the origins and early evolution of the modern Japanese postal system "Making use of private energies" -- postwar commissioned postmasters and the politics of self-preservation Public servants with private interests -- the view from inside The commissioned postmasters -- The postwar postal regime and the failure of reform -- the Hashimoto reforms Setting the stage -- Koizumi Jun'Ichiro and the politics of postal privatization -- the revenge of the postal regime Conclusion -- Reference matter -- Works cited -- Index
Why has Japan failed to fulfill the mission of its 2005 postal privatization legislation? The answer is informal institutions that empower the postmasters within the electoral system and facilitate the mobilization of elites on behalf of anti-reformist goals. To support this claim, I analyze three such institutions: the postmasters' ownership of postal facilities; the re-employment of former bureaucrats by the postal system and of top postal employees elsewhere in the system; and sales and vote-mobilization quotas. Theoretically, this study analyzes four sources of informal institutional resilience following formal institutional change: the heretofore understudied participation of officialdom in the introduction, communication, and enforcement of informal institutions; the establishment of such institutions prior to new formal rules; institutional duplication across economic sectors; and institutional complementarities.
What explains the electoral staying power of many Japanese interest groups in the wake of electoral reform? Electoral explanations provide part of the answer; candidates in elections to both houses of the Diet continue to face incentives—many of them unintended—to court the organized vote. But missing from such accounts is an explanation of why economically noncompetitive groups provide the bulk of such support. The primary reason for this, I argue, is organization. As a result of their historical linkages to the bureaucracy, many interests developed hierarchical, national organizational structures that enabled them to carry out a variety of vote-gathering functions that the parties had trouble performing themselves. Although electoral reform and long-term demographic trends have weakened the electoral influence of interest groups, these organizational complementarities between groups and the parties continue to matter in Japanese elections—including under conditions of two-party competition. To illustrate these points, I trace the evolution of interest group politics from the era of LDP dominance through the rise of two-party competition and the LDP's recent return to power, using postmasters associations and agricultural cooperatives as case studies.
Although scholars have long been interested in the relationships among civil society, the state and the market in advanced industrial democracies, the implications of state disengagement from the affairs of private firms for civil society have yet to be explored in the contemporary literature. My purpose in this essay has been to address this issue by examining the effects of deregulation on Japanese consumer society, paying particular attention to how legislative and bureaucratic changes in the wake of regulatory reform have affected consumer relations with business and, more significantly, state actors.
Although Japan scholars have long been aware that media institutions facilitate state efforts to curtail the free flow of information within Japanese society, Closing the Shop is the first comprehensive treatment of this important topic. The book was well worth the wait.
