The present study examines the costs of discrimination and cultural-linguistic differences for the development of migrants' sense of belonging to the receiving society. Focusing on Latin Americans in Spain allows shedding light on the cultural and linguistic mechanisms involved in this process. Migration scholars have long recognized the importance of belonging as a key indicator of integration. An analysis of belonging has clear relevance to settlement policies and programs to prevent social fragmentation or isolation of immigrants. This article takes a fresh approach to explore the development of migrants' sense of belonging to the receiving society by drawing on an original survey data set collected in 25 highly diverse territories in Spain (N = 2,648). The results show that cultural and linguistic affinity matter: There is a greater predisposition among immigrants born in Latin America to identify themselves as Spaniards, compared with other immigrant groups. However, self-reported discrimination and deficient residential settings seem to be hindering the development of a significant feeling of belonging to Spain, also among Latin Americans. Public policies aimed at decreasing discrimination against migrants, as well as improving migrant neighborhoods, will favor the integration of these immigrants and their descendants ; This article and its open access publication is based upon work funded by COST Action 16111 EthmigSurveyData (https://www.cost.eu/actions/CA16111/), supported by COST (European Cooperation in Science and Technology) and funded by the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme of the European Union; the University of Oxford; the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, and the Casa de Velázquez in Madrid
The present study examines the costs of discrimination and cultural-linguistic differences for the development of migrants' sense of belonging to the receiving society. Focusing on Latin Americans in Spain allows shedding light on the cultural and linguistic mechanisms involved in this process. Migration scholars have long recognized the importance of belonging as a key indicator of integration. An analysis of belonging has clear relevance to settlement policies and programs to prevent social fragmentation or isolation of immigrants. This article takes a fresh approach to explore the development of migrants' sense of belonging to the receiving society by drawing on an original survey data set collected in 25 highly diverse territories in Spain ( N = 2,648). The results show that cultural and linguistic affinity matter: There is a greater predisposition among immigrants born in Latin America to identify themselves as Spaniards, compared with other immigrant groups. However, self-reported discrimination and deficient residential settings seem to be hindering the development of a significant feeling of belonging to Spain, also among Latin Americans. Public policies aimed at decreasing discrimination against migrants, as well as improving migrant neighborhoods, will favor the integration of these immigrants and their descendants.
Diversas protestas sociales han tenido un papel disruptivo en la segunda década de este siglo, con formas que han puesto a prueba nuestra comprensión previa de los movimientos sociales. Algunas de ellas forjaron tipos poco convencionales de estructuras de movilización, como los llamados square movements. El último libro de Cristina Flesher Fominaya, publicado por Oxford University Press, realiza una revisión teórica amplia de lo que han supuestos estos movimientos a partir de su caso más significativo: el 15-M. Se trata de un libro ambicioso, empezando por su estructura organizada en cinco partes: democracia y 15-M; de la protesta a la ocupación; de la ocupación al movimiento; del 15-M a Podemos; y un capítulo final de conclusiones.
O surgimento de partidos populistas inclusivos contesta a construção social do "povo" aos populismos excludentes, gerando recentemente novos debates acadêmicos. Os novos partidos da esquerda radical têm um caráter nacionalista? O populismo e o nacionalismo são duas dimensões inseparáveis? Com base em um conjunto de dados primários da Espanha, este artigo mostra que os eleitores do Podemos são significativamente menos nacionalistas, expressando atitudes mais abertas em relação à diversidade cultural e imigração, além de níveis mais baixos de espanholidade do que os eleitores de outros partidos. Poderíamos dizer que Podemos opera como uma opção política antagônica às posições tradicionais da direita populista radical, construindo nesse antagonismo uma comunidade imaginária inclusiva em torno de um tipo de patriotismo constitucional ou populismo republicano. Esses resultados contribuem para o debate acadêmico sobre a relação entre nacionalismo e populismo, trazendo à discussão os valores centrais dos partidários de um partido populista como um elemento complementar à sua categorização ; O surgimento de partidos populistas inclusivos contesta a construção social do "povo" aos populismos excludentes, gerando recentemente novos debates acadêmicos. Os novos partidos da esquerda radical têm um caráter nacionalista? O populismo e o nacionalismo são duas dimensões inseparáveis? Com base em um conjunto de dados primários da Espanha, este artigo mostra que os eleitores do Podemos são significativamente menos nacionalistas, expressando atitudes mais abertas em relação à diversidade cultural e imigração, além de níveis mais baixos de espanholidade do que os eleitores de outros partidos. Poderíamos dizer que Podemos opera como uma opção política antagônica às posições tradicionais da direita populista radical, construindo nesse antagonismo uma comunidade imaginária inclusiva em torno de um tipo de patriotismo constitucional ou populismo republicano. Esses resultados contribuem para o debate acadêmico sobre a relação entre nacionalismo e populismo, trazendo à discussão os valores centrais dos partidários de um partido populista como um elemento complementar à sua categorização ; The emergence of inclusive populist parties disputes the social construction of the 'people' to the exclusive populism, recently generating new academic debates. Do the new radical left parties have a nationalist character? Are populism and nationalism two inseparable dimensions? Drawing on an original dataset in Spain, this article shows that Podemos' supporters are significantly less nationalist, expressing more open attitudes towards cultural diversity and immigration, and lower levels of Spanishness than voters from other parties. Arguably, Podemos operates as an antagonistic political option to the traditional positions of the populist radical right (PRR), building an inclusive imagined community around a type of constitutional patriotism or republican populism. These findings contribute to the scholar debate on the relationship of nationalism and populism, bringing to discussion the core values of the supporters of a populist party as a complementary element to its categorization. ; El surgimiento de partidos populistas inclusivos disputa la construcción social del "pueblo" a los populismos excluyentes, generando recientemente nuevos debates académicos. ¿Tienen los nuevos partidos de izquierda radicales un carácter nacionalista? ¿Son el populismo y el nacionalismo dos dimensiones inseparables? Basándose en un conjunto de datos primarios en España, este artículo muestra que los votantes de Podemos son significativamente menos nacionalistas, expresando actitudes más abiertas hacia la diversidad cultural y la inmigración, así como niveles más bajos de españolidad que los votantes de otros partidos. Podríamos decir que Podemos opera como una opción política antagónica a las posiciones tradicionales de la derecha populista radical, construyendo en ese antagonismo una comunidad imaginaria inclusiva en torno un tipo de patriotismo constitucional o populismo republicano. Estos hallazgos contribuyen al debate académico sobre la relación del nacionalismo y el populismo, trayendo a discusión los valores centrales de los partidarios de un partido populista como un elemento complementario a su categorización.
El paso de movimientos sociales a formaciones políticas ha sido escasamente tratado en la literatura académica, aunque reúne un interés creciente. En España, ciertas continuidades entre el 15-M y la emergencia de nuevos partidos pueden ser observadas. En este artículo, se plantean tres ideas sobre el paso de movimientos a partidos y se ponen en relación con contribuciones que siguen en esta misma sección. En primer lugar, el 15-M está lejos de ser un bloque claramente delimitado, por lo que su extensión hacia la política representativa no puede ser tratada de manera única; es preciso identificar distintas formas en las que este paso o extensión a la dinámica de partidos tiene lugar. En segundo lugar, se explora la relación existente entre tres procesos de cambio: la erosión del apoyo político desde 2008, el apoyo a las movilizaciones del 15-M en 2011 y la emergencia de nuevos partidos en 2014 y 2015. Por último, se subraya la importancia de introducir el análisis de 'la transversalidad con intensidades distintas' que tiene lugar entre la opinión pública en estos tres procesos de cambio. Palabras clave: Nuevos partidos políticos, movimientos ; The passage of social movements to political parties has been barely treated in the academic literature, but it meets a growing interest. In Spain, certain continuities between 15-M and the emergence of new parties can be observed. This article raised three ideas about the passage of social movements to political parties, which are presented in relation to subsequent articles in this section. First, the 15-M is far from being a clearly defined block, so its extension into representative politics cannot be treated in a unique way; it is necessary to identify different levels in which this extension takes place. Second, the relationship between three processes of change is analysed: the erosion of political support since 2008, the public's support for the 15-M demonstrations in 2011, and the emergence of new parties in 2014 and 2015. Finally, it is emphasized the importance of introducing the analysis of 'cross-sectionalism with different intensities' that occurs within public opinion in these three processes. Keywords: New political parties, social mov
AbstractJacop Custodi elaborated recently a response to our article "A nationalist party with non‐nationalistic voters? Discussing the limits of nationalism in party categorisation" published in the journal Nations & Nationalism. We consider the work of Custodi is an important and original contribution to the study of left politics and nationalism. This being said, we reflect on the negative consequences of overstretching the category nationalism, both referring to parties and to political discourse. The aim of this reply is unpacking and explaining these negative consequences and offering an alternative as well as responding to some specific points raised by Custodi in his reply.
AbstractAre populism and nationalism two inseparable dimensions? The controversial argument is that both exclusionary and inclusionary populism draw on nationalist representations and traditions to construct their political discourse. In the case of Podemos, several scholars have argued that this party presents a nationalistic character based on its invocation of the 'patria' and a demarcated, imagined political community. This article relies on an original data set in order to test this hypothesis related to Podemos's supply and demand. With regard to supply, we explore four party manifestos to elucidate how Podemos refers to the nation, Spanish identity, sovereignty and immigration. To evaluate demand, we analyse the party's supporters' political attitudes and values regarding the nation, assimilation of immigrants and national preferentialism. Our results show that Podemos's supporters express lower levels of national identification than the remainder of the population. Similarly, the former analysis reveals a pro‐immigration position and a tendency of the party Podemos to avoid issues related to national identity. Departing from these results, we draw several implications on the use of nationalism for the categorisation of political parties and, in particular, left‐wing populism.
AbstractThe use of mobile instant messaging services (MIMS) for the dissemination of electoral information has been increasing in recent years. Drawing on a novel dataset from a 2015 post-electoral survey in Spain, we focus on individuals' digital political behavior, both public and private. Our results show that, in a context of high electoral volatility and polarization, right-wing supporters are willing to engage in political persuasion activities using tools such as MIMS in the private digital arena but not publicly (e.g., on social media). In contrast, left-wing milieus develop mobilization efforts in both public and private settings. We argue that distinct political styles are key in accounting for the difference in channels of partisan persuasion, in which preference falsification mechanisms are involved in the public sphere. These results bear important implications for the understanding of false information exchanges in the private sphere, social media activism, and political participation. Additionally, they help us shed light on the recurring failure of polls in capturing electoral behavior among right-wing voters in polarized elections and referenda.
In the last decade, the emergence of inclusive populist parties has transformed the electoral field in several countries, with special intensity in Southern Europe. Two of the most significant cases have been those of Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain. This paper focuses on the analysis of an existing tension within these parties between mobilization and institutionalization. Our conclusions point out that this tension is inherent in the way in which this type of political formations emerge and, in addition, it articulates the main internal disputes, from ideological issues to intra-organizational leadership competition. ; En la última década, la emergencia de partidos populistas de izquierdas ha transformado el campo electoral en varios países, con especial intensidad en el sur de Europa. Dos de los casos más significativos han sido los de Syriza en Grecia y Podemos en España. Este trabajo se centra en analizar la existencia de una tensión en el seno de estos partidos entre una mayor movilización y una mayor institucionalización. Nuestras conclusiones apuntan a que esta tensión es inherente a la forma en la que emergen este tipo de formaciones políticas y, además, sobre ella se articulan las principales disputas internas, desde cuestiones de cultura organizativa hasta la competición por el liderazgo interno.
In the last decade, the emergence of inclusive populist parties has transformed the electoral field in several countries, with special intensity in Southern Europe. Two of the most significant cases have been those of Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain. This paper focuses on the analysis of an existing tension within these parties between mobilization and institutionalization. Our conclusions point out that this tension is inherent in the way in which this type of political formations emerge and, in addition, it articulates the main internal disputes, from ideological issues to intra-organizational leadership competition. ; En la última década, la emergencia de partidos populistas de izquierdas ha transformado el campo electoral en varios países, con especial intensidad en el sur de Europa. Dos de los casos más significativos han sido los de Syriza en Grecia y Podemos en España. Este trabajo se centra en analizar la existencia de una tensión en el seno de estos partidos entre una mayor movilización y una mayor institucionalización. Nuestras conclusiones apuntan a que esta tensión es inherente a la forma en la que emergen este tipo de formaciones políticas y, además, sobre ella se articulan las principales disputas internas, desde cuestiones de cultura organizativa hasta la competición por el liderazgo interno.
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Information, Communication & Society on 21/04/2020, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/1369118X.2020.1749697 ; Recent studies suggest that new parties display new patterns of digital mobilization. We shed light on this debate: do new party supporters engage in online political activities to a greater extent during electoral campaigns? Do they share political images or quotes on social media, participate in political forums, or exchange political messages with their friends more often than supporters of traditional parties? No. Drawing on a post-electoral survey dataset in Spain, we find that offline extra-institutional political activities are key predictors of the level of online political engagement. Even in the context of a polarized electoral campaign and the emergence of new electoral forces such as Podemos, extra-institutional political participation drives digital activism to the detriment of institutional variables, such as turnout or partisan preferences. Thus, all parties depend on extra-institutional activists to boost their online campaigns. Since grassroots activists increasingly influence the communicative strategy of all political parties, we interpret this process within a long-term digital-based post-material transformation of the political culture, with major implications for partisan organization, mobilization, and polarization in many democracies. We contend that the overrepresentation of grassroots activists in producing and disseminating political content in social media may have favored an increase of the visibility and public support of political outsiders in several countries ; This work was supported by Secretaría de Estado de Investigacion, Desarrollo e Innovacion [grant number CSO2013-48612-C2-1-P]
In this article, we analyse the evolution of electoral information flows in Spain in the digital environment. Three post-electoral surveys (2008, 2011 and 2015) among internet users ( N = 4,312) and a series of focus groups enable us to analyse the process of expansion of the Digital Public Sphere (DPS) in Spain. We show that, instead of disintermediation, new intermediations of the electoral information flows appear. The candidacies no longer monopolize the electoral communication; rather, they share spaces in the DPS with personal contacts and civic-social organizations. We observe that, for the first time, in the 2015 elections, the influence exercised by the digital media – particularly social media – exceeded the information received directly from people they know, print media and radio. However, television remained the most influential media during the elections. We note that the use of the DPS in electoral campaigns is increasingly hybrid and dialogical. We find that, in the Spanish case, these changes are linked to the emergence of the 15M movement, which encouraged the emergence of internet-based civil organizations. The traditional political players continue to occupy a very significant role as a source of electoral information, but they share space with this new type of civil organization and with the extensive network of digital contacts. Changes in the Spanish DPS between 2008 and 2015 evidence a greater diversity in information sources and more citizens play an increasingly active role in the creation, modification and dissemination of political content.
ABSTRACT The various narratives of a conflict play a central role in its development. Not only are they a reflection of the collective memory of the various parties in conflict, but also a functional element in its dynamics. In the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, data show that each side's main narratives are fairly stable over time, and they possess significant magnitudes – over two thirds of their publics, in both cases. This article analyses the use of narratives in the dynamics of the conflict, which affects both the cognitive and emotional dimensions of the public's worldview on both sides. We draw ten main functions of collective narratives in the conflict. We discuss that, although a transformation of narratives in the conflict is required for its resolution, both groups will face resistance associated with the functionality of the narratives during this process.
This article examines the electoral impact of social protest movements, providing new methodological and conceptual approaches to the subject. Two fields of study, social movements and new political parties, seem to have left a sparsely treated gap between the two: the connection between the rise of social movements and the subsequent emergence of new political parties. Specifically, we are interested in investigating how the foundations of a protest movement electorally behave at the emergence of a new party –one that theoretically reflects the central demands of the movement. We analyze how the support to the 15M movement (also known as the Indignants) has evolved into electoral support to Podemos after its first months of existence. To do this, we compare the social profiles of 15M supporters and Podemos voters through the introduction of an electoral crystallization indication. The results suggest that Podemos vote in the 2014 European elections can be seen as an extension of the protests in the electoral field. This continuity with the protest seems to characterize the appearance of the new party, both in the social base of its first electorate as in regard to its narrative-symbolic aspect. Further, its first electoral base did not respond so much to a 'protest vote' –in the sense proposed by Van der Eijk– but rather to a 'vote of the protest', gaining electoral support from those more identified with the 15M demands. Finally, comparing the results with other studies, we noted that the political and institutional confidence crisis has an asymmetric effect on the electoral dynamics along the ideological spectrum, a much more intense one than observed on the support to the protest movements. Thus, the ideology is presented as the main regulator of the electoral impact of political dissatisfaction among citizens. ; Nuestro trabajo trata de aportar nuevas aproximaciones metodológicas y conceptuales al análisis del impacto electoral de movimientos sociales y de protesta. Dos campos de estudio, el de los movimientos sociales y el de nuevos partidos políticos, parecen haber dejado un hueco analítico escasamente tratado entre los dos: la conexión entre el auge de movimientos sociales y la posterior aparición de nuevos partidos políticos. Concretamente, nos interesa indagar cómo se comportan electoralmente las bases de un movimiento de protesta ante la aparición de un nuevo partido que, teóricamente, recoge las demandas centrales del movimiento. Analizamos el paso del apoyo al movimiento 15M (conocido también como los indignados) al apoyo electoral a Podemos tras sus primeros meses de existencia. Para ello introducimos el cálculo de un índice de cristalización electoral para diferentes grupos sociales, lo que nos permite contribuir a la caracterización de la emergencia del nuevo partido. Los datos apuntan a que el voto a Podemos en las elecciones europeas de 2014 puede entenderse como a una extensión de la protesta en el campo electoral. Esta continuidad con la protesta parece caracterizar la aparición del nuevo partido, tanto en la base social de su primer electorado como en lo que se refiere a su aspecto narrativo-simbólico. Su primera base electoral no respondería tanto a un voto de protesta – en el sentido planteado por Van der Eijk– sino, más bien, a un voto de la protesta, consiguiendo captar electoralmente a aquellos simpatizantes del 15M más identificados con sus principales reivindicaciones. Finalmente, contrastando los resultados con otros estudios, apuntamos que la crisis política y de confianza institucional tendría un efecto asimétrico en la dinámica electoral a lo largo del arco ideológico, de un modo mucho más intenso de lo que ocurre en el apoyo a los movimientos de protesta. Así, la ideología se presenta como el principal regulador del impacto electoral de la insatisfacción política entre la ciudadanía. This article examines the electoral impact of social protest movements, providing new methodological and conceptual approaches to the subject. Two fields of study, social movements and new political parties, seem to have left a sparsely treated gap between the two: the connection between the rise of social movements and the subsequent emergence of new political parties. Specifically, we are interested in investigating how the foundations of a protest movement electorally behave at the emergence of a new party –one that theoretically reflects the central demands of the movement. We analyze how the support to the 15M movement (also known as the Indignants) has evolved into electoral support to Podemos after its first months of existence. To do this, we compare the social profiles of 15M supporters and Podemos voters through the introduction of an electoral crystallization indication. The results suggest that Podemos vote in the 2014 European elections can be seen as an extension of the protests in the electoral field. This continuity with the protest seems to characterize the appearance of the new party, both in the social base of its first electorate as in regard to its narrative-symbolic aspect. Further, its first electoral base did not respond so much to a 'protest vote' –in the sense proposed by Van der Eijk– but rather to a 'vote of the protest', gaining electoral support from those more identified with the 15M demands. Finally, comparing the results with other studies, we noted that the political and institutional confidence crisis has an asymmetric effect on the electoral dynamics along the ideological spectrum, a much more intense one than observed on the support to the protest movements. Thus, the ideology is presented as the main regulator of the electoral impact of political dissatisfaction among citizens.
This paper examines the frequency of midpoint responses in agree/disagree scales in a survey measuring attitudes toward science and scientific policy, a low-salience and difficult topic. It also examines the contribution of individual differences to explain the tendency to select this option. It is assumed that the use of the midpoint "Neither agree nor disagree" (NA/ND) in Agree/Disagree (A/D) scales is to some extent an indication of satisficing. It is also assumed that there are individual differences in respondents' tendency to select the NA/ND response. Using a Generalized Linear Mixed Model we include Krosnick's regulators of satisficing, socio-demographics and individual differences as predictors. We find that the contribution of the regulators of satisficing identified by Krosnick is small. In turn, factors associated with individual differences explain a great amount of variance on the number of NA/ND responses. We conclude that the presence of this option in a survey of a low-salience topic increases satisficing as strategy of the respondents to deal with the cognitive burden of both the A/D scale and the difficulty of the topic. Furthermore, the number of NA/ND responses may be understood as an indicator of individual differences in the propensity of respondents to satisficing when answering a survey on a low-salience or difficult topic.
