Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Half-title -- Series-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Theory and Historical Context -- The Generalized Other: Social Influence in Contemporary American Politics -- Beyond Personal Influence: The Rise of Impersonal Associations -- The Origins of Perceptions of Mass Collectives: Mass Media's Role -- Effects of Perceptions of Mass Experience -- The Politicization of Personal and Collective Experience -- Connecting the Personal and the Political: Media as Facilitator or Inhibitor? -- Effects of Perceptions of Mass Opinion -- When Does Success Succeed? A Review of the Evidence -- The Social Psychology of Impersonal Influence from Collective Opinion -- The Role of Collective Opinion in Individual Judgment: Processes and Effects -- Conclusion -- Impersonal Influence and the Mass Society Tradition -- Appendix: Methodology -- References -- Index.

Using a measure designed to capture intolerance on both sides of the political spectrum, I find that opinions favoring the abridgement of free speech rights are overwhelmingly targeted at right-leaning groups, and racist groups in particular. Consistent with recent studies, Democrats are found to be less tolerant than Republicans of speech they dislike. However, contrary to existing findings, the same patterns of intolerance are present for both racist and nonracist target groups. Treating racist groups as an exception to the principle of free expression may have resulted in a spillover to intolerance of other disliked groups.

Few Americans change their choice of presidential candidate to a different political party from election to election. This study evaluates whether and in what direction the Black Lives Matter movement affected the small percentage of voters whose presidential votes changed from 2016 to 2020. Six waves of nationally representative probability surveys are used to establish that significant increases in the extent to which Americans perceived discrimination against Blacks and to which people favored more government efforts to address racial inequality both occurred in 2020. Using panel data, results suggest that increases in perceptions of racial inequality significantly increased the probability of vote switching toward the Democratic candidate. Attention to racial injustice also primed voters to rely more heavily on this issue when evaluating candidates.

Whether American citizens hold presidents accountable for changes in the condition of the economy has increasingly been questioned. At the same time, the outcome of the 2016 election has been widely interpreted in economic terms. Press and pundits on both sides of the aisle have endorsed the "left behind" voter thesis suggesting that those who were economically dissatisfied or anxious voted against the incumbent party and thus elected Donald Trump. Likewise, some have argued that Trump would have won again in 2021 if not for the economic downturn caused by the COVID19 pandemic. In this study I use seven waves of nationally-representative panel data to examine change over time in individuals' perceptions of the economy across the two most recent presidential election periods. I compare the magnitude of change from partisan rationalization of the economy to the magnitude of changes in perceptions due to the record-breaking decline in GDP during the year that COVID19 hit the US. My results provide little to no evidence that changes in perceptions due to real economic change were strong enough to overcome the effects of partisan rationalization. Given that the COVID19 recession was unusually severe, these results provide little reason for optimism that voters can hold leaders accountable for economic change.

What difference does it make if people attribute the loss of manufacturing jobs to trade as opposed to automation? Attributions of responsibility for social problems help shape mass opinion. In this study I use two experiments, including one nationally representative probability survey-experiment, to examine the consequences of attributing job loss to trade versus automation. Findings suggest that as of 2018, public discourse attributes manufacturing job loss in America primarily to trade. When I experimentally manipulate attributions of responsibility for job loss, I find important consequences for levels of mass support for international trade, the extent of negative emotions arising from job loss, and beliefs that trade restrictions and tariffs can bring back manufacturing jobs. Finally, job loss that is attributed to trade—even when it is a single job loss—also serves as a threat to the national ingroup, which triggers a heightened sense of national superiority among white Americans.

ABSTRACTFew empirical studies suggest that fictional stories can influence political opinions. Nonetheless, in this study I demonstrate the relevance of Harry Potter consumption to oppositional attitudes toward Donald Trump and his worldview. Using multivariate observational models and panel data from 2014 to 2016, results suggest that the lessons of the Harry Potter series have influenced levels of opposition to punitive policies and support for tolerance of groups considered outside the American mainstream. Further, they predict public reactions to Donald Trump above and beyond their influence on policies consistent with his views.

AbstractUsing the most extensive dataset available on the 2008 election, I examine the impact of dog ownership on presidential vote preference. Canines were elevated to the status of a campaign issue when, during the 2008 campaign, Barack Obama publicly promised his daughters a dog after the election was over, a campaign promise that has since been fulfilled. However, this announcement appears to have unintentionally highlighted the absence of a key point of potential identification between this candidate and voters, and thus to have significantly undermined the likelihood that dog-owning voters would support Obama. I elaborate upon the implications of this finding for future presidential candidates.

To further dialogue between theory and research on deliberative democracy, I advocate abandoning tests of deliberative theory per se and instead developing "middle-range" theories that are each important, specifiable, and falsifiable parts of deliberative democratic theory. By replacing vaguely defined entities with more concrete, circumscribed concepts, and by requiring empirically and theoretically grounded hypotheses about specific relationships between those concepts, researchers may come to understand which elements of the deliberative experience are crucial to particular valued outcomes. Adapted from the source document.