Suchergebnisse

Abstract.Some citizens differ in their levels of concern for the supporters of various parties. I demonstrate how such concerns can motivate citizens to vote. I first present a simple formal model that incorporates concern for others and election benefits to explain the decision to vote. By predicting substantial turnout, this model overcomes the "paradox of participation." I then verify the model empirically. I utilize a series dictator games in an online survey of more than 2000 Canadians to measure the concern of individuals for other partisans. I show how the preferences revealed in these games can predict the decision to vote in the face of several conventional controls. Taken together, the formal model and empirical results generate a more fulsome and satisfactory account of the decision to vote than an explanation which relies solely on duty.Résumé.Les citoyens ne se préoccupent pas tous des partisans des divers partis politiques. Je démontre comment de telles préoccupations peuvent motiver les citoyens à participer aux élections. Je présente d'abord un modèle formel qui explique la décision de voter en intégrant les préoccupations à l'égard des autres électeurs et les bénéfices associés à une élection. En prédisant une part substantielle de la participation, ce modèle surmonte le paradoxe de la participation électorale. Ensuite, le modèle est vérifié empiriquement. J'emploie à cette fin une série de jeux du dictateur insérés dans une enquête menée en ligne auprès de 2000 Canadiens afin de mesurer leur degré de préoccupation à l'égard des autres partisans. Je montre comment les préférences révélées dans ces jeux peuvent prédire la décision de voter. Ensemble, le modèle formel et les résultats empiriques produisent une explication plus éloquente et plus satisfaisante de la décision de voter lors d'une élection que les explications qui s'appuient seulement sur le sens du devoir.

Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics, Ian Shapiro,
Rogers M. Smith and Tarek E. Masoud, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004, pp. xi., 419.This important volume recounts a meeting of some the best minds in
political science, but, in the end, it is a meeting in the physical sense
(as the volume comes out of a conference held at Yale in 2002) and not
really in any intellectual sense. The ostensible goal of the volume is to
proffer answers to what the editors call "a fundamental question
about the proper place of problems and methods in the study of
politics…. Which should political scientists chose first, a problem
or a method?" (1). Unfortunately, a good many of the contributors to
the volume ask whether this is a question at all. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
most of those who reject the question do not have objections to the
increased technical and mathematical nature of modern political science.
And, equally unsurprising, those who suggest that method has too often
come before problem are those who have earlier, and often eloquently,
bemoaned the rise of rational choice theory and econometric applications.
As an intellectual rapprochement, the work fails. It rather resembles a
dinner of extended family, where long-held differences and grievances are
kept just under the breath, but as a collection of essays by leading
scholars which consider the methodologies and epistemologies of political
science, the volume is a smashing success.

The development of methods to measure the ideological positions of legislators and other political actors has become one of the most successful research programs in the study of political behavior. Less effort, however, has been given to approaches for measuring public uncertainty about those positions. In this article, we propose the use of a well-known measurement model to investigate public uncertainty about the ideological locations of political actors. To motivate its use empirically, we examine citizens' perceptions of the ideology of Donald Trump during the 2016 election campaign. We show that among Republican and Democratic candidates since 1972, and compared to contemporary legislators, citizens have had the most difficulty assessing the ideology of Donald Trump. Our approach is widely applicable to questions concerning public perceptions of politicians' ideology and the political behavior of citizens and their representatives.

Experimental research by political scientists on elites has grown dramatically in recent years. Experimenting on and with elites raises important questions, both practical and ethical. Elites are busy people, doing important work under public scrutiny. Therefore, any experiments that use up political elites' time, risk impairing their ability to do their jobs as well as possible, or put at risk the larger research community's access to elites should be avoided. Nevertheless, despite these risks and challenges, we argue experimenting with elites has enough benefits both to the research community and to elites themselves, that it should still be done. The relevant question then becomes how should we think about doing experiments with political elites? We propose a framework of value-added and transparent experiments. Our framework is guided by the following two simple rules: Elite subjects should individually benefit from the process of doing the experiment. It should add value to their role as representatives. Second, the identity of the researchers and purposes of the experiment should be transparent. As we argue, these two combined features can still accommodate a large range of experiments, can creatively spark researchers to think up new designs and can protect access to elites for future research. We review two such examples at the end of this essay.

AbstractWar comes with terrible costs both in terms of money and lives. Do voters punish incumbents for these costs? Much of the existing literature on the effects of war deaths on public opinion toward incumbents and their war efforts suggests that the answer is yes. We test this proposition on data from a non-US case: Canada's war in Afghanistan. We estimate models of the effect of local war deaths on incumbent support using individual-level panel data from the 2006, 2008 and 2011 Canadian Election Studies and aggregate district-level data from the 2008 and 2011 general elections. In none of our models do we find support for the conclusion that war deaths decrease support for candidates of the governing party. Instead, we find evidence at both the individual and district levels that support for Conservative party candidates is higher in districts that experienced war deaths.

Risk management underlies almost every aspect of elite politics. However, due to the difficulty of administering assessment tasks to elites, direct evidence on the risk preferences of elected politicians scarcely exists. As a result, we do not know how consistent are politicians' risk preferences, and under what conditions they can be changed. In this paper, we conduct a survey experiment with 440 incumbent local politicians from across the United States. Using a modified version of the Asian Disease framing experiment, we show that gain/loss frames alter the stated risk preferences of elected officials. We further show that priming democratic accountability increases the tendency to engage in risky behavior, but that this shift in preference only occurs in those politicians who are interested in seeking reelection. These results inform several political science theories that assume stable risk preferences by political elites, or that make no risk assumptions whatsoever. They also provide insights into the role of political ambition and accountability in structuring the behavior of political elites.