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Economic development and social welfare depend on the existence of effective and efficient infrastructure systems, particularly in health, energy, transportation and water, many of which are developed and managed through Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). However, empirical evidence suggests some pitfalls in the use of these PPP arrangements. This book addresses these issues, focusing on mostly three key questions: How to improve the robustness of the decision-making process leading to the option of PPP? How to improve contract management as the longest phase of the process? How can contracts

Economic development and social welfare depend on the existence of effective and efficient infrastructure systems, particularly in health, energy, transportation and water, many of which are developed and managed through Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). However, empirical evidence suggests some pitfalls in the use of these PPP arrangements. This book addresses these issues, focusing on mostly three key questions: How to improve the robustness of the decision-making process leading to the option of PPP? How to improve contract management as the longest phase of the process? How can contracts be improved to accommodate uncertainty and avoid harmful renegotiations? The authors explore the concept of flexible contracts, the uncertainty modeling for improving the robustness of the decision-making process, and develop an overall framework for effective contract management, along with a comprehensive analysis of current renegotiation patterns. The ultimate goal is to improve the contractual performance, as well as the overall infrastructure management and social welfare.

ABSTRACTStreet lighting is a classic example of a public good, and governments are extensively involved in its provision. Adequate lighting facilitates both car traffic and personal safety while improving an urban area's character. However, many systems are mismanaged and obsolete, incurring high energy costs and emissions with relatively low lighting quality. Public authorities facing budget constraints often find retrofitting old street‐lighting systems challenging. They have two options: either direct in‐house, public‐authority renovation or contracting with a private company through a public–private partnership (PPP). Although private‐sector‐participation approaches vary, most public authorities can now enter into a street‐light modernization PPP agreement. That can be a win‐win option for both the public and private sectors. The upfront investment is small and operational expenses outweigh capital expenses, generating lower payback periods and energy‐cost reduction with light‐emitting diode (LED) technology. Little public expenditure is necessary when private partners are compensated via shared energy savings. We analyze the Detroit street‐light PPP – the United States' first – and find that PPPs are practical for retrofitting US street lights and in other countries where they are antiquated.

There is a global trend for local governments to engage in public‐private partnerships (PPPs) to provide infrastructures and public services. Light rails, water systems, waste management, schools, sport centres, social housing, are just a few examples of sectors where the private sector is becoming more actively involved with local authorities. Most of these engagements are done through mixed companies and contractual concessions. Both suffer from a major shortcoming – renegotiations. Contracts are often renegotiated within few years after signature, and some evidence show that the results might not protect the public interest. This paper tries to understand how and why renegotiations of local concessions happen by looking at the specific characteristics of contracts (endogenous determinants). To illustrate the discussion, a case study from a light rail system is analysed, exemplifying the effect of a contractual renegotiation. The authors argue that contractual renegotiation can be useful in decreasing contract incompleteness, but a poor design of these clauses can allow for opportunistic behaviour by concessionaires.