Prosociality spillovers of working with others
In: Journal of economic behavior & organization, Band 155, S. 205-216
ISSN: 1879-1751, 0167-2681
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In: Journal of economic behavior & organization, Band 155, S. 205-216
ISSN: 1879-1751, 0167-2681
In: Economics of education review, Band 77, S. 102010
ISSN: 0272-7757
How do radical reforms of the state shape economic development over time? In 1790, France's first Constituent Assembly overhauled the kingdom's organization to set up new administrative entities and local capitals. In a subset of departments, new capitals were chosen quasi-randomly as the Assembly abandoned its initial plan to rotate administrative functions across multiple cities. We study how exogenous changes in local administrative presence affect the state's coercive and productive capacity, as well as economic development in the ensuing decades. In the short run, proximity to the state increases taxation, conscription, and investments in law enforcement capacity. In the long run, the new capitals and their periphery obtain more public goods and experience faster economic development. One hundred years after the reform, capitals are 40% more populated than comparable cities in 1790. Our results shed new light on the intertemporal and redistributive impacts of state-building in the context of one of the most ambitious administrative reforms ever implemented.
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We estimate effects of the Pell Grant - the largest U.S. federal grant for college students - using administrative data from Texas public colleges and a discontinuity in grant generosity for low-income students. Within four-year institutions, eligibility for additional grant aid significantly increases first-time students' degree completion and later earnings. Our estimated impacts on earnings alone are enough to fully recoup government expenditures within 10 years, suggesting that financial aid likely pays for itself several times over.
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We estimate the effect of grant aid on poor college students' attainment and earnings using student-level administrative data from four-year public colleges in Texas. To identify these effects, we exploit a discontinuity in grant generosity as a function of family income. Eligibility for the maximum Pell Grant significantly increases degree receipt and earnings beginning four years after entry. Within 10 years, imputed taxes on eligible students' earnings gains fully recoup total government expenditures generated by initial eligibility. To clarify how these estimates relate to social welfare, we develop a general theoretical model and derive sufficient statistics for the welfare implications of changes in the price of college. Whether additional grant aid increases welfare depends on (1) net externalities from recipients' behavioral responses and (2) a direct effect of mitigating credit constraints or other frictions that inflate students' in-school marginal utility. Calibrating our model using nationally representative consumption data suggests that increasing grant aid for the average college student by $1 could generate negative externalities as high as $0.50 and still improve welfare. Applying our welfare formula and estimated direct effects to our setting and others suggests considerable welfare gains from grants that target low-income students.
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