Suchergebnisse

A recently established field of political studies aims at explaining historical events through models drawn from Rational Choice & Game Theory. This blend between history & theory is now generally indicated as Analytic Narratives, which is the name of an influent book published a few years ago. In this essay the author applies the approach of analytic narratives to the period immediately after WWII when the anti-Fascist parties alliance was superseded by majority governments between the Christian Democratic Party & its smaller moderate allies & the Socialist & the Communist parties were excluded from government. The paper maintains that that passage can be analyzed through the debates in the constitutional assembly elected in June 1946. It focuses on the question of the relations between the Italian Republic & the Vatican State. The Communist Party, contrary to general expectations, voted in favor of the Catholic position that eventually prevailed. The paper makes use of well-known historical documents to plot parties' positions in the political space. Then the author explains the unexpected Communist choice considering its unwillingness to face religious confrontation, & its hope to be accepted as a long-term government partner by the Catholic Party. On the basis of the spatial theory of rational voting, the paper shows that both hypotheses are consistent with the preferences of the parties & their view of the political situation. This choice reveals the disregard of the Communist Party toward the Socialist & the other Left parties, a theoretical finding confirmed by historical research. 2 Tables, 6 Figures, 45 References. Adapted from the source document.

IntroduzioneTra gli scienziati sociali che operano oggi in Italia l'espressione «teorie razionali della politica» può far pensare a Max Weber e alla sua concezione del carattere razionale del potere legale con apparato amministrativo burocratico.

Despite a growing interest in investigating the causes of political corruption, far less attention has been devoted to analysing the conditions under which political actors have an incentive to highlight corruption in electoral competition. Do parties talk about corruption just as a reaction to exogenous factors (i.e. scandals reported in the press)? Or are there systematic patterns in the way parties emphasize this issue during campaigns? Assuming that corruption is a valence issue (i.e. an issue universally supported/disclaimed by electors), we put our investigation in the framework of a one-dimensional model and hypothesize that spatial considerations can affect parties' incentives to emphasize corruption issues. Empirical analysis based on CMP data shows that such an incentive exists for both cabinet and non-cabinet parties, and increases with proximity on the ideological scale.