adapted from the source document.

Most studies of belief congruence between elites and their constituencies have dealt with a single type of political institution, such as legislatures, political parties, or bureaucracies. This article compares the extent of congruence between governmental and interest group elites with their constituencies. After discussing elites' incentives to appeal both to their very broad "claimed" constituency and to a much narrower "activist" constituency, we suggest a number of reasons for hypothesizing that governmental elites will do a better job than interest group leaders of mirroring the beliefs of their broader "Claimed" Constituency. Survey data from a number of governmental and interest group elites involved in a longstanding environmental dispute at Lake Tahoe generally support this contention.

This paper studies the risk of "fire sales" in the tri‐party repo market, a large and important market where securities dealers find short‐term funding for a substantial portion of their own and their clients' assets. We distinguish between fire sales of assets by a dealer who, facing a run that could lead to default, sells securities to generate liquidity, and fire sales of assets by repo investors after a dealer's default has occurred. While fire sales do cause damage no matter how they arise, the tools available to lessen the harm from the two types of fire sales are different. We find that limited tools are available to mitigate the risk of predefault fire sales and that no established tools currently exist to mitigate the risk of postdefault sales. (JEL G01, G18)