Suchergebnisse

English
The UK's Private Finance Initiative (PFI) closely resembles the bilateral contracting mechanism advanced by transaction cost economics (TCE). However, the principles informing both the PFI and TCE generally are seriously flawed. In particular, TCE does not accommodate the concept of power, makes incorrect assumptions about the capabilities of organisational buying functions and lacks an appreciation of the political nature of organisational decision making. The impact of these flaws can be recognised in many PFI projects and can help explain why on so many occasions risk has not been transferred to private sector suppliers.

This article discusses the concept of contractual uncertainty and assesses its impact upon the ability of public sector bodies to obtain value for money from their suppliers. Particularly in the realm of public private partnerships, governments around the world are increasingly developing specifications that are likely to be subject to contractual uncertainty. Contractual uncertainty is not necessarily a problem in itself, but can be if the public body cannot avoid an unfavourable power relation in its dealings with the supplier, because it is in a poor position to undertake the inevitable post-contractual negotiations. The argument is illustrated with two cases from the UK public sector that highlight the fact that British public bodies are often seeking to manage contractual uncertainty from a position of weakness.

English
Over recent years, a number of contributors to the public management literature have argued that the buyer–supplier relationships generated by the UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI) are qualitatively different from those generated by traditional contracting out. References have been made to equality, transparency, risk-sharing and trust. In this article, the authors test a contrary argument: that UK public managers negotiate and implement PFI contracts within an environment which is, to a significant extent, characterised by supplier opportunism, something that requires them to employ an extremely assiduous, if not necessarily distant, approach to contract and relationship management. The testing of this argument is undertaken with evidence from PFI construction contracts operated within the National Health Service.

PurposeThis paper aims to explore how social procurement (SP)-related capabilities might be developed within public authorities.Design/methodology/approachThe paper utilizes qualitative research, based upon an inductive research design. This leads to a model to inform future research and practice.FindingsWithin the context of a "disconnected and nascent institutional field of practice" (Loosemore et al., 2023), the research generated rich data illustrating how certain English public authorities have developed relatively mature SP capabilities and applied them within the procurement process. The former included the appointment of "champions"; the founding of groups/units; training using webinars, online resources and case studies; "toolkits", including policy documents, process guidance and measurement tools and networking. The latter included consultation with social value recipients and close engagement with both internal stakeholders and suppliers. The research also revealed the internal political skills of "champions", as SP challenges incumbent logics regarding procurement objectives and practices.Practical implicationsFirst, the paper provides a potential roadmap for organisational capability development. Second, the research makes clear that public authorities should not seek to reinvent the capability wheel. Engagement with peers, advisory bodies, established "toolkits", etc. is imperative, with much expertise publicly available. Third, it also suggests that smaller public authorities might seek to act as part of a consortium rather than go it alone, given the investment required for effective SP. Fourth, the research showed that practitioners need to understand SP as not simply a development challenge but also a political one.Originality/valueThe paper contributes to the literature by analysing SP from the largely overlooked resource-based perspective, by providing rich data on buy-side practice, by usefully adding to the literature's emerging "practice theme" and by offering guidance to buy-side managers within public authorities.

PurposeA lack of sourcing-specific team research prevents a full understanding of sourcing teamwork effectiveness (STE). Moreover, the limited purchasing and supply management (PSM) team literature often tends to focus on an aggregate group level. The paper makes a step towards adopting an individual actor perspective on teamwork effectiveness with an emphasis on the context of sourcing, explicating the effects of team-member knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs), and examining how these relationships are moderated by a common learning experience of strategic sourcing masterclass.Design/methodology/approachBased on a cross-sectional survey, this study analyses a sample of 90 sourcing team members from a global aerospace manufacturing company using hierarchical regression analysis.FindingsThe results suggest that four of the five KSAs positively and significantly affect STE; the exception was collaborative problem solving. Masterclass learning outcomes were found to positively moderate the effects of these KSAs on STE, again exclusive of the collaborative problem-solving KSA.Research limitations/implicationsCross-sectional design focused only on the aerospace sector may affect generalizability. Further, longitudinal research designs would capture the effects of the common learning experience over an extended period.Practical implicationsSourcing team members could be selected based on having KSAs which significantly affect teamwork effectiveness. Training and development for sourcing teams should combine guided reflexivity and cross-training to deliver learning outcomes that create similar team mental models.Originality/valueThe study provides an individual team-member perspective on the functioning of sourcing teams which is absent in the extant research. It contributes to the very limited research base on skills in PSM.

We test an argument, drawn from transaction cost economics, that an assumption of intentional trust should be replaced with one of supplier opportunism in public sector procurement and contract management. We use structural equation modelling to evaluate quantitative evidence from 180 public and private sector buyers on the perceived effectiveness of various management control mechanisms aimed at restraining supplier opportunism. Our findings suggest that supplier opportunism is potentially a problem and that certain procurement and contract management mechanisms can assist buying organisations in moderating that opportunism. This supports arguments in favour of a 'cautious approach' to procurement and contract management.

In recent years marked changes have occurred in the way employers recruit and select agency workers, with this activity increasingly being outsourced to third party organizations providing 'vendor managed services' (VMS). Drawing on data from a study of English social services, this article explores the consequences of this outsourcing. The findings reveal that although VMS has delivered cost savings, it has also resulted in less effective placement matching, rising line manager workloads and concerns about service quality. In the conclusion the wider implications of VMS for the future development of partnerships between employers and employment agencies are discussed.