Suchergebnisse

Dans cet article, nous montrons comment l'introduction d'une contrainte financière dans le problème de maximisation de l'utilité espérée d'un agriculteur modifie ses décisions d'investissement. Bien que supposé intrinsèquement neutre au risque, l'agriculteur va se comporter comme un agent risquophobe ou risquophile, selon que ses liquidités initiales sont suffisantes ou insuffisantes pour honorer ses engagements de fin de période. De tels choix sont dus à la discontinuité de la fonction d'utilité apparente. Nous analysons ses choix d'investissement face à un projet risqué indivisible, puis lorsqu'il dispose d'une fonction de production stochastique à un intrant. Les modifications des conditions d'accès aux marchés financiers peuvent s'avérer être un outil de politique économique intéressant.

Dans cet article, nous montrons comment l'introduction d'une contrainte financière dans le problème de maximisation de l'utilité espérée d'un agriculteur modifie ses décisions d'investissement. Bien que supposé intrinsèquement neutre au risque, l'agriculteur va se comporter comme un agent risquophobe ou risquophile, selon que ses liquidités initiales sont suffisantes ou insuffisantes pour honorer ses engagements de fin de période. De tels choix sont dus à la discontinuité de la fonction d'utilité apparente. Nous analysons ses choix d'investissement face à un projet risqué indivisible, puis lorsqu'il dispose d'une fonction de production stochastique à un intrant. Les modifications des conditions d'accès aux marchés financiers peuvent s'avérer être un outil de politique économique intéressant.

The broad structure of Modified National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (mNAIS), the main crop insurance program in India, is technically sound and appropriate in the context of India. The NAIS is based on an indexed approach, where average crop yield of an insurance unit, or IU, (i.e., block) is the index used. The insurance is mandatory for all farmers that borrow from financial institutions, though insurance cover is also available to non-borrowers. The actual yield of the insured crop (as measured by crop cutting experiments) in the IU is compared to the threshold yield. If the former is lower than the latter, all insured farmers in the IU are eligible for the same rate of indemnity payout. Individual crop insurance will have been prohibitively expensive, or even impossible, in a country such as India with so many small and marginal farms. Further, the method of using an 'area based approach' has several other merits and, most importantly, it mitigates moral hazard and adverse selection. This report offers detailed analysis of a number of technical and operational issues which should be addressed if mNAIS is to be implemented. GOI is to be complemented on its bold vision of the future of agriculture insurance through modifying NAIS, an action which, if well implemented, has the potential for significant economic and political economy gains. The policy note World Bank (2010) supported this vision and offered specific policy recommendations for mNAIS, with reference to the Joint Group report (2004). This technical report is intended as a complement to World Bank (2010) and also to the previous technical report World Bank (2007a), by offering detailed technical analysis of a number of issues that will be critical to the success of mNAIS.

Intro -- Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Glossary -- Overview -- Toward a Country Catastrophe Risk Financing Framework -- Why Should Donors Intervene in Catastrophe Risk Markets? -- How Should Donors Intervene in Catastrophe Risk Markets? -- What Roles for the Donor Community? -- 1. Introduction -- Cost of Natural Disasters in Developing Countries -- Proactive Country Disaster Risk Management -- Toward a Country Catastrophe Risk Financing Framework -- Objectives -- 2. Market Imperfections and Catastrophe Insurance -- Basic Features of Catastrophe Insurance Markets -- Demand-Driven Market Imperfections -- Supply-Driven Market Imperfections -- Are Prices of Catastrophe Risk Transfer Instruments Excessive? -- Summary: Insurance Markets and Market Imperfections -- Notes -- 3. Principles for Public Intervention in the Catastrophe Insurance Markets -- Risks of Public Intervention in Catastrophe Insurance Markets -- Guiding Principles for Market Intervention -- Notes -- 4. Roles for the Donor Community -- Convening Power -- Promoter of Public Goods -- Provider of Technical Assistance for Innovative Catastrophe Risk Financing Solutions -- Financier -- References -- Appendixes -- Appendix 1. World Bank List of Economies -- Appendix 2. Reference Catastrophe Losses -- Appendix 3. Catastrophe Risk Modeling -- Introduction: Using Modeling to Manage Risk -- Methodology -- Risk Metrics -- Appendix 4. Catastrophe Risk Financing Projects Supported by the World Bank and Donors -- Appendix 5. Some Recent Catastrophe Risk Financing Initiatives Supported by the World Bank and Donors -- Property Catastrophe Insurance Programs for Homeowners -- Agricultural Insurance Programs -- Sovereign Risk Financing -- Notes -- References -- Appendix 6. Prototype Weather-Based Crop Insurance Policy -- Appendix 7. Commercial Catastrophe Risk Models.

We investigate the demand for insurance when contracts are subject, with positive probability, to two distinct types of incomplete performance. When partial performance means payment of some fraction of the indemnity under full performance, the latter exhibits a disappearing deductible. When partial performance is due to insufficient financial capacity, optimal insurance contracts, for any given level of financial capacity, offer full marginal coverage above a deductible. For either type of non‐performance, the optimal deductible under full performance is positive when insurance is offered at an actuarially fair price.