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In recent years, the role of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) in automotive has been accentuated, as services requiring vehicle-to-infrastructure ("V2I") networks to communicate with off-board software have been multiplying. While current legislation, policies and network infrastructure generally limit such off-board services to infotainment (for example in-vehicle hotspots for media streaming, web browsing from passenger mobile devices) for safety and security reasons, many industry analysts but also the research community predict that the automotive landscape of 2025 will be different. Next generation mobile networks are expected to provide the necessary quality of service (e.g. low latency, high throughput) to support a broad range of applications, from infotainment to mission-critical telematic applications that involve partial or full remote vehicle control. At the same time, such mission-critical applications have already started to appear as Proof-of-Concepts (PoCs), in controlled environments (for example controlled sections of highways, or test tracks). In this paper, we investigate the role of Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) in such applications. The paper starts from an overview of the current status of automotive/ICT industry from a market, policy and technology perspective. Subsequently, we present results from a study of two use cases performed within Ericsson Research. The authors use learnings from these use cases and the current industry status to form a general understanding on the challenges that MNOs will face as network infrastructure providers for automotive applications, as well as strategic options for MNOs to address these challenges.

Cooperation between Mobile Network Operators (MNO), as competing entities, has become a solution to overcome lack of revenue by reducing expenditures during recent years; where theses cooperation patterns consist of horizontal and vertical models. As much as all these models apply in macrocell networks, they are all applicable in smallcell networks as well, but it is observed that smallcells are still deployed in single operator patterns. On the other hand, telecom regulatory authorities are always concerned about cooperation between operators since they prefer fare distribution of market power among competing operators. The idea to stimulate competition, in order to bring maximum profit for end users, is an ultimate goal for regulators. At the same time, regulators are worried if a high level of collaboration between operators introduces new dilemmas such as creating closed clubs with significant market power. In this paper we first discuss interpretations of national European telecom regulators from the European electronic communications regulatory framework, which is considered as a reference for all countries. Surprisingly, we see that European countries have different interpretations of the same European framework while transposing it into their regulations. Next, the effect of these regulations that are either pro or against cooperation in smallcell networks is investigated. We conclude by presenting the idea that European regulators may need to revise their legislations by considering regulation for promoting smallcell wholesale network sharing as the proper solution.

Cooperation between Mobile Network Operators (MNO), as competing entities, has become a solution to overcome lack of revenue by reducing expenditures during recent years; where theses cooperation patterns consist of horizontal and vertical models. As much as all these models apply in macrocell networks, they are all applicable in smallcell networks as well, but it is observed that smallcells are still deployed in single operator patterns. On the other hand, telecom regulatory authorities are always concerned about cooperation between operators since they prefer fare distribution of market power among competing operators. The idea to stimulate competition, in order to bring maximum profit for end users, is an ultimate goal for regulators. At the same time, regulators are worried if a high level of collaboration between operators introduces new dilemmas such as creating "closed clubs" with significant market power. In this paper we first discuss interpretations of national European telecom regulators from the European electronic communications regulatory framework, which is considered as a reference for all countries. Surprisingly, we see that European countries have different interpretations of the same European framework while transposing it into their regulations. Next, the effect of these regulations that are either pro or against cooperation in smallcell networks is investigated. We conclude by presenting the idea that European regulators may need to revise their legislations by considering regulation for promoting smallcell wholesale network sharing as the proper solution. ; QC 20131217

A Licensed Shared Access (LSA) authorization/license includes an agreement between the secondary sharing user (some type of operator) and the primary license holder (e.g. a government organization) around the conditions of use (where, when, how). Compared to secondary access LSA offers a more attractive case for long term investments. The contribution in this paper is that we look into how LSA can be used by different types of actors. The outcome depends heavily on what type of actor that makes use of the spectrum using LSA. Based on cost structure analysis (leading to required investments) and analysis of availability of the basic spectrum resource we can identify clear differences of the commercial usability of spectrum awarded using LSA, all depending on what actors that make use of the LSA contract. Cases where new actors need to invest a lot in new infrastructure do not that look that promising. We cannot identify a separate LSA business case that is feasible from a business perspective (where the key resource for the operator is spectrum awarded using LSA). Service availability that cannot be guaranteed due to LSA type of spectrum being the only resource seems risky, especially when combined with high investments. However this applies only for outdoor deployment. For deployment of a new indoor network the situation is different. The cost structure is the same no matter if a new or existing actor deploys the networks. In addition, a multitude of spectrum bands and spectrum access options exist indoor so the service provisioning will be less vulnerable if some part of spectrum is not available some period of time.

Spectrum is a key factor for network deployments, since it determines the capacity of thenetwork. Nonetheless, spectrum is a limited natural resource, i.e. a finite, non-exhaustiblecommon resource. In order to fulfill the high performance targets of future mobile broadband(MBB) systems, a more efficient use and more effective management of spectrum resources haveto be developed.Licensed Shared Access is a new complementary spectrum access scheme that allows for thesharing of partially used licensed spectrum from an incumbent (e.g. a government organization),by a limited number of "LSA licensees" (e.g. Mobile Network Operators). The LSA agreementfollows pre-defined dynamic or static sharing conditions, that determine where, when and how touse the incumbent's spectrum.The implementation of Licensed Shared Access needs the support of a very good regulatoryframework and follow the harmonized spectrum pathway. Spectral harmonization or the uniformallocation of frequency bands across an entire region lowers the technology costs, making iteasier for any country to consider its implementation. Once adopted throughout the regions,economies of scale are achieved.The approach taken in this research covers the interrelations between technical, market andregulatory conditions in Latin America, in order to present the possible value LSA could bring tothe region. The research showed how the region still has a vast amount of spectrum to beallocated as exclusive spectrum, which is preferred by operators. The low mobile broadbandpenetration in most of the region is another factor for the low value of LSA at the time of thisstudy. ; Qc 20150205 ; METIS