Suchergebnisse

"In many European labour markets, temporary employment has become a sizeable phenomenon. We know that temporary contracts come with severe socio-economic disadvantages. But do they also affect political views and behaviour? Do temporary workers have distinct policy preferences? Do they lean towards specific parties? Or do they see themselves as politically excluded and respond with protest behaviour or abstention? It is these vital questions that The Political Behaviour of Temporary Workers addresses. Combining insights from psychology, political science and labour market research, it offers new theories and evidence on the political repercussions of temporary jobs, working with original and existing data to analyse social and labour market policy preferences, voting behaviour and levels of trust in politicians"--

The classic literary utopias -- The Amana, the Rappites and New Harmony -- The Shakers -- The Oneida Community -- Walden Two -- The Twin Oaks Community -- Other contemporary intentional communities

Many observers have noticed the importance of anger in contemporary politics, particularly with reference to populism. This article addresses the question under which conditions people become angry about a specific aspect of their lives: their personal financial situation. Specifically, it asks if populist anti-elite rhetoric has a causal influence on anger and if this influence differs across socio-economic groups. The theoretical expectation is that anti-elite rhetoric allows people to externalize responsibility for an unfavorable financial situation and thereby to turn negative self-conscious emotions into anger. The argument is tested with original survey data from France, Germany, and the United States. The empirical analysis yields three main insights. First, negative emotional reactions to respondents' personal finances (and anger in particular) are surprisingly widespread in all three countries. Second, there is a pronounced socio-economic gradient in the distribution of anger and other negative emotions. Third, and most importantly, randomly exposing participants to populist anti-elite rhetoric causes considerably higher expressed anger about one's financial situation in France and Germany, but less so in the United States. This suggests a causal role of anti-elite rhetoric in stirring "pocketbook anger." This is true in particular in the middle classes. The notion that populist rhetoric reduces negative self-conscious emotions, such as shame, is not supported by the data.

Political behaviour research is divided into several explanatory approaches. They have in common that they disregard, to varying extents, the social bases of their explanatory concepts. To fill this void, the present article explores the theoretical advantages of applying Randal Collins's ritual theory to political behaviour. The central claim is that any cognitive factor, such as interests, values, norms or identities has to be infused with emotional resonance in concrete social interaction in order to become a relevant motivation for political behaviour. Based on this argument, the article develops four testable propositions and discusses how they relate to existing approaches. The article concludes that ritual-based emotions are a unified motivational basis for political behaviour, which help understand which cognitive factor becomes politically relevant in a specific situation. The theoretical discussion is complemented with suggestions of how to study political rituals empirically.

Many observers have noticed the importance of anger in contemporary politics, particularly with reference to populism. This article addresses the question under which conditions people become angry about a specific aspect of their lives: their personal financial situation. Specifically, it asks if populist anti-elite rhetoric has a causal influence on anger and if this influence differs across socio-economic groups. The theoretical expectation is that populist rhetoric allows people to externalize responsibility for an unfavorable financial situation and thereby to turn negative self-conscious emotions into anger. The argument is tested with original survey data from France, Germany, and the United States. The empirical analysis yields three main insights. First, negative emotional reactions to respondents' personal finances (and anger in particular) are surprisingly widespread in all three countries. Second, there is a pronounced socio-economic gradient in anger and other negative emotions. Third, and most importantly, randomly exposing participants to (mildly) populist anti-elite rhetoric causes considerably higher expressed anger about one's financial situation in France and Germany, but less so in the United States. This suggests a causal role of populist rhetoric in stirring 'pocketbook anger'. This is true in particular in the middle classes. The notion that populist rhetoric reduces negative self-conscious emotions, such as shame, is not supported by the data.

Political behaviour research is divided into several explanatory approaches. They have in common that they disregard, to varying extents, the social bases of their explanatory concepts. To fill this void, the present article explores the theoretical advantages of applying Randal Collins's ritual theory to political behaviour. The central claim is that any cognitive factor, such as interests, values, norms or identities has to be infused with emotional resonance in concrete social interaction in order to become a relevant motivation for political behaviour. Based on this argument, the article develops four testable propositions and discusses how they relate to existing approaches. The article concludes that ritual-based emotions are a unified motivational basis for political behaviour, which help understand which cognitive factor becomes politically relevant in a specific situation. The theoretical discussion is complemented with suggestions of how to study political rituals empirically.

"Adding to the recent debate on insider-outsider politics, the article provides a novel theory of how non-standard employment affects voting behavior. While existing theories stress effects on ideological position and rely on a spatial model of party choice, it argues that labor market status can also affect variables relevant in a valence model. Based on the concept of relative deprivation, it argues that non-standard workers with a poor job situation tend to hold the government responsible and punish it at the polls. The article makes a theoretical contribution by integrating elements from political economy, electoral behavior and social psychology. The argument is tested for temporary workers in the 2009 German general election. The findings lend support to the theory: compared to permanent workers, temporary workers in this election were more likely to hold the government responsible for their poor economic situation and vote against it." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

The political economy literature has gathered compelling evidence that labour market risks shape political preferences. Accordingly, insecurity fuels support for redistribution and left parties. This article analyses this argument for temporary workers, a so far neglected risk category which has increased dramatically in the past two decades. Temporary workers also have been in the focus of recent insider-outsider debates. Some authors in this line of research have argued that temporary work leads to political disenchantment -- for example, non-instrumental responses such as vote abstention or protest voting. This contradicts risk-based explanations of political preferences. The article discusses both theoretical perspectives and derives conflicting hypotheses for the empirical analysis of temporary workers' policy and party preferences. The review reveals considerable ambiguity regarding the questions which parties temporary workers can be expected to support and what the underlying motives for party choice are. Synthesising arguments from both perspectives, the article proposes an alternative argument according to which temporary workers are expected to support the 'new' left -- that is, green and other left-libertarian parties. It is argued that this party family combines redistributive policies with outsider-friendly policy design. Using individual-level data from the European Social Survey for 15 European countries, the article supports this argument by showing that temporary, compared to permanent, workers exhibit higher demand for redistribution and stronger support for the new left. Neither the risk-based nor the insider-outsider explanations receive full support. In particular, no signs of political disenchantment of temporary workers can be found. Thus, the findings challenge central claims of the insider-outsider literature. Adapted from the source document.

This article sheds light on the so far under-researched effect of subjective job insecurity on social policy preferences and the moderating role of employability. Using pooled individual-level data from the European Social Survey for workers from 11 Western European countries, it shows that subjective job insecurity does increase demand for redistribution. This effect is conditional upon employability perceptions, that is, expectations about future employment prospects. The impact of job insecurity on redistribution is strongest for workers who fear long-term unemployment. The findings do not seem to be driven by underlying political belief systems as they are robust in a reduced sample of centrist non-partisan workers. While the results confirm the hypothesised repercussions of labour-market flexibility on the individual level, aggregate effects should not be exaggerated, since the segment of workers exposed to job insecurity and low employability at the same time is rather small.