Suchergebnisse

The article shows how new policy tools are designed in the Mediterranean countries for the monitoring of research and innovation. It relies on the results of a large European project, ESTIME, funded by the European Union that aimed at describing the state of research and technology policies and systems of partner countries in the Mediterranean. Other initiatives are also mentioned that aimed at gathering information on research and innovation systems in the Middle East and North African countries (MENA). The article presents the importance of the European Union as a reference for this monitoring activity. It also shows that the new tools, for example, innovation surveys, are a part of the policy process itself. Finally, it presents the main characteristics of public policies, their recent turn toward innovation and the effects that these policies have had on the institutions and actors promoting innovation which we propose to call the 'innovation world'. Two examples are presented in more detail, Tunisia and Morocco, since both countries have been actively promoting innovation policies and have developed innovation surveys.

L'objet de cet article est d'évaluer le niveau de développement atteint par quatre pays MEDA (l'Égypte, la Jordanie, le Maroc et la Tunisie) en termes d'innovation. Malgré le fait que les contours d'un tel concept fassent encore l'objet de discussions et de controverses, nous avons choisi d'aborder ce sujet selon une optique particulière : celle de la gouvernance des politiques Maghreb-Machrek , N? 202, Hiver 2009-2010 d'innovation. Cette approche nous semble la plus adaptée au contexte de pays où « un système national d'innovation », dans son acception la plus stricte, n'est pas encore de mise. Les résultats auxquels nous aboutissons montrent que même s'il est incontestable qu'il existe aujourd'hui une volonté politique réelle dans la plupart des pays de la région à développer leur économie par l'intermédiaire des leviers de la R&D et de l'innovation, néanmoins les maillons faibles de leur système sont encore nombreux : la politique de l'État a surtout servi à développer la recherche publique alors que les tentatives récentes relatives à la mise en place d'une politique nationale d'innovation sont restées sans effets notables sur les économies ; la raison serait, selon nous, liée au fait qu'elle a eu souvent du mal à être acceptée (appropriée) par les divers opérateurs économiques (dans une approche qui serait top down ) ; la politique d'innovation semble hésitante et discontinue malgré le volontarisme affiché car plutôt circonstancielle (changements au Maroc, en Tunisie, en Jordanie, en Égypte) ; la recherche scientifique existe mais reste paradoxalement le fruit d'efforts individuels des chercheurs et l'innovation, en plein développement, renvoie à une démarche strictement économique et portée par les entreprises qui la plupart du temps méconnaissent les mesures mises en place par l'État. Nous en concluons que dans ce « monde de l'innovation » si le rôle de l'État peut sembler prépondérant il reste de « façade », car par trop peu efficace peu influent.

Si la notion de gouvernance a fait l'objet d'analyses théoriques dans le Nord, elle a été conçue comme une prescription our les pays en développement. Or, la diversité des contextes de développement a donné un contenu et une portée contrastée à cette injonction. Au total, c'est moins la gouvernance qui a été capable de façonner de nouveaux rapports sociaux autour de la décision colletive que l'inverse : les niveaux de développement - schématiquement, celuis des pays les moins avancés et des pays en transition - ; l'organisation sociale et celle des pouvoirs nationaux semblent finanlement avoir largement déterminé la matière concrète de la gouvernance. Nous illustrerons cette différenciation en mettant en perspeictive les pays « émargeants » et les pays émergents. A travers l'exemple de la gouvernementalité au Maroc, nous aborderons de facon plus détaillée la réalité de l'action publique territoriale dans ce pays en évolution. (Maghreb-Machrek/GIGA)

International audience ; The objective of this article1 is to contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of Technoparks (TP) in developing and emerging economies using the example of Tunisia. This article is based on a thorough desk review and informal interviews with TP entrepreneurs and managers in Tunisia. Setting up "ex-nihilo" ten TPs in Tunisia in the mid-1990s was a political decision. Having signed the Treaty of Marrakesh to enter in a Free Trade Zone with Arab Countries in 1989, and being the first Mediterranean country to enter in a free trade area with the EU in 1995, Tunisia needed to boost its productivity and competitiveness both within the EU and with other Arab states. As a response Technoparks started burgeoning in an attempt to address new economic challenges such as demand for highly skilled labour, jobs for youth, economic diversification, capturing the dividend of new technologies, and boosting regional development. In 1997, Tunisia set up El Ghazela --a competitive Technopark in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Six other TPs followed suit in various priority areas like biotechnology, energy, and agri-business which are still in progress. Tunisia's eleventh development plan programmed for an additional three TPs in the south and in the west of the country. Of the ten TPs only El-Ghazala is effective. A key success factor was the interaction between government, higher education institutions and multinationals as well as the diaspora which played a crucial role in attracting multinationals. They also effectively linked Tunisian start-up companies to the international value chain of production. El-Ghazala had access to a critical mass of highly skilled researchers and a local labour market. The other TPs failed to put in place some of these necessary prerequisites. This article shows that setting up ten TPs in a small developing country like Tunisia was quite unrealistic. A better strategy would have been to concentrate on three or four specific centres of excellence such as ...

International audience ; The objective of this article1 is to contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of Technoparks (TP) in developing and emerging economies using the example of Tunisia. This article is based on a thorough desk review and informal interviews with TP entrepreneurs and managers in Tunisia. Setting up "ex-nihilo" ten TPs in Tunisia in the mid-1990s was a political decision. Having signed the Treaty of Marrakesh to enter in a Free Trade Zone with Arab Countries in 1989, and being the first Mediterranean country to enter in a free trade area with the EU in 1995, Tunisia needed to boost its productivity and competitiveness both within the EU and with other Arab states. As a response Technoparks started burgeoning in an attempt to address new economic challenges such as demand for highly skilled labour, jobs for youth, economic diversification, capturing the dividend of new technologies, and boosting regional development. In 1997, Tunisia set up El Ghazela --a competitive Technopark in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Six other TPs followed suit in various priority areas like biotechnology, energy, and agri-business which are still in progress. Tunisia's eleventh development plan programmed for an additional three TPs in the south and in the west of the country. Of the ten TPs only El-Ghazala is effective. A key success factor was the interaction between government, higher education institutions and multinationals as well as the diaspora which played a crucial role in attracting multinationals. They also effectively linked Tunisian start-up companies to the international value chain of production. El-Ghazala had access to a critical mass of highly skilled researchers and a local labour market. The other TPs failed to put in place some of these necessary prerequisites. This article shows that setting up ten TPs in a small developing country like Tunisia was quite unrealistic. A better strategy would have been to concentrate on three or four specific centres of excellence such as ...

The objective of this article1 is to contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of Technoparks (TP) in developing and emerging economies using the example of Tunisia. This article is based on a thorough desk review and informal interviews with TP entrepreneurs and managers in Tunisia. Setting up "ex-nihilo" ten TPs in Tunisia in the mid-1990s was a political decision. Having signed the Treaty of Marrakesh to enter in a Free Trade Zone with Arab Countries in 1989, and being the first Mediterranean country to enter in a free trade area with the EU in 1995, Tunisia needed to boost its productivity and competitiveness both within the EU and with other Arab states. As a response Technoparks started burgeoning in an attempt to address new economic challenges such as demand for highly skilled labour, jobs for youth, economic diversification, capturing the dividend of new technologies, and boosting regional development. In 1997, Tunisia set up El Ghazela --a competitive Technopark in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Six other TPs followed suit in various priority areas like biotechnology, energy, and agri-business which are still in progress. Tunisia's eleventh development plan programmed for an additional three TPs in the south and in the west of the country. Of the ten TPs only El-Ghazala is effective. A key success factor was the interaction between government, higher education institutions and multinationals as well as the diaspora which played a crucial role in attracting multinationals. They also effectively linked Tunisian start-up companies to the international value chain of production. El-Ghazala had access to a critical mass of highly skilled researchers and a local labour market. The other TPs failed to put in place some of these necessary prerequisites. This article shows that setting up ten TPs in a small developing country like Tunisia was quite unrealistic. A better strategy would have been to concentrate on three or four specific centres of excellence such as performing universities ...

International audience ; The objective of this article1 is to contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of Technoparks (TP) in developing and emerging economies using the example of Tunisia. This article is based on a thorough desk review and informal interviews with TP entrepreneurs and managers in Tunisia. Setting up "ex-nihilo" ten TPs in Tunisia in the mid-1990s was a political decision. Having signed the Treaty of Marrakesh to enter in a Free Trade Zone with Arab Countries in 1989, and being the first Mediterranean country to enter in a free trade area with the EU in 1995, Tunisia needed to boost its productivity and competitiveness both within the EU and with other Arab states. As a response Technoparks started burgeoning in an attempt to address new economic challenges such as demand for highly skilled labour, jobs for youth, economic diversification, capturing the dividend of new technologies, and boosting regional development. In 1997, Tunisia set up El Ghazela --a competitive Technopark in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Six other TPs followed suit in various priority areas like biotechnology, energy, and agri-business which are still in progress. Tunisia's eleventh development plan programmed for an additional three TPs in the south and in the west of the country. Of the ten TPs only El-Ghazala is effective. A key success factor was the interaction between government, higher education institutions and multinationals as well as the diaspora which played a crucial role in attracting multinationals. They also effectively linked Tunisian start-up companies to the international value chain of production. El-Ghazala had access to a critical mass of highly skilled researchers and a local labour market. The other TPs failed to put in place some of these necessary prerequisites. This article shows that setting up ten TPs in a small developing country like Tunisia was quite unrealistic. A better strategy would have been to concentrate on three or four specific centres of excellence such as ...

International audience ; The objective of this article1 is to contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of Technoparks (TP) in developing and emerging economies using the example of Tunisia. This article is based on a thorough desk review and informal interviews with TP entrepreneurs and managers in Tunisia. Setting up "ex-nihilo" ten TPs in Tunisia in the mid-1990s was a political decision. Having signed the Treaty of Marrakesh to enter in a Free Trade Zone with Arab Countries in 1989, and being the first Mediterranean country to enter in a free trade area with the EU in 1995, Tunisia needed to boost its productivity and competitiveness both within the EU and with other Arab states. As a response Technoparks started burgeoning in an attempt to address new economic challenges such as demand for highly skilled labour, jobs for youth, economic diversification, capturing the dividend of new technologies, and boosting regional development. In 1997, Tunisia set up El Ghazela --a competitive Technopark in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Six other TPs followed suit in various priority areas like biotechnology, energy, and agri-business which are still in progress. Tunisia's eleventh development plan programmed for an additional three TPs in the south and in the west of the country. Of the ten TPs only El-Ghazala is effective. A key success factor was the interaction between government, higher education institutions and multinationals as well as the diaspora which played a crucial role in attracting multinationals. They also effectively linked Tunisian start-up companies to the international value chain of production. El-Ghazala had access to a critical mass of highly skilled researchers and a local labour market. The other TPs failed to put in place some of these necessary prerequisites. This article shows that setting up ten TPs in a small developing country like Tunisia was quite unrealistic. A better strategy would have been to concentrate on three or four specific centres of excellence such as ...

The objective of this article1 is to contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of Technoparks (TP) in developing and emerging economies using the example of Tunisia. This article is based on a thorough desk review and informal interviews with TP entrepreneurs and managers in Tunisia. Setting up "ex-nihilo" ten TPs in Tunisia in the mid-1990s was a political decision. Having signed the Treaty of Marrakesh to enter in a Free Trade Zone with Arab Countries in 1989, and being the first Mediterranean country to enter in a free trade area with the EU in 1995, Tunisia needed to boost its productivity and competitiveness both within the EU and with other Arab states. As a response Technoparks started burgeoning in an attempt to address new economic challenges such as demand for highly skilled labour, jobs for youth, economic diversification, capturing the dividend of new technologies, and boosting regional development. In 1997, Tunisia set up El Ghazela --a competitive Technopark in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Six other TPs followed suit in various priority areas like biotechnology, energy, and agri-business which are still in progress. Tunisia's eleventh development plan programmed for an additional three TPs in the south and in the west of the country. Of the ten TPs only El-Ghazala is effective. A key success factor was the interaction between government, higher education institutions and multinationals as well as the diaspora which played a crucial role in attracting multinationals. They also effectively linked Tunisian start-up companies to the international value chain of production. El-Ghazala had access to a critical mass of highly skilled researchers and a local labour market. The other TPs failed to put in place some of these necessary prerequisites. This article shows that setting up ten TPs in a small developing country like Tunisia was quite unrealistic. A better strategy would have been to concentrate on three or four specific centres of excellence such as performing universities or industrial zones and leverage the diaspora more effectively.