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The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act enables local authorities to put in place local street curfews for children aged under 10 years. The Act has been fuelled by discourses which present a vision of a society escalating towards lawlessness and moral decline. Curfew orders are grounded on the exclusionary principles of control and deterrence. We argue that the case for curfews is much less clear than recent policy documents suggest. Evidence based upon a large-scale study points to a more positive role of streets in the lives of young people than is acknowledged in current discussions. We propose that curfew does not offer a way forward: for young people it reinforces a sense of power-lessness and alienation and for adults it establishes a positionality which further dislocates young people from their world. Throughout the curfew debate there has been no attempt to incorporate the views of young people. We propose that, instead of curfew, what is needed are inclusionary strategies which encourage the incorporation of young people into communities, empower their voices in environmental decisionmaking, and challenge the hegemony of adulthood upon the landscape.

Modern technology, together with an advanced economy, can provide a good or service in myriad ways, giving us choices on what to produce and how to produce it. To make those choices more intelligently, society needs to know not only the market price of each alternative, but the associated health and environmental consequences. A fair comparison requires evaluating the consequences across the whole "life cycle"—from the extraction of raw materials and processing to manufacture/construction, use, and end‐of‐life—of each alternative. Focusing on only one stage (e.g., manufacture) of the life cycle is often misleading. Unfortunately, analysts and researchers still have only rudimentary tools to quantify the materials and energy inputs and the resulting damage to health and the environment. Life cycle assessment (LCA) provides an overall framework for identifying and evaluating these implications. Since the 1960s, considerable progress has been made in developing methods for LCA, especially in characterizing, qualitatively and quantitatively, environmental discharges. However, few of these analyses have attempted to assess the quantitative impact on the environment and health of material inputs and environmental discharges. Risk analysis and LCA are connected closely. While risk analysis has characterized and quantified the health risks of exposure to a toxicant, the policy implications have not been clear. Inferring that an occupational or public health exposure carries a nontrivial risk is only the first step in formulating a policy response. A broader framework, including LCA, is needed to see which response is likely to lower the risk without creating high risks elsewhere. Even more important, LCA has floundered at the stage of translating an inventory of environmental discharges into estimates of impact on health and the environment. Without the impact analysis, policymakers must revert to some simple rule, such as that all discharges, regardless of which chemical, which medium, and where they are discharged, are equally toxic. Thus, risk analysts should seek LCA guidance in translating a risk analysis into policy conclusions or even advice to those at risk. LCA needs the help of RA to go beyond simplistic assumptions about the implications of a discharge inventory. We demonstrate the need and rationale for LCA, present a brief history of LCA, present examples of the application of this tool, note the limitations of LCA models, and present several methods for incorporating risk assessment into LCA. However, we warn the reader not to expect too much. A comprehensive comparison of the health and environmental implications of alternatives is beyond the state of the art. LCA is currently not able to provide risk analysts with detailed information on the chemical form and location of the environmental discharges that would allow detailed estimation of the risks to individuals due to toxicants. For example, a challenge for risk analysts is to estimate health and other risks where the location and chemical speciation are not characterized precisely. Providing valuable information to decisionmakers requires advances in both LCA and risk analysis. These two disciplines should be closely linked, since each has much to contribute to the other.

Slowing climate change requires overcoming inertia in political, technological, and geophysical systems. Of these, only geophysical warming commitment has been quantified. We estimated the commitment to future emissions and warming represented by existing carbon dioxide-emitting devices. We calculated cumulative future emissions of 496 (282 to 701 in lower- and upper-bounding scenarios) gigatonnes of CO2 from combustion of fossil fuels by existing infrastructure between 2010 and 2060, forcing mean warming of 1.3 degrees C (1.1 degrees to 1.4 degrees C) above the pre-industrial era and atmospheric concentrations of CO2 less than 430 parts per million. Because these conditions would likely avoid many key impacts of climate change, we conclude that sources of the most threatening emissions have yet to be built. However, CO2-emitting infrastructure will expand unless extraordinary efforts are undertaken to develop alternatives.

Lemoine and Rudik (2017) argues that it is efficient to delay reducing carbon emissions, due to supposed inertia in the climate system's response to emissions. This conclusion rests upon misunderstanding the relevant earth system modeling: there is no substantial lag between CO2 emissions and warming. Applying a representation of the earth system that captures the range of responses seen in complex earth system models invalidates the original article's implications for climate policy. The least-cost policy path that limits warming to 2°C implies that the carbon price starts high and increases at the interest rate. It cannot rely on climate inertia to delay reducing and allow greater cumulative emissions. (JEL H23, Q54, Q58)

The Paris Agreement has opened debate on whether limiting warming to 1.5°C is compatible with current emission pledges and warming of about 0.9°C from the mid-19th-century to the present decade. We show that limiting cumulative post-2015 CO2 emissions to about 200 GtC would limit post-2015 warming to less than 0.6°C in 66% of Earth System Model members of the CMIP5 ensemble with no mitigation of other climate drivers, increasing to 240GtC with ambitious non-CO2 mitigation. We combine a simple climatecarbon- cycle model with estimated ranges for key climate system properties from the IPCC 5th Assessment Report. Assuming emissions peak and decline to below current levels by 2030 and continue thereafter on a much steeper decline, historically unprecedented but consistent with a standard ambitious mitigation scenario (RCP2.6), gives a likely range of peak warming of 1.2- 2.0°C above the mid-19th-century. If CO2 emissions are continuously adjusted over time to limit 2100 warming to 1.5°C, with ambitious non-CO2 mitigation, net future cumulative CO2 emissions are unlikely to prove less than 250 GtC and unlikely greater than 540GtC. Hence limiting warming to 1.5°C is not yet a geophysical impossibility, but likely requires delivery on strengthened pledges for 2030 followed by challengingly deep and rapid mitigation. Strengthening near-term emissions reductions would hedge against a high climate response or subsequent reduction-rates proving economically, technically or politically unfeasible.