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A democratic audit of the European Union
In: One Europe or several?
World Affairs Online
World Affairs Online
Intermediate deployments: the strategy and doctrine of peacekeeping-type operations
In: The occasional paper 25
Reconciling the Interconnectedness and Autonomy of European Union Democracies: Lessons from Hume and Kant
In: Politique européenne, Band 83, Heft 1, S. 42-65
ISSN: 2105-2875
Comment les démocraties contemporaines peuvent-elles être « ordonnées au niveau international » de manière à combiner leur interdépendance avec une forme d'autonomie interne où leurs citoyens sont libres, égaux et efficaces dans l'utilisation de leurs démocraties pour s'accorder mutuellement des droits et des obligations, et contrôler leurs propres lois ? J'utilise deux justifications de l'autorité politique pour examiner cette question. L'une, associée à David Hume, suggère une justification instrumentale de l'autorité politique comme moyen de fournir des biens collectifs essentiels. L'autre, associée à Emmanuel Kant, considère que l'autorité politique est justifiée par des droits et des devoirs. J'utilise les deux pour suggérer comment l'Union peut être au service des démocraties membres en conciliant leur interdépendance avec leur autonomie.
Autonomy or Domination? Two Faces of Differentiated Integration
In: Swiss political science review: SPSR = Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft : SZPW = Revue suisse de science politique : RSSP, Band 27, Heft 3, S. 546-562
ISSN: 1662-6370
AbstractWhen is differentiated integration (DI) of the European Union a source of autonomy and when is it a source of domination? Much depends on what collective goods member state democracies seek through integration. Club goods often require member state democracies to form DIs of their choice. Public goods and common resource goods may, in contrast, require limits on DI if member state democracies are to meet their own obligations to their own publics to secure rights, justice, non‐domination and democracy itself. Those differences are important to understanding how European democracies should be 'internationally ordered' if they are to sustain internal forms of political autonomy. They also demonstrate the importance of DI to the autonomy of member state democracies in associating together beyond the state; in defining obligations within the state; and in securing the greatest autonomy of each European democracy compatible with the greatest possible autonomy of all European democracies.
David Levi-Faur and Frans van Waarden (eds), Democratic Empowerment in the European Union
In: European review of international studies: eris, Band 8, Heft 1, S. 112-117
ISSN: 2196-7415
SSRN
No epistocracy without representation? The case of the European Central Bank
In: European politics and society, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 1-15
ISSN: 2374-5126
The European Parliament: a working parliament without a public?
In: The journal of legislative studies, Band 24, Heft 1, S. 34-50
ISSN: 1743-9337
How can Parliaments Contribute to the Legitimacy of the European Semester?
In: Parliamentary affairs: a journal of comparative politics, Band 70, Heft 4, S. 673-690
ISSN: 1460-2482
The legitimacy of exits from the European Union
In: Journal of European integration: Revue d'intégration européenne, Band 39, Heft 5, S. 499-513
ISSN: 1477-2280
An indirect legitimacy argument for a directly elected European Parliament
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 56, Heft 3, S. 512-528
ISSN: 1475-6765
AbstractCan a directly elected European Parliament help deliver standards by which the European Union can be indirectly legitimated through its component national democracies? This article argues that the Union can be indirectly legitimate where it helps member state democracies meet their own obligations to their own publics. The Union can do just that by managing externalities in ways needed to secure core values of justice, democracy and freedom from arbitrary domination within member states. Yet that poses a predicament: for if any one member state has an interest in imposing negative externalities or in freeriding on positive externalities provided by another, then so may its voters and democratic institutions. The article argues a directly elected European Parliament can help manage that predicament both by identifying externalities and by ensuring their regulation meets standards of public control, political equality and justification owed to individual national democracies.