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This study empirically examines the effectiveness of various regulatory interventions on systemic risk during the financial crisis in Japan. Our findings generally show that the regulatory interventions worked effectively through the liquidity provision. That is, the public fund injection programs, the prompt corrective actions, and the blanket guarantee reduced systemic risk. The simple government intervention package to bail out distressed "too-big-to-fail" banks stabilized the banking system via the external channel whereas the massive bailout scheme suffered the "too-many-to-fail" problem in the sense that it increased systemic risk through both direct spillover and external channels. This study suggests that the effective government intervention should be restricted to a limited number of bailouts to reduce systemic risk.

PurposeThe knowledge of the link between interbank financing and business cycle fluctuations is important in assessing the stability and soundness of the banking sector. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the simultaneous relationship between interbank financing and the business cycle with respect to the financial structure of the bank-based and market-based systems in European countries by using bank-level data from 2007 to 2011.Design/methodology/approachThe study employs an innovative instrumenting technique with an instrument of the financial structure to address the simultaneous determination of interbank financing and the business cycle.FindingsThe results suggest that banks establish pro-cyclical interbank borrowing by increasing their interbank position during booms and reducing it during downturns. Bank-based system performs better in redistributing the liquidity in the economy than the market-based system when there are imperfectly correlated liquidity shocks across regions during the 2007–2009 financial crisis.Practical implicationsThe improvement of banks' liquidity risk management should be aligned with a specific financial system. The macro-prudential supervisor should require banks in the market-based system to disclose their interbank position on the extent of risk exposure during the liquidity shock period to stabilize the EU banking industry.Originality/valueThis study is the first to provide policy makers with some novel empirical results concerning the linkage among bank liquidity, the macroeconomic condition and financial structure.

© 2018 Elsevier B.V. We find that multi-bank holding companies (MBHCs) in the U.S. have lower insolvency risk than single-bank holding companies (SBHCs) at the parent level, but have significantly higher insolvency risk than the latter at the subsidiary level. Our results suggest that MBHC parents tend to benefit from the internal capital market while allowing for more risk-taking at the individual levels. We further find that the higher risk for MBHC affiliates is because of the organizational and geographic complexity at the MBHC parent level. Our results highlight the importance of government regulation on banks at both parent and subsidiary levels.

We find that multi-bank holding companies (MBHCs) in the U.S. have lower insolvency risk than single-bank holding companies (SBHCs) at the parent level, but have significantly higher insolvency risk than the latter at the subsidiary level. Our results suggest that MBHC parents tend to benefit from the internal capital market while allowing for more risk-taking at the individual levels. We further find that the higher risk for MBHC affiliates is because of the organizational and geographic complexity at the MBHC parent level. Our results highlight the importance of government regulation on banks at both parent and subsidiary levels.