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AbstractIn "Causality and Determination", Anscombe stressed that, in her view, physical determinism and free action were incompatible. As the relevant passage suggests, her espousal of incompatibilism was not merely due to specific features of human 'ethical' freedom, but (also) due to general features of agency, intentionality, and voluntariness. For Anscombe went on to tentatively suggest that lack of physical determination was required for the intentional conduct of animals we would not classify as 'free', too. In this paper, I examine three different lines of argument to establish Anscombe's latter suggestion, which are based on general considerations about the causal efficacy of psychological-agential phenomena, the nature of agency, and the specific features of intentional agency. I start with Anscombe's own claim from "The Causation of Action" that microphysical determinism would make psychological and personal phenomena epiphenomenal, before I turn to the view of 'Agency Incompatibilism', that genuine agency requires the absence of antecedent necessitation, and, lastly, to concerns about some crucial features of intentional agency which we find in both human and animal agents.

AbstractThis article explores Kant's view, found in several passages in his late writings on moral philosophy, that the verdicts of conscience are infallible. We argue that Kant's infallibility claim must be seen in the context of a major shift in Kant's views on conscience that took place around 1790 and that has not yet been sufficiently appreciated in the literature. This shift led Kant to treat conscience as an exclusively second-order capacity which does not directly evaluate actions, but one's first-order moral judgments and deliberation. On the basis of this novel interpretation, we develop a new defence of Kant's infallibility claim that draws on Kant's account of the characteristic features of specificallymoraljudgments.

»Freiheit« findet als politisch-rechtliche Leitidee der Moderne weitreichende Zustimmung. Bei näherem Hinsehen zeigen sich gleichwohl höchst unterschiedliche Deutungen und Akzentuierungen. Darüber hinaus ist der Freiheitsbegriff semantischen Umkehrungen ausgesetzt, die sogar darauf hinauslaufen können, faktische Unfreiheit als höchste Freiheit auszugeben. Die interdisziplinären Beiträge sprechen sich für ein anspruchsvolles Freiheitsverständnis aus und legen ihr Augenmerk nicht zuletzt auf die relationale Dimension von Freiheitspraxen