Suchergebnisse

It should come as no surprise that both the amount and pace of administrative work that
departments must accomplish at almost all higher education institutions has increased
substantially over the past 10 years. If this is news to you just talk to your department
administrator—if she/he has time to have a pleasant conversation. After all, for most
institutions, operations budgets have been cut and professional and classified staff have
been reduced, while at the same time, administrative work has escalated in response to
increases in student enrollments, greater demands for accountability, the increasing
importance of fund raising efforts, and the generation of sponsored research. No wonder that
the lives of department chairs, administrators, and other professional and classified staff
have become more challenging. The increase in administrative work at the department level is
largely a function of increases in administrative mandates.

Endowing agents that prefer co-operative outcomes with asymmetric power substantially increases the chances that both co-operative agents survive and that co-operative worlds evolve across a variety of structural settings of conflict and co-operation present in international relations; particularly when agents are endowed with the ability to selectively interact with other agents. These results are consistent with the general finding that non-compulsory play consistently helps co-operators. The question addressed in this analysis is whether or not asymmetric power also helps exploitive agents in the same structural settings; a question heretofore not analysed. Contrary to expectations, the simulation results reported here suggest that exploitive agents benefit from asymmetric power only in very restricted circumstances – circumstances relatively unlikely to occur in international relations. In effect, there is an asymmetry in the benefits of asymmetric power.