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After the Labour victory, the United Kingdom and the European Union are aiming for a reset of their bilateral relations. Energy and climate emerge as strategic sectors for deeper collaboration, but success will depend on the ability to overcome regulatory constraints and coordinate common policies.

According to the latest polls,[1] the Labour Party is expected to win the British elections scheduled for 4 July. Keir Starmer may therefore lead the first non-Conservative government in the UK since 2010 and, most importantly, since the decision to leave the European Union following the 2016 Brexit referendum. The activation, for the first time in the history of the EU, of the clause in Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) regulating the withdrawal of one of its member states, was an unprecedented event, followed by long political negotiations to regulate the divorce between Brussels and London. During that phase, the UK attitude was driven by the 'Global Britain' approach that dominated the Leave Campaign, revolving around the notion of the UK as an international power no longer held back by EU rules and procedures. The EU-UK relationship deteriorated profoundly amidst tensions and mutual accusations, driving them apart despite sharing numerous strategic goals and common interests.
The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) signed with the government led by Boris Johnson in December 2020 deliberately excluded matters of primary importance, such as foreign policy, security and defence cooperation, which became a priority following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Moscow's actions prompted London and Brussels to establish an initial form of informal dialogue on these issues, but without ever institutionalising their coordination. Starmer and some leading Labour figures, however, have already publicly expressed their intention to negotiate a strong agreement with the EU on foreign and security matters.[2] The outcome of the July elections could signal a new start in the relationship between Brussels and London, ending the prolonged post-Brexit conflict.The Trade and Cooperation Agreement
The EU-UK TCA sets out preferential arrangements in areas such as trade in goods and services (with limited mutual market access), digital trade, intellectual property, public procurement, aviation and road transport, energy, fisheries, social security coordination, law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, while simultaneously sanctioning the end of the free movement of persons between the EU and the UK and the exit from the European Single Market.[3] Most significantly, it excludes formal cooperation between the two parties in security and defence matters, although it encourages the establishment of regular dialogues on countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Article 765), small arms and light weapons and other conventional weapons (Article 766), the most serious crimes of concern to the international community (Article 767), cyber issues (Article 703) and counter-terrorism (Article 768).[4]
The choice by Boris Johnson's government to leave such sensitive matters out of the scope of the TCA was a political one. Indeed, the previous government, led by Theresa May, had begun negotiating a post-Brexit agreement with the EU on defence and foreign policy cooperation. Johnson's decision to exclude these areas from the TCA was linked to the original idea of Brexit: that is, to supposedly allow the UK to regain total control in matters most sensitive to public opinion, such as security and migration. Johnson's vision was to pursue bilateral relations with individual member states rather than with the EU to relaunch the image of a 'Global Britain' as an international player. The outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine in 2022, however, demonstrated how short-sighted this calculation was.The war against Ukraine as a (partial) game-changer
The invasion of Ukraine profoundly changed the scenario and put foreign and security policy back at the centre of the relationship between London and Brussels. The EU and the UK have actively contributed to supporting Kyiv militarily, economically and politically. Ad hoc UK-EU coordination in sanctions, intelligence and the training of the Ukrainian armed forces intensified, even though with mixed results.
Cooperation on sanctions against Russia proved the most successful, thanks to continuous exchange of information, cooperation in drawing up sanctions lists and support in implementation. In light of such success, a recent report by the European Affairs Committee of the House of Lords, advised the UK government to make these mechanisms permanent and to create new formats of structured dialogue for cooperation on foreign policy issues.[5]
In terms of military assistance, the EU and UK have provided extensive support to Ukraine both financially and in training. EU member states had allocated a total of 28 billion euros by mid-March 2024, 5.6 billion euros from the EU's European Peace Facility (EPF). According to the House of Commons, the UK had committed a total of 7.6 billion pounds by the beginning of May for the 2024-2025 financial year.[6] The direct cooperation between the EU and the UK in defence has, however, been complicated by the British preference for bilateral relations.[7] Moreover, London remains sceptical about the EU's criteria for regulating the participation of third countries in defence industrial projects, for example, membership of the single market in order to be eligible for funds from the European Defence Agency (EDA). To date, the UK has demonstrated a tepid interest in the Military Mobility project,[8] which forms part of the EU's Permanent Structured Cooperation in defence (PESCO).
At the institutional level, coordination between London and Brussels also seems to have yielded modest results. Despite Liz Truss' participation in the EU Foreign Affairs Council in March 2022, there have been no subsequent direct high-level political interactions between the two sides. Cooperation developed on a purely informal basis or in the context of broader, US-dominated alliances, such as the G7 and NATO. In the case of the training of Ukrainian troops, for instance, the main forum has been the US-led Ukraine Defence Contact Group – the Ramstein group. Looking ahead, however, these fora do not seem fully adequate to replace a cooperation agreement between the EU and the UK, given the partial divergence of objectives between the two sides within them.[9] In the case of NATO, for instance, the EU used the Ukrainian crisis as a catalyst to boost its role in defence industrial initiatives and in the joint development of capabilities with the Atlantic Alliance; this approach, however, created tensions with London, which has always been interested in the development of European capabilities only within NATO. Another forum for dialogue has been the European Political Community (EPC), which was established in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and took its first steps as a multilateral diplomatic forum aimed at promoting political dialogue and cooperation on the European continent.[10] However, the EPC has not promoted any concrete steps toward more structured formal relations. Moreover, the next meeting will be hosted by the UK on 18 July, immediately after the Westminster election and while the arrangements for the new European Commission and European Parliament majority are underway, with the real risk of limited participation and an ill-defined agenda. As a forum without formal structures, the EPC is largely dependent on the active participation of the various leaders, which makes its future uncertain.What future for the Westminster-Brussels relationship
The war against Ukraine undoubtedly represented a turning point for EU-UK relations in terms of foreign, security and defence policy, without, however, achieving a significant step change in the formalisation of their cooperation. In light of the challenges posed to European security by the recent wave of international crises, from Ukraine to Gaza, a structured agreement is most helpful to regulate cooperation between the EU and UK. While the Conservatives always preferred an informal approach, the Labour Party has already expressed its intention to negotiate a strong agreement with Brussels, seeking closer coordination on "military, economic, climate, health, cyber, and energy security issues".[11] This structured dialogue would be developed through regular access to EU Foreign Affairs Council meetings, while at the bilateral level, the stated aim is to develop closer bilateral relations with France, Germany, Ireland and Poland.[12]
Such an agreement would primarily facilitate the resolution of the limitations that have already been identified in the informal cooperation mechanisms, facilitating the expansion of the scope of the areas covered, thereby reducing inefficiencies and cooperation problems.[13] Secondly, it would mitigate the influence of political contingencies. In the context of the Ukrainian crisis, the urgency of the situation enabled effective ad hoc coordination. However, in the long term, the establishment of formalised agreements would be conducive to greater continuity and stability, providing clear direction and impetus to drive issues of shared interest. This is all the more necessary in light of the upcoming US elections. A possible new Trump administration could significantly change US engagement in major international crises, altering the balance in those forums that have been strategic for the EU and the UK. London and Brussels may be required to assume greater responsibility for European security, for which informal dialogue may prove inadequate.
Despite the benefits, however, there remain some knots that need to be cleared up, especially on the defence side. Indeed, it must be remembered that, from the EU perspective, the UK is first and foremost a third country. If, on the one hand, the EU considers London as an important security partner with considerable capabilities, on the other hand, it cannot afford to grant a privileged relationship compared to what is offered to other (more) friendly third countries, as it would risk devaluing the Union's own membership. Brussels probably wants to avoid a repetition of what happened in the past when the British adopted non-dialogue positions on the integration process of defence policies. Notably, even the Labour Party is adopting a cautious approach on these matters. While it proposed "a more formal partnership agreement" on sanctions and "new mechanisms for cooperation on hybrid threats", energy security, organised crime, intelligence exchanges, and new technologies between EU and UK", vague statements have been included on defence such as a "properly bespoke relationship".[14] From London's perspective, the most significant challenge appears to be the EU regulations governing the involvement of third-party actors in defence integration projects. This is exemplified by the PESCO initiative, where the UK would be unable to influence strategic planning but would be obliged to align itself with the decisions of EU member states.
These challenges notwithstanding, a structured agreement appears to be most beneficial for both parties, as demonstrated by the response to the war against Ukraine. The European Parliament has also recently welcomed a greater institutionalisation of the relationship, suggesting the participation of British representatives in the Foreign Affairs Committee on an ad hoc basis. After the election, the first political choice that will have to be made concerns the degree of formalisation of the relationship. The TCA is largely a technical agreement without substantial political input, which makes it difficult to solve issues that may arise. A more structured approach would require a minimum degree of political coordination. In this sense, the EU has experience in 'political dialogues' with third countries for cooperation on foreign and security policy that integrate trade deals with "varying degrees of formalisation" of political interaction.[15] A more agile alternative could be a joint statement which commits the two parties to regular political input and meetings. However this coordination will be framed, the outcome of the July election in the UK is likely to offer a window of opportunity for greater dialogue between the UK and the EU on foreign and security policy that should not be wasted.Luca Cinciripini is a Researcher in the EU, Politics and Institutions programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).[1] Economist, "How Will Britain Vote on July 4th?", in The Economist, 22 May 2024, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2024/05/22/how-will-britain-vote-on-july-4th.[2] George Parker, "Keir Starmer Pledges to Seek Major Rewrite of Brexit Deal", in Financial Times, 17 September 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/6bdc4e88-c2ed-44ad-aa7d-c70bc358e027.[3] European Commission website: The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, https://commission.europa.eu/node/4617_en.[4] Jannike Wachowiak, Richard G. Whitman and Joelle Grogan, "UK-EU Foreign, Security & Defence Cooperation", in UK in a Changing Europe Reports, 27 March 2024, p. 9, https://ukandeu.ac.uk/?p=56983.[5] House of Lords European Affairs Committee, "The Ukraine Effect: The Impact of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine on the UK–EU Relationship", in HL Papers, No. 48 (31 January 2024), paragraph 302, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/43134/documents/214562/default.[6] Ian Bond and Luigi Scazzieri, "Working Hand in Hand? EU-UK Co-operation in Supporting Ukraine", in CER Policy Briefs, May 2024, p. 3, https://www.cer.eu/node/10918.[7] Cleo Davies and Jannik Wachowiak, "UK-EU Relations Tracker Q1 2024", in UK in a Changing Europe Reports, 9 May 2024, p. 9, https://ukandeu.ac.uk/?p=57362.[8] The project aims at standardising cross-border military transport procedures and the movement of military personnel and assets within the borders of the EU, avoiding long bureaucratic procedures. See PESCO website: Military Mobility (MM), https://www.pesco.europa.eu/project/military-mobility.[9] Richard G. Whitman, "The Role of the UK in a New European Security Architecture", in Heinrich Böll Stiftung Analysis, 26 January 2024, https://www.boell.de/en/node/76635.[10] Luca Cinciripini, "Virtues and Limitations of the European Political Community after the Granada Summit", in IAI Commentaries, No. 23|56 (October 2023), https://www.iai.it/en/node/17729.[11] David Lammy, "The Case for Progressive Realism", in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 103, No. 3 (May/June 2024), p. 125-135 at p. 131, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/node/1131579.[12] Ibid.[13] Benjamin Martill and Monika Sus, "UK-EU Security Cooperation after Ukraine", in Judy Dempsey's Strategic Europe, 25 January 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2024/01/uk-eu-security-cooperation-after-ukraine.[14] Jannike Wachowiak, Richard G. Whitman and Joelle Grogan, "UK-EU Foreign, Security & Defence Cooperation", cit., p. 14.[15] With the EU-Canada Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) "being a particularly developed example". Ibid., p. 17.

This policy paper addresses the European Union's (EU) role in restructuring global governance in the aftermath of two significant crises: the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The document explores the interconnected crises and their impact on the international system, assesses the responses of international institutions, and formulates actionable policy recommendations for the EU. The goal is to enhance the EU's effectiveness in responding to global crises, reinforce its resilience, and contribute to the reform of the global governance system.

The third meeting of the European Political Community (EPC) in Granada on 5 October[1] gave mixed indications as to its solidity and ability to establish itself within the framework of the European security architecture.[2] The EPC was initiated with the express purpose of filling the political and institutional vacuum created by the Russian invasion of Ukraine at the heart of the previously existing European security architecture. This had long been articulated and somewhat institutionalised around a series of organisations and partnerships such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe or the NATO-Russia Council; such a setup, however, was fundamentally undermined by Moscow's violation of international law. Against this backdrop, the EPC was launched as an attempt to recreate a multilateral forum capable of gathering together a variety of actors very different from each other but eager to play a central role in the European strategic security discourse.
After the first two summits (in October 2022 in the Czech Republic and in June 2023 in Moldova) had yielded some initial results, the expectations for the meeting in Spain were rather high, especially on the security side. However, the limits of the initiative, in formal and political terms, became much more evident at the Granada summit. At the Granada summit, where involvement of external partners in key neighbourhood areas was limited, the focus of discussions was mostly on migration, and increased overlap with formal EU fora emerged as an obstacle. After a promising start, the outcomes of the Granada summit thus call for a reconsideration of the EPC format.A promising start
The Granada Summit came on the back of the encouraging success of the first two EPC meetings. Established as a political response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine at the suggestion of French President Emmanuel Macron,[3] the EPC took its first steps as a multilateral diplomatic forum aimed at promoting political dialogue and cooperation on the European continent.[4] The first meeting, which was held in Prague in October 2022, achieved important practical results, in particular an EU-led civilian mission to Armenia and Azerbaijan to monitor the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh, which later led to the creation of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA). But the results achieved at the political level were even more significant: the inclusion of 47 European countries in the new structure, with the sole exception of Russia and Belarus, sent a clear signal of political unity against the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[5] The EPC thus seemed to be the first step towards a profound restructuring of the European security architecture in preparation for the aftermath of the war against Ukraine.[6] The second major achievement was the strategic rapprochement between the EU and the United Kingdom (UK).[7] The newfound dialogue after the tensions arising from the Brexit agreements is a key building block for European cooperation especially in security and defence matters, as the UK's commitment to join the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) also shows.[8] In addition to relaunching relations with EU institutions, there was also a strengthening of bilateral relations between the UK and individual member states, starting with France, with which dialogue on migration was intensified within the framework of the Calais Group. Besides migration, the relationship with the UK can be strategic for EU member states in energy matters as well, as demonstrated by the resumption of cooperation with the UK in the framework of the North Seas Energy Cooperation (NSEC), which already includes EU states and Norway and aims to develop renewable energy.
The second summit, held in Moldova in June 2023, continued along the same lines, although it was more focused on security aspects in a broad sense, including energy and infrastructure. The summit served to reiterate the political and material support for Ukraine, including the decision to proceed with a contribution of 87 million euro to non-military logistical aid from the European Peace Facility, as well as the establishment of a civilian mission in Chișinău.
In both meetings, the topic of security was therefore prominent, and the opportunity to hold bilateral meetings on the sidelines of official summits could be used to include those countries that would be otherwise excluded from the European security debate. Although initially welcomed with some favour by EU institutions, the EPC instead aroused more perplexity in some of the partner countries that were supposed to be part of it, albeit with different motivations. The German leadership was irked at not having been consulted beforehand by French President Macron, while Eastern countries viewed the project as a potentially permanent slowdown in the enlargement process and a possible source of contrast with NATO. Despite these uncertainties, however, due to its focus on strategic cooperation and security, and thanks to its informal structure, the EPC seemed to be off to a promising start.A disappointing present, a future in the balance
As mentioned, however, the recent Granada summit marked instead an abrupt halt to the future development of the EPC. The lack of concrete results, evidenced by the absence of a final communiqué and press conference, highlights the main limitations that may jeopardise the future of the EPC.[9] This latches on to the debate that has existed since the early days of the Community, that is, whether it should be an informal forum for multilateral strategic dialogue primarily aimed at furthering Russia's isolation, or rather a body with clear and defined political objectives. Both solutions present difficulties and obstacles.[10] In the former case, there is a risk of an excess of vagueness that can quickly make the interest fade away once the war against Ukraine is over. This format would also be structurally dependent on the participation of leaders from key neighbouring countries in the meetings, as demonstrated by the absences of Erdoğan and Ilham Aliyev in Granada while the Armenian crisis was raging on.[11] The second, more 'political' model inevitably calls into question the EPC's ties with the EU. A greater and formalised definition of the deliverables in the hands of the EPC would lead to an inevitable involvement of the EU.
An EPC that no longer simply acts as a forum for dialogue may create a conflict of competences with Brussels in those matters that are already strictly regulated at the EU level. This overlap may create tensions and misunderstandings with regard to the role of key EPC countries such as the UK.[12] Already in the early days of the project, friction was reported between the then UK Prime Minister Liz Truss and other European leaders over the choice of name and symbols, with the British government being wary of explicit references to the EU.[13] Ultimately, clarifying the relationship between the EPC and the EU also serves to dispel ambiguities about the enlargement process. The initial coldness with which the EPC was received by the countries interested in EU membership signals the fear that the initiative could be perceived as an attempt to indefinitely postpone their EU accession.Light institutionalisation for greater coherence
The EPC stems from the urgent need to rethink foreign and security policy coordination in Europe in the political and institutional vacuum created by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with a view to reorganising the European security architecture once the war in Ukraine is over. It can offer a valuable venue to address security crises and launch new initiatives including countries usually on the margins of such initiatives.[14] Above all, the Community seems to take due account of the fact that Europe and the EU do not coincide and are not superimposable in any context. The inclusion of a much larger group of states in the EPC may potentially contribute to bridging this gap in strategic outlooks, broadening the horizon of the European security debate. To overcome the current limitations of the Community, however, managing the participation of all the relevant stakeholders, as well as developing a format that allows flexibility and informality but within a more precise framework for cooperation, will be key.
Increased participation should certainly be encouraged, but taking into consideration that in addition to EU member states, at least three groups of countries stand out, each of them bearing specific necessities. First, it is pivotal that candidate countries to EU membership are involved in the Community but not frustrated by the perception that the ultimate goal of the EPC is to indefinitely postpone their accession process. Should this happen, it could have profound consequences not only on the future of the EPC but on the whole enlargement process. Second, the EPC provides a venue for the consolidation of a renewed partnership with the UK outside the EU's formal remit, to stimulate cooperation at the bilateral level on a broad range of topics, especially in light of the next meeting that will be hosted by the UK in 2024. With a view to maintaining renewed ties with London, the EPC could facilitate not only bilateral meetings between top political figures, but also the equally crucial collateral and preparatory diplomatic activities. Finally, the EPC should try to engage those countries that are currently beyond its current framework, such as MENA countries. Even if they are outside the European geographical space, and are not candidate states, they are key interlocutors for strategic and security reasons. As the recent escalation between Israel and Hamas and the political turmoil in Maghreb show, the region continues to generate significant challenges to European security. The absence of a strategic dialogue with these countries in the framework of the EPC may significantly hamper its capacity to address the whole range of European countries' security concerns.
As far as the EPC's institutionalisation is concerned, high levels of informality and flexibility surely provide an advantage, especially as far as British involvement is concerned, but they also have limitations that became evident at the Granada summit. The lack of clear objectives, which is also the result of a plurality of interests and perspectives, makes it complex to evaluate the effectiveness of the EPC and may perpetuate a situation where the EPC is associated solely to the contingencies of the current international scenario, thus posing substantial questions about its future once the war is over. For the future, it seems extremely difficult to envisage a high degree of institutionalisation of the Community, as this would alienate a substantial number of countries and increase the overlap with the existing European institutional network. Nonetheless, the EPC must outline clear and defined political objectives, evolving from a talking shop to an incubator of concrete projects involving both EU and non-EU countries in areas such as hybrid threats or fostering societal resilience in the Eastern neighbourhood, as well as promoting an enlarged European diplomatic culture. The summit in Granada for example was used as a platform, from the EU side, to announce the launch of a training programme on cybersecurity aimed at extra-EU EPC member states.[15] To facilitate the process of pinpointing the scope of action of the EPC, a number of instruments may be adopted, starting with a clear agenda-setting process to ensure clarity as to what each summit aims to achieve. In this sense, a light institutionalisation process may be instrumental in improving the coordination between meetings, ensuring logical coherence between the summits and relieving the host country of the task of taking on the content and political aspects alone. Coordination and dialogue between the previous, current and next presidencies in the preparation of the agenda of each summit, as well as more regular meetings between government advisers and officials in between summits, could be beneficial. All these actions may help define the identity of the EPC more unambiguously, providing it with a future beyond the current international scenario.Luca Cinciripini is researcher in the EU, Politics and Institutions programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).[1] European Council, Meeting of the European Political Community, 5 October 2023, https://europa.eu/!7ywQhY.[2] Clea Caulcutt, Nicholas Vinocur and Sarah Anne Aarup, "Shambles in Granada: Mega-gathering of European Leaders Ends with a Whimper", in PoliticoEU, 5 October 2023, https://www.politico.eu/?p=3672678.[3] France, Speech by M. Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic, at the Closing of the Conference on the Future of Europe, Strasbourg, 9 May 2022, https://uk.ambafrance.org/President-Macron-explains-proposal-for-a-Europ....[4] Alexander Stubb, "The Case for a Confederal Europe", in ECFR View from the Council, 21 June 2022, https://ecfr.eu/article/the-case-for-a-confederal-europe; Arnault Barichella, Xavier Prats-Monné and Jerome Vignon, A European Political Community for a Geopolitical Era, Paris, Institut Jacques Delors & Sciences Po, 24 May 2023, https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/a-european-political-community....[5] Richard Whitman, "The European Political Community: A Diplomatic Davos in the Making?", in UK in a Changing Europe Commentaries, 4 October 2023, https://ukandeu.ac.uk/?p=54463.[6] Matteo Bonomi and Nicoletta Pirozzi, "Allargamento, vicinato e Comunità Politica Europea", in Focus Euroatlantico, No. 3 (September 2023), p. 64-74, https://www.iai.it/en/node/17457.[7] Thu Nguyen, "European Political Community: From Family Photo to 'Strategic Intimacy'", in Jacques Delors Centre Policy Briefs, 8 November 2022, https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/european-political-community.[8] Peter Jurkovic, "The European Political Community", in UK in a Changing Europe Explainers, 5 October 2023, https://ukandeu.ac.uk/?p=53393; Pepijn Bergsen, Richard G. Whitman and Alice Billon-Galland, "UK-Europe Relations Finally Head in the Right Direction", in Chatham House Expert Comments, 24 January 2023, https://www.chathamhouse.org/node/31047.[9] Jason C. Moyer and Masa Ocvirk, "The Third European Political Community Summit and the Four Rings of European Integration", in Wilson Center Articles, 6 October 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/third-european-political-community-....[10] Mathieu Droin and Ilke Toygür, "The Granada Summit of the European Political Community: Ambition or Oblivion?", in CSIS Commentaries, 4 October 2023, https://www.csis.org/node/107525.[11] Alice Tidey and Aida Sanchez, "Blow to European Leaders' Summit as Azerbaijan, Turkey are No-shows", in Euronews, 5 October 2023, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/10/05/blow-to-european-leaders-s....[12] Luigi Scazzieri, "Can the European Political Community Be a Bridge between the UK and the EU?", in CER Policy Briefs, 28 April 2023, https://www.cer.eu/node/10365.[13] Mujtaba Rahman, "The European Political Community Is a Big Deal — for EU-UK Relations", in PoliticoEU, 5 October 2022, https://www.politico.eu/?p=2248892.[14] Camille Grand, "No Procedures, No Problem: The European Political Community as a Platform for Security Dialogue", in ECFR Policy Alerts, 4 October 2023, https://ecfr.eu/article/no-procedures-no-problem-the-european-political-....[15] Luigi Scazzieri, "Can the European Political Community Survive?", in CER Insights, 17 October 2023, https://www.cer.eu/node/10603.

The latest elections showed that the radical right within the EU Parliament has increased its seats and hence political influence. The conservative group of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) gained 7 seats while the Identity and Democracy (ID) group has enlarged its membership by 9.[1] In addition, the radical right can count on the support of 15 MEPs from Alternative für Deutschland and the 11 belonging to the Hungarian Fidesz party. If united, the bloc would gather support from 160 MEPs, being the second political force in the Parliament.
However, the so-called radical right is not a cohesive force and therefore its relevance will be highly dependent on political factors. Even because of that, the majority supporting the future Commission is unlikely to change.[2] In a scenario where another centrist majority faces such a right-wing surge, the most critical phase may be the presentation of the EU Agenda 2024-2029, which – aiming at a broad consensus – needs to reconcile not only different national interests but also opposing political views in a coherent framework. The new landscape may drive the future Commission to seek votes from the aforementioned right-wing groups, trading some strategic priorities to avoid the creation of a large anti-Commission bloc in the Parliament. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), whose importance has grown during the current legislative term due to recent crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, is one of the policy areas that could be impacted by the outlined scenario.Conservatives, radical right and EU foreign policy
In the EU Parliament, the radical right is composed of two distinct political families, namely the ECR and the ID group. Despite an approach tendentially Eurosceptic and mistrustful of the current EU integration processes, the ECR group has over the years taken positions more aligned with those of the European People's Party (EPP), especially in foreign policy, where there is a growing pro-Atlantic proclivity, coupled with hawkish attitudes towards Russia.[3]
In contrast, the ID group has so far been characterised by a nationalist nature and takes openly hostile positions to the EU, uncooperative in the European Parliament and opposed to any further transfer of sovereignty from the national to the EU dimension. The group's markedly nationalistic nature makes it challenging to find a synthesis between the different national claims, which in turn renders a structural and effective collaboration within the group, with the ECR or the EPP more complex. This cooperation is even more difficult in topical areas such as foreign policy whose relevance is steadily growing.Support for Ukraine
As of today, it seems likely that the next European Parliament will continue providing financial, logistical and military support to Kyiv, regardless of the electoral results. Therefore, the elections should not translate into a reversal of the EU's support for Ukraine, even in consideration of the positions to date assumed by the ECR, which are often aligned with the current majority.[4] On the Ukrainian issue, the ID group is more fragmented; there are parties like the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) that are traditionally close to Russia and others, such as the Polish and Baltic, which look particularly hawkish on Moscow. Many parties within the group are today openly campaigning to cut the EU aid for Ukraine, sometimes supporting pro-Russian narratives.
In October 2023, the European Parliament voted by a vast majority for an aid package supporting Ukraine within the multi-annual financial framework 2024-2027.[5] This same majority might be slightly thinner after the elections. The most sceptical and hostile parties towards the Ukrainian cause may attempt to exploit the budgetary instruments and negotiations in the aftermath of the EU elections to condition the Union's choices in this area, especially concerning reconstruction or new financial loans. Another complex issue to unravel in the next years will be Ukraine's access to the common EU market and its repercussions on the Common Agricultural Policy; the topic is expected to be highly polarising especially within the right-wing camp, as the boycott of Ukrainian grain showcased in 2022.Enlargement
After years of stagnation, the enlargement process has been reinvigorated by the war in Ukraine. In the last years, the Commission imprinted to enlargement a new speed, conferring the candidate status upon Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova in 2023 and opening negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, while the situation in Georgia has been made muddled by the recent approval of the so-called "Foreign Agents Law" by the national Parliament. ECR and ID's political stances about enlargement are taking quite divergent trajectories. The parties that constitute the ID group are openly opposed to the enlargement process, mainly because of the consequences in terms of expected migration flows as well as the potential impact on cohesion funds and the overall financial budget of the Union. Differently, the parties within or close to ECR pursue purely national interests in favouring the inclusion of specific candidates while opposing others. This is what happened with the Polish Law and Justice party (PiS) supporting the enlargement towards Ukraine for national security reasons, or Fidesz's favouring the Western Balkans while opposing Ukraine.[6]
ECR's positions on enlargement are therefore more blurred and have been profoundly affected by the invasion of Ukraine. The partial narrowing of the gap between ECR and the incumbent majority on this issue is testified by the document that outlines ECR's priorities for the next legislature, where enlargement is defined as "a geostrategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity",[7] and will be supported in the next future by the parliamentarian group.[8] Yet, as the enlargement debate is increasingly linked to the reform of the EU Treaties, the ECR group tried to disconnect this relationship, stating that "the enlargement process must not be used as a backdoor to introduce […] treaty changes and new powers such as qualified majority voting in the Council on foreign policy issues".[9] The wording indicates a positive attitude towards the enlargement process as long as it will not trigger real institutional changes.
Therefore, an increased centrality of the conservatives and the far right may hurdle any reform aimed at relinquishing the member states' veto power in foreign policy or approving any voting mechanisms in the EU Council that may diminish the perceived national influence. Although this attitude may not necessarily halt the enlargement process, the opposition to any reforms at the institutional level could indirectly put the brakes on it in light of the nexus between enlargement, governability and reforms.[10]Defence funding
One of the primary fears of a potential right-wing Parliament is the stalling of the shy advancements recently made in the defence field. The latest progress in the CSDP domain has been initiated by the Juncker Commission with the establishment of the European Defence Fund, an instrument intended to improve joint military research and development. The von der Leyen Commission updated this framework with the Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), which, according to proponents, should encourage member states to purchase European defence systems rather than relying on external procurement (mostly the US and South Korea). The significance of these steps should not be underestimated in consideration of the forthcoming rearmament carried out by EU member states, which necessitate topping off the inventories that were supplied to Ukraine. Besides the armament industry, the EU is also focusing on the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Capacity, a small operative standing unit composed of rotating European brigades. The settlement of this force was endorsed by the 2022 Strategic Compass,[11] the EU's major strategic document published (after months of fruitless elaboration) in response to the Ukrainian invasion.
When it comes to the radical right groups, the two aspects of defence (industry and operational) must be distinguished. For instance, in terms of development and joint acquisition, the ECR has been a staunch backer of a stronger European defence (and its lawmakers even contributed to the EDIRPA's regulation),[12] while the ID's attitude has been more ambiguous, and the group looks poorly integrated. However, in terms of operational steps, both political groups are extremely suspicious about the formation of a European army or any joint deployment force. The leaders of all of these parties have expressed concern that such an instrument would either threaten the states' sovereignty in a sensitive subject like defence (especially ID)[13] or weaken NATO (especially ECR).Maintenance with no leap forwards
Although the two groupings have similarities, it is important to note that the alignments in the future EU Parliament may be more fluid and unpredictable due to current political circumstances. In this regard, two factors could be significant: the formation of the next EU Commission (with the associated political dynamics) and the possible election of Donald Trump in November. From a European standpoint, especially this latter point is sensitive, owing to the growing concern that Europe alone would not be able to sustain Ukraine militarily and economically for long in case of a US disengagement.
With these caveats in mind, in the three outlined sectors – Ukraine, enlargement and defence – the first challenge for the ID and ECR groups is to align their respective agendas. The specific political weight of the two formations is linked to their unity and the ability to put forward a set of coherent proposals (or vetoes). While the greater presence of MEPs from the two groups will be noticed across sectors, their ability to influence the next Parliament's policy agenda and especially CFSP will be closely linked to their ability to overcome their internal fragmentation. It is precisely this latter aspect, in light of the heterogeneous nature of the two groups, that seems to limit their effective ability to intervene effectively in the policy areas under consideration. The different stances held by the radical right on the dossiers considered – also subject to the political contingencies of the moment – will hardly undermine EU policy in support of Ukraine. Likewise, defence investments should not suffer profound deviations. The only field at risk of circumvention is enlargement, where the game and the players however transcend the simple divide left-right wing.
Against this background, the majority of the radical right in the next EU Parliament will likely endorse the CFSP initiatives at play, but hardly come up with new ideas or proposals, nor accept deep revisions of the current foreign policy framework. Arguably, the different formations on the right side of the Parliament will try to limit any possible reform of the institutional set-up of the CFSP, following the traditional skepticism over an enlargement of the EU competencies in this area. The obstructionism of the radical right on a possible CFSP reform will not necessarily translate into interference with the current initiatives, which mostly maintain an intergovernmental and voluntary approach.Federico Castiglioni and Luca Cinciripini are Researchers in the EU, Politics and Institutions programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).[1] European Parliament, 2024 European Election Results, https://results.elections.europa.eu.[2] Andrew Gray, Michel Rose and Julia Payne, "EU's von der Leyen Seeks Centrist Allies after Far-Right Election Gains", in Reuters, 10 June 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eus-von-der-leyen-seeks-centrist-allies-after-far-right-election-gains-2024-06-10.[3] ECR Group, The ECR Will Stand by Ukraine until Russia Is Defeated and Beyond, 9 February 2023, https://ecrgroup.eu/article/legutko_the_ecr_will_stand_by_ukraine_until_russia_is_defeated_and_beyond.[4] EPP Group, EPP, S&D, Renew Europe, Greens/EFA and ECR Leaders Call on EUCO to Deliver on Ukraine, 31 January 2024, https://www.eppgroup.eu/newsroom/leaders-call-on-euco-to-deliver-on-ukraine.[5] European Parliament, A Long-Term Solution for Ukraine's Funding Needs, 17 October 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20231013IPR07125.[6] Rosa Balfour and Stephan Lehne (eds), Charting the Radical Right's Influence on EU Foreign Policy, Brussels, Carnegie Europe, April 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/04/charting-the-radical-rights-influence-on-eu-foreign-policy.[7] The wording adopted by the ECR's document resounds the conclusions of the European Council of December 2023. See: European Council Conclusions, 14 and 15 December 2023, point 13, https://europa.eu/!VTprkk.[8] ECR Group, Priorities 2024-2029, April 2024, point 11, https://ecrgroup.eu/priorities#11.[9] Ibid. However, it is worth noting that Meloni's Italy joined the group of countries in favour of qualified majority voting on foreign policy, thereby contradicting the ECR stance. See Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministries on the Launch of the Group of Friends on Qualified Majority Voting in EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 4 May 2023, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/-/2595304.[10] Luigi Scazzieri, "The European Parliament Elections: A Sharp Right Turn?", in CER Insights, 30 April 2024, https://www.cer.eu/node/10889.[11] Council of the EU, A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, 14 March 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/410976_en.[12] Sebastian Clapp, "European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA)", in EPRS Briefings, November 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2023)739294.[13] Jordan Bardella, "Défense nationale: il faut à la France les moyens de la puissance et de l'indépendance", in L'Opinion, 9 November 2022, https://www.lopinion.fr/politique/defense-nationale-il-faut-a-la-france-les-moyens-de-la-puissance-et-de-lindependance-la-tribune-de-jordan-bardella.

The first Euro-Atlantic Focus of 2024 opens, as usual, with an analysis of the state of transatlantic relations (accompanied by a series of graphs). Riccardo Alcaro and Tiziano Breda explain US and European difficulties in securing support for Ukraine in its defence against Russia. They then consider the war in the Middle East. In the section on US domestic politics, Riccardo Alcaro delves into the feud within the Republican Party. He then turns his attention to the 2024 presidential campaign. In the special essay, Luca Cinciripini contends that the Arctic has now become a theatre of growing conflict between the EU, the US and Russia (and China too).

Enhancing EU-Western Balkans cooperation and the role of the Western Balkans in the EU's future ware the focus of the conference held in Rome on 29 May 2024, organised by the Istituto Affari Internazionali and the Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa. Stemming from the European Council's call for EU reforms to accommodate new members, the discussions centred on three main areas. Firstly, the conference examined how Western Balkan countries can benefit from greater participation in the European Single Market through the New Growth Plan, emphasising economic reforms and financial support. Secondly, it explored the Western Balkans' contributions to the EU's strategic autonomy, particularly in security and economic sectors. Lastly, the need for concurrent reforms within the EU and candidate countries was highlighted, promoting early involvement of candidate states in EU governance to foster a sense of ownership and mutual recognition. The conference underscored the strategic importance of the Western Balkans for EU stability and security.

Report of the conference "Preparing for Enlargement: The EU and Western Balkans' Contributions", Rome, 29 May 2024.

This policy paper addresses the European Union's (EU) role in restructuring global governance in the aftermath of two significant crises: the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The document explores the interconnected crises and their impact on the international system, assesses the responses of international institutions, and formulates actionable policy recommendations for the EU. The goal is to enhance the EU's effectiveness in responding to global crises, reinforce its resilience, and contribute to the reform of the global governance system.

In the context of the 2025 Munich Security Conference (MSC), it is critical that leaders, understandably consumed with state-centric geopolitical disruptions, pay close attention to transnational and systemic risks – one of the most significant of which is the food-climate conflict nexus. This backgrounder unpacks the nexus and its associated risks while presenting near-term solutions, that range from the promotion of sustainable agri-food systems to empowering climate champions in defence institutions.

Policymakers are increasingly acknowledging the impact of transnational challenges, such as food and climate issues, on driving conflicts. The global famine has reached unprecedented levels, highlighting the intricate connections between hunger, climate change, and global security. The escalating violence in Africa, the Middle East, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, coupled with the visible impact of climate change, exacerbates global food insecurity. Despite the challenges, food presents an opportunity for multilateral cooperation. The process of mainstreaming food security into multilateral processes has begun, but significant gaps remain, particularly in the limited allocation of climate finance to green transitions in food systems. This paper emphasizes the long-term and systemic nature of food security challenges, driven by development, security, governance, and environmental factors. Conflict can worsen hunger, and food insecurity can increase security risks, particularly for vulnerable populations. In addition, terrorist organizations may use food as a means of recruitment and control. Therefore, it is important to integrate food security into interventions and climate finance efforts, and to have a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between food security, climate risks, political instability, and conflict. To move forward, it is important to recognize food as a predictive tool, shift away from donor-driven approaches, and discourage policy silos in order to address the intersection of hunger, climate, and security.

This booklet constitutes the second chapter of the ITTP NEXUS in Europe and Beyond Report. It maps the transnational traffic of cigarettes along the North-Eastern Route.Section 1 describes the main illicit cross-border flows of cigarettes along the Route.Section 2 outlines the main types of illicit cigarettes trafficked along the Route.Section 3 presents the main criminal actors involved in cigarette smuggling along the Route.Section 4 focuses on five key nodes of the Route (i.e., Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states), uncovering several country-level contextual factors and drivers behind cigarette smuggling.Section 5 describes the evolution of the Route in the last ten years (2008-2017).Section 6 discusses the potential changes and developments that may impact on the Route in the near future. Section 7 graphically summarises the enabling factors identified as drivers behind the traffic of cigarettes along the North-Eastern Route. The factors are divided among six macro dimensions, namely political, geographical, regulation and enforcement, socio-economic, cultural, and criminal factors.