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多年来,平台经济及其社会影响一直是学术界和社会争论的焦点。本书聚焦平台工作者劳动条件和劳动权利的发展变化,重点关注平台经济这种新兴商业模式带来的劳动法律冲突以及主要市场经济国家法律体系面对挑战所采取的不同调整策略。 本书把平台经济对现有社会模式的冲击放在历次技术革命对劳动世界的影响背景下进行思考,同时对比了奥地利、比利时、法国、意大利、荷兰、罗马尼亚、西班牙、瑞士、英国和美国等国劳动法律规制的近期新动态。通过比较分析勾画出未来平台经济的劳动立法趋势。 For many years, the platform economy and its social impact have been the focus of debate in academia and society. This book focuses on the development and changes of platform workers' labor conditions and labor rights, focusing on the labor law conflicts brought about by the emerging business model of the platform economy and the different adjustment strategies adopted by the legal systems of major market economy countries to face challenges. This work puts the impact of the platform economy on the existing social model in the context of the impact of the previous technological revolutions on the world of work, and compares the approach of various legal systems, looking at latest developments in the country's labour laws and regulation. Through comparative analysis, it outlines the labour legislation trends of the future platform economy.

'The employee-shareholder in English Law: The Story of a Legislative Failure'

This Chapter outlines the legal contradictions in the European 'project' with regard to work. In particular, it points to grave tensions between, on the one hand, the 'existential' social aspirations of the European Union, which place work at their centre, and, on the other hand, the 'metaphysical' realities of a legal framework which has singularly failed to constitute the very working relationships upon which the much vaunted 'Social Europe' is predicated. By constructing this ontological account of the role of law in constituting all social and economic identity and exchange, this Chapter argues that the legal and constitutional theory which formed the basis of the 'economic' phase of European integration has not been followed during the 'social' phase of integration which has followed. In this manner, the 'social' within Europe has been relegated to an inferior status, precisely due to the failure to construct the working relationships which this social vision is based upon. While the idea that the 'social' gives way to the 'economic' is one which emerges from much writing on the European Union and international economic integration more generally, this Chapter breaks with that vast, cacophonous body of literature to argue that it is precisely the efforts to rectify this 'social deficit' which cement this failure. The emergent 'social' acquis of European Union law at constitutional level has often come to adopt the 'existential' trappings of constitutional language, by expressing the identity of its polity through its values and social aims. However, in so doing, it has failed to capture the ontological essence of constitutionalism, whereby social or economic actors are literally constituted by the law. It is this ontological role of the law which allows us to talk of the European Union as a genuinely constitutional project, at least in the economic sphere. As the social values of the Union largely rest on an economic framework premised on stable working relationships, the failure of the constitutional settlement to ensure such relationships has the effect of negating the ontological status of the work in the European social model. In this manner, this Chapter questions the coherence of the European employment and social policies through their failure to deliberately constitute stable employment relationships, while nonetheless being premised upon their existence. This failure is not simply a legal one however, but also one of ideology: much labour law thinking, including that which is critical of the relegation of social policy within the European project, shares this naïve vision of economic relationships and work. On the one hand, labour law emerged within an economico-historical, materialist heritage, rejecting the importance of law in the arranging of industrial affairs. On the other hand, more recent labour law scholarship and policy development have often fallen into a form of jurisprudential naivety, in which it has been thought sufficient to engage in a form of juridical 'virtue signalling' through the use of the rhetoric of social values and human rights. Such scholarship is based on, respectively, legitimate and laudable concerns regarding social power and the pervasiveness of constitutional principles. However, this Chapter argues that without the necessary legal constitution of the economic relationships, in particular working relationships, upon which these values and rights are predicated, such goals will remain illusory, and social power will prove difficult to shape. While the passing of ambitious legislation such as the European Pillar of Social Rights, declared in late 2017, in many ways typifies and indeed magnifies these errors yet again, it might offer an opportunity for judicial and policy-focused reflection that forces greater focus on constituting working relationships within the shared European economic and social space.

This article analyses Brexit and the declaration of the European Pillar of Social Rights from the perspective of constitutional and economic theory of labour law. It concludes that both events are constitutional moments, in that they are examples of political choices in which values of a political community are expressed in some symbolic form. However, it is argued that the Social Pillar is merely the latest example of a serious failing in European social policy, in which existential constitutional statements of values are prioritised ahead of ontological constitutional frameworks which create the necessary economic and social actors and institutions to achieve those very social goals. The success of the internal market was built on the clear legal establishment of economic actors and rights, based on the influential constitutional ideas of ordoliberal economic thought and its innate legal theory. In contrast, the European Social Model is based on the assumption of the existence of stable employment relationships, however European Union law does not make any serious attempt to construct or guarantee such relationships. In part, this is due to methodological errors within labour law scholarship. To succeed, Social Europe should focus on the creation of a European Employment Contract. --- Cet article analyse le Brexit et la proclamation du Socle européen des droits sociaux du point de vue de la théorie constitutionnelle et économique du droit social. Il conclut que ces deux événements sont des « moments constitutionnels », en ce sens que ce sont des exemples de choix politiques où les valeurs d'une collectivité politique sont exprimées sous forme symbolique. Cependant, l'auteur du présent article soutient que le Socle des droits sociaux n'est que l'exemple le plus récent d'une défaillance sérieuse de la politique sociale européenne, dans laquelle les énoncés existentiels constitutionnels de valeurs sont prioritaires par rapport par rapport aux cadres constitutionnels ontologiques qui créent les acteurs économiques et sociaux nécessaires pour atteindre ces mêmes objectifs sociaux. Le succès du marché intérieur s'est fondé sur l'établissement juridique clair d'acteurs et de droits économiques, une structure fondée sur les idées constitutionnelles influentes de la pensée économique ordolibérale et de sa théorie juridique innée. En revanche, le modèle social européen se fond sur l'hypothèse de l'existence de rapports d'emploi stables, mais le droit de l'Union européenne ne fait aucune tentative sérieuse, ni pour construire ni pour garantir de tels rapports. Cela est dû en partie à des erreurs méthodologiques dans le droit social. Pour atteindre ses buts, l'Europe sociale devrait se concentrer sur la création d'un contrat de travail européen.

This article analyses Brexit and the declaration of the European Pillar of Social Rights from the perspective of constitutional and economic theory of labour law. It concludes that both events are constitutional moments, in that they are examples of political choices in which values of a political community are expressed in some symbolic form. However, it is argued that the Social Pillar is merely the latest example of a serious failing in European social policy, in which existential constitutional statements of values are prioritised ahead of ontological constitutional frameworks which create the necessary economic and social actors and institutions to achieve those very social goals. The success of the internal market was built on the clear legal establishment of economic actors and rights, based on the influential constitutional ideas of ordoliberal economic thought and its innate legal theory. In contrast, the European Social Model is based on the assumption of the existence of stable employment relationships, however European Union law does not make any serious attempt to construct or guarantee such relationships. In part, this is due to methodological errors within labour law scholarship. To succeed, Social Europe should focus on the creation of a European Employment Contract. Cet article analyse le Brexit et la proclamation du Socle européen des droits sociaux du point de vue de la théorie constitutionnelle et économique du droit social. Il conclut que ces deux événements sont des « moments constitutionnels », en ce sens que ce sont des exemples de choix politiques où les valeurs d'une collectivité politique sont exprimées sous forme symbolique. Cependant, l'auteur du présent article soutient que le Socle des droits sociaux n'est que l'exemple le plus récent d'une défaillance sérieuse de la politique sociale européenne, dans laquelle les énoncés existentiels constitutionnels de valeurs sont prioritaires par rapport aux cadres constitutionnels ontologiques qui créent les acteurs économiques et sociaux nécessaires pour atteindre ces mêmes objectifs sociaux. Le succès du marché intérieur s'est fondé sur l'établissement juridique clair d'acteurs et de droits économiques, une structure fondée sur les idées constitutionnelles influentes de la pensée économique ordolibérale et de sa théorie juridique innée. En revanche, le modèle social européen se fond sur l'hypothèse de l'existence de rapports d'emploi stables, mais le droit de l'Union européenne ne fait aucune tentative sérieuse, ni pour construire ni pour garantir de tels rapports. Cela est dû en partie à des erreurs méthodologiques dans le droit social. Pour atteindre ses buts, l'Europe sociale devrait se concentrer sur la création d'un contrat de travail européen.

This article analyses Brexit and the declaration of the European Pillar of Social Rights from the perspective of constitutional and economic theory of labour law. It concludes that both events are constitutional moments, in that they are examples of political choices in which values of a political community are expressed in some symbolic form. However, it is argued that the Social Pillar is merely the latest example of a serious failing in European social policy, in which existential constitutional statements of values are prioritised ahead of ontological constitutional frameworks which create the necessary economic and social actors and institutions to achieve those very social goals. The success of the internal market was built on the clear legal establishment of economic actors and rights, based on the influential constitutional ideas of ordoliberal economic thought and its innate legal theory. In contrast, the European Social Model is based on the assumption of the existence of stable employment relationships, however European Union law does not make any serious attempt to construct or guarantee such relationships. In part, this is due to methodological errors within labour law scholarship. To succeed, Social Europe should focus on the creation of a European Employment Contract. Cet article analyse le Brexit et la proclamation du Socle européen des droits sociaux du point de vue de la théorie constitutionnelle et économique du droit social. Il conclut que ces deux événements sont des ? moments constitutionnels ?, en ce sens que ce sont des exemples de choix politiques où les valeurs d'une collectivité politique sont exprimées sous forme symbolique. Cependant, l?auteur du présent article soutient que le Socle des droits sociaux n'est que l?exemple le plus récent d'une défaillance sérieuse de la politique sociale européenne, dans laquelle les énoncés existentiels constitutionnels de valeurs sont prioritaires par rapport aux cadres constitutionnels ontologiques qui créent les acteurs économiques et sociaux nécessaires pour atteindre ces mêmes objectifs sociaux. Le succès du marché intérieur s?est fondé sur l'établissement juridique clair d'acteurs et de droits économiques, une structure fondée sur les idées constitutionnelles influentes de la pensée économique ordolibérale et de sa théorie juridique innée. En revanche, le modèle social européen se fond sur l'hypothèse de l'existence de rapports d'emploi stables, mais le droit de l'Union européenne ne fait aucune tentative sérieuse, ni pour construire ni pour garantir de tels rapports. Cela est dû en partie à des erreurs méthodologiques dans le droit social. Pour atteindre ses buts, l'Europe sociale devrait se concentrer sur la création d'un contrat de travail européen.

Labour rights can be understood as those parts of law which grant workers, whether individually or collectively, particular entitlements connected to their employment, or by virtue of their status as workers. These rights are often connected to their terms of employment and how those terms are negotiated, in particular through mechanisms of collective bargaining and the role of trade → unions. Paradigmatic examples of labour rights attached to the individual worker might include guarantees of fair and safe conditions of work, the prohibition of certain forms of → discrimination, and protections against unjustified dismissal. Collective labour rights include the right to → freedom of association, in particular in relation to trade unions, the right to bargain collectively, and the right to strike. Such collective rights might belong to individual workers, or to collective organizations, in particular trade unions, themselves. Labour rights are an aspect of a broader field of law, labour law, which emerged in many countries in the 19th century and early 20th century. Labour law was, and is, primarily concerned with the regulation of the terms of work according to different principles from those which apply to ordinary commercial contracts. The primary function of labour rights to guarantee certain minimum standards and other entitlements for workers. In many legal traditions, the emergence and idea of labour rights are intrinsically linked to organized labour and the trade union movement, and this is recognized in many constitutional systems through the institutionalization of representatives of workers and employers in ?pluralist? pseudo-legislative structures which are charged with the production of the norms which govern certain aspects of employment. Much legislation in the field of labour law in many legal systems is developed within ordinary legislation rather than at constitutional level, however labour rights and constitutions interact in a series of ways. This entry is concerned primarily with the relationship between labour rights and constitutions and/or constitutional law, rather than focusing labour rights more generally within different constitutional orders. The relationship between labour rights and constitutional law is often a complex one for a variety of reasons. There are several distinct but connected tendencies in the relationship between labour rights and constitutional law. The most obvious and visible connection is the placing of different types of labour rights within constitutional documents and the emergence of certain labour rights as ?constitutional? in status, phenomena which themselves have numerous distinct variations across history and between jurisdictions. A second important relationship between labour rights and constitutional law is the tension between certain labour rights and other entrenched constitutional values or fundamental rights within the same legal order, a tension which has sometimes resulted in jurisprudence regarding the constitutional legality of certain labour rights. Thirdly, there is the application in certain legal systems of other constitutional rights or values to the employment relationship, sometimes through their → horizontal application to private law employment relationships with a consequent impact on the content of labour rights or their entrenched status.

Although neither legal order deliberately set out to deal with complex matters of labour law, the European Union (EU or Union) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or Convention) have both had a large impact, in one way or another, on labour law matters. By creating an (admittedly complex) external supervisory system to review the legality of EU action, while also internalising the values the Convention within the EU legal order, the Union's formal accession to the ECHR is an(other) important constitutional moment for the EU in several respects, all of which deserve careful consideration. In the field of labour law in particular, an embedded inclusion of human rights-type guarantees into the EU legal order has long been advocated by many commentators to counterbalance a perceived prioritisation of market freedoms. This chapter seeks to understand how accession will affect the EU legal order, building on three constitutionalâ models through which we can understand EU law and the ECHR. In what way will accession affect our constitutional understanding of the Union, and how will this affect labour law? Much constitutional theorising regarding the EU has focused on two broad models of constitution: a hierarchy-based model which stems from the autonomous nature of EU law and the constitutional role of the EU Treaties, and a value-based model which considers the interaction of competing legal sources and their principled resolution. It will be argued that while the ECHR will not affect the hierarchical supremacy of EU law by virtue of the ECHR's particular legal structure, its new supervisory role and embedded constitutional values will inevitably impact upon labour law in the EU. However, this chapter argues that a third, much neglected, model of constitution must be grasped to understand the place of labour law in the EU. Labour law is here presented as part of an industrial constitution, stressing the law's constitutive function with regard to social actors and the market. It will be demonstrated that the impact of rights-based judicial supervision of the Union will be inherently limited on the industrial constitution, as this supervisory structure embodies a purely liberal vision of constitutional review which can police actors and norms, but cannot directly reconstitute market actors according to constitutional values such as democracy, dignity or solidarity. As significant as the constitutional moment of accession might be, transformative reform of EU labour law is unlikely to come, in the first instance, from accession to the ECHR, and is ultimately dependent on a legislative restructuring of the internal market of the EU, and in particular an incorporation of values of citizenship into the market. Accession my cast light upon the need for such reforms, but is intrinsically limited in its ability to achieve these changes.

The "Race Directive," along with the rest of the recent European Union expansion of its body of equality law, was welcomed with huge acclaim and fanfare, predictably by the Commission, but also by much academic writing. Now that this has subsided, it is necessary to engage in a sober analysis of the contents of the directive. Although the directive has been seen as embodying a huge shift in conceptions of equality and discrimination, and as part of an emerging European social citizenship, a closer examination of the provisions of the directive reveals something quite different: an ambivalence towards broader reaching conceptions of equality, a repeating of the mistakes of the past, and a series of delegations of key decisions regarding the potentially most progressive aspects of the legislation to other actors. This article suggests that whereas the directive contains many positive aspects, to a large extent it represents an exercise in passing the buck, given the hollowness of many of the seemingly expansive provisions. This means that our focus must shift onto member states and other actors, who have traditionally been conspicuously inactive in the field of race discrimination.

Abstract
This article argues that law is an inherently modernist normative practice. Constructing a vision of Modernism which is at once an epistemology and an attitudinal disposition to doubt and make anew our assumptions about the world, the authors demonstrate that legal practice encounters the world through individual cases. Through these examples, the law is capable of both interacting with and comprehending that world, while also being forced to question the law's own precepts and their application. In this manner, the law's generalisations and abstractions become concrete, and can indeed be upended, through fleeting, impressionistic and highly case-specific examples. This exemplarity within law explains how law is able to navigate its apparently contradictory aspirations and natures which have bedevilled legal philosophy for millennia. In reality, law exists within a series of polarities, rather than contradictions, which are navigated through the law's encounters with examples from the extra-legal world. The authors conclude that this aspect of the law's nature also has practical consequences, requiring the law to maintain the fora in which new and novel cases are heard, and through which law's modernist spirit can thrive.

Introduction: Impure theories of custom and law -- PART 1: Custom, law and legality -- 1. Custom and primitivity: On the unity of the legal technique -- 2. A three-dimensional ontology of customs -- 3. Land tenure and irrigation in North Vietnam's mountainous regions: Rights outside the law? -- PART 2: Codifying customs in the face of social change -- 4. Oral custom: At the origin or at the fringes of law? -- 5. A written customary law among the Rwa in Tanzania -- 6. Are all informal normative facts custom? The ideological dimensions of company customs -- 7. Law, custom and social change in New Caledonia: A case-study: Gender reassignment on the customary civil register -- PART 3: Custom, law and property rights -- 8. When land and sky turn French: Is there any place left for the Bunong when private land property disrupts customary spaces along the Vietnamese-Cambodian border? -- 9. Proof and test: The construction of customary land in New Caledonia -- 10. Customary land rules in French Provence from the Ancien Régime to our days.

The results leading to this publication have received funding from the Innovative Medicines Initiative 2 Joint Undertaking under grant agreement No 777394 for the project AIMS-2-TRIALS. This Joint Undertaking receives support from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme and EFPIA and AUTISM SPEAKS, Autistica, SFARI. The funders had no role in the design of the study; in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript; or in the decision to publish the results. Any views expressed are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the funders.

ABSTRACTLooking at caregivers' faces is important for early social development, and there is a concomitant increase in neural correlates of attention to familiar versus novel faces in the first 6 months. However, by 12 months of age brain responses may not differentiate between familiar and unfamiliar faces. Traditional group‐based analyses do not examine whether these 'null' findings stem from a true lack of preference within individual infants, or whether groups of infants show individually strong but heterogeneous preferences for familiar versus unfamiliar faces. In a preregistered proof‐of‐principle study, we applied Neuroadaptive Bayesian Optimisation (NBO) to test how individual infants' neural responses vary across faces differing in familiarity. Sixty‐one 5–12‐month‐olds viewed faces resulting from gradually morphing a familiar (primary caregiver) into an unfamiliar face. Electroencephalography (EEG) data from fronto‐central channels were analysed in real‐time. After the presentation of each face, the Negative central (Nc) event‐related potential (ERP) amplitude was calculated. A Bayesian Optimisation algorithm iteratively selected the next stimulus until it identified the stimulus eliciting the strongest Nc for that infant. Attrition (15%) was lower than in traditional studies (22%). Although there was no group‐level Nc‐difference between familiar versus unfamiliar faces, an optimum was predicted in 85% of the children, indicating individual‐level attentional preferences. Traditional analyses based on infants' predicted optimum confirmed NBO can identify subgroups based on brain activation. Optima were not related to age and social behaviour. NBO suggests the lack of overall familiar/unfamiliar‐face attentional preference in middle infancy is explained by heterogeneous preferences, rather than a lack of preference within individual infants.

The results leading to this publication have received funding from the Innovative Medicines Initiative 2 Joint Undertaking under grant agreement No 777394 for the project AIMS-2-TRIALS. This Joint Undertaking receives support from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme and EFPIA and AUTISM SPEAKS, Autistica, SFARI. The funders had no role in the design of the study; in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript; or in the decision to publish the results. Any views expressed are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the funders.