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AbstractThis article presents a theory of the order of power to explain the dynamics and interaction between the political and legal orders in China's courts. This theory posits that the political order is embodied in the extensive administrative ranking system (ARS) of the People's Republic of China and has a systematic impact on the legal order regardless of the subject matter. The ARS is a system that regulates power relations between various institutional and personal actors in all key power fields, including courts. According to this theory, power, as stratified by the ARS, relativizes law during the processes of legal implementation, application, and enforcement. This theory provides a coherent explanation of judicial behavioural patterns in different subject matters, such as the centralization of criminal investigations in some crimes but not others, the distribution of corruption in China's courts, and the outcome patterns of administrative litigation. Whilst the conventional wisdom sees that the political and the legal orders in China's courts are partitioned based on the subject matter, this theory asserts the opposite: the impact of the political order is systemic, comprehensive, and applicable to the entire legal field. This article fills a knowledge gap in Chinese law and politics, where the ARS has received little attention except for recent studies on administrative litigation. The article also identifies two overlooked but distinctive features of the ARS—its multidimensionality and interconnectivity—our understanding of which is disproportionately poor in relation to their significance.

AbstractTo date, there is a very limited literature on the use of systems ideas and methodologies as a basis for developing curriculum or courses. To fill the gap, this study has made several contributions by employing systems theory and thinking in analysing issues related to higher education. Industry 4.0 is reshaping the future of education, which opens up our vision and makes us to consider what knowledge and skills students should possess after they have graduated from college, when to accelerate workforce reskilling and what is the building blocks and connections of education supply chain. In this study, it is the first time the concept of 'education supply chain' is proposed and coined. Furthermore, our research has led us to view educational systems and configurations, such as international mobility and transnationalization, as outcomes of enduring power related to industrial revolutions. Finally, a curriculum structure based on system thinking is proposed. We engage our inquiry with transformations that are happening around higher education and position our research on the benefits of sharing of global intellectual resource and top talents through transnational mobility and education joint ventures in the context of Industry 4.0.

AbstractThis article provides an analytical account of how politics and law in China are
organically integrated in the institutional architecture of courts as designed
by the Chinese Communist Party ("the Party"). This design allows
the Party to retain its supreme authority in the interpretation, application,
and enforcement of the law through its institutional control over courts. At the
same time, the Party can, under this design, also afford to grant an autonomous
sphere where courts can perform their adjudicative functions with minimal
interference from the Party, as long as the Party is assured of full authority
to determine the scope of the "autonomous-zone," to impose rules
on it, and to revoke it when necessary. Consequently, courts assume a double
character: a pliant political agent on the one hand and a legal institution of
its own agency on the other.

This article traces the process of Xi Jinping's campaign in 2012-2017 and explains how an anticorruption effort has been transformed into an exercise of power-consolidation for his office. The findings of this article are three-fold. First, the power-consolidation process has benefited from a combination of an ideological campaign and a disciplinary campaign, which were not only synchronized but also feed into one another to achieve a shared goal. Second, the campaign became politicized around midterm and intensified afterwards. The pace of progress of the campaign coincided with Xi Jinping's advancement of power. Third, the most significant outcome of Xi Jinping's campaign is not the numbers of disciplined corrupt officials but the paradigm-change in the disciplinary regime of the Party: first, the reversal of the depoliticization process of the Party's disciplinary regime; second, the retention of temporarily mobilized anticorruption resources; and third the simplification of evidence production procedure. The combined result is a considerable expansion of the CCDI's anticorruption investigative capacities and a significant increase Xi Jinping's leverage to impose political loyalty and compliance upon Party officials in the future. (J Contemp China/GIGA)