Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis article studies cost‐minimizing two‐stage procurement with Research and Development (R&D). The principal wishes to procure a product from an agent. At the first stage, the agent can conduct R&D to discover a more cost‐efficient production technology. First‐stage R&D efficiency and effort and the realized second‐stage production cost are the agent's private information. The optimal two‐stage mechanism is implemented by a menu of single‐stage contracts, each specifying a fixed provision price and remedy paid by a defaulting agent. A higher delivery price is paired with a higher default remedy, and a more efficient type opts for a higher price and higher remedy.

AbstractWe show that the prevalence of prolonged tennis contests drops sharply when the ambient environment deteriorates through heat or pollution. We develop a multi‐battle dynamic model to investigate how the disutility from a protracted competition shapes agents' willingness to fight on. Our theory predicts that a poor environment amplifies the momentum of a competitor's head start. We show how model primitives including preferences for environmental amenities can be inferred from battle‐to‐battle transition probabilities. We find that heat and pollution affect incentives to compete strategically. In a contest between equally able rivals at the median prize of $15,100, the value of a head start is $130‐370 higher in a degraded environment compared with a climate‐controlled one.

AbstractWe examine how disclosure policy can be optimally designed to incentivize contestants when their participation is exogenously stochastic. In a generalized Tullock contest setting with two players who are asymmetric in both their values and entry probabilities, we fully characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions under which no disclosure dominates full disclosure. We find that the comparison depends solely on a balance effect exercised by entry probabilities on the expected total effort. The optimal disclosure policy must better balance the competition. These conditions continue to hold when the precisionrof Tullock contests is endogenously chosen by the designer.