Suchergebnisse

In this paper we analyze the optimal incentive contracts under imperfect auditing. Both principal's commitment and no commitment to auditing cases are investigated. In the commitment case, the Baron–Besanko‐type (RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 15 (1984), pp. 447–470) contract would fail under imperfect auditing. In the no‐commitment case, the Baron–Myerson (Econometrica, Vol. 50 (1982), pp. 911–930) and the Khalil‐type (RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 28 (1997), pp. 629–640) contracts could survive under specific misjudging probabilities. In addition, there exists a separate equilibrium with the agent's full compliance and the principal's sure ex post auditing.

Social networks have increasingly become important and popular in modern times. Moreover, the influence of social networks plays a vital role in various organizations, including government organizations, academic research organizations and corporate organizations. Therefore, strategizing the optimal propagation strategy in social networks has also become more important. Increasing the precision of evaluating the propagation probability of social networks can indirectly influence the investment of cost, manpower and time for information propagation to achieve the best return. This study proposes a new algorithm, which includes a scale-free network, Barabási–Albert model, binary-addition tree (BAT) algorithm, PageRank algorithm, Personalized PageRank algorithm and a new BAT algorithm to calculate the propagation probability of social networks. The results obtained after implementing the simulation experiment of social network models show that the studied model and the proposed algorithm provide an effective method to increase the efficiency of information propagation in social networks. In this way, the maximum propagation efficiency is achieved with the minimum investment.

AbstractStochastic choice, the act of choosing differently in repeated decisions, can be a conscious decision made by individuals who are aware of their inability to make a definitive choice. To examine the prevalence and implications of conscious stochastic choice, we developed a novel method and implemented it in a preference reversal experiment: In each valuation choice between the bet and a varying reference option, subjects could either pay a small cost to select a specific option or opt for a free randomization choice where a computer randomly selects an option. Our findings revealed that the majority of subjects exhibited conscious stochastic choice, and further that their choices were significantly affected by the elicitation procedures.

AbstractThis research explores the equilibria of a spatial model with consumers having finite reservation prices and two firms under Cournot‐Bertrand competition. We find three types of equilibria. For high effective reservation prices, a unique equilibrium exists with spatially agglomerating firms serving all consumers. For medium effective reservation prices, the intermediate‐location‐differentiation firms serve all consumers at equilibria. For low effective reservation prices, the firms act as two monopolists and do not serve all consumers at equilibria. The results herein and from previous studies together demonstrate that changing one of two Bertrand (Cournot) firms to Cournot‐type (Bertrand‐type) can make the minimum‐location‐differentiation equilibrium appear (disappear). Moreover, both firms' location distances at our intermediate‐location‐differentiation equilibria are always larger than those at the equilibria of firms' price competition.