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This article explores the definition of the term "cyberterrorism" in light of available literature and recent legislation in an attempt to distinguish cyberterrorism from other cyber activities and crimes. Cyberterrorism is the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace. The author discusses the differences between true cyberterrorism – that is, actual harm caused by cyber attacks – versus less malignant attacks that do more to annoy than harm. The author points out that the main difference between cyberterrorism and other cyber attacks, such as hacking and cracking, is that cyberterrorists are politically motivated, while other cyber attackers have non-politic motives.

This article explores the definition of the term "cyberterrorism" in light of available literature and recent legislation in an attempt to distinguish cyberterrorism from other cyber activities and crimes. Cyberterrorism is the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace. The author discusses the differences between true cyberterrorism – that is, actual harm caused by cyber attacks – versus less malignant attacks that do more to annoy than harm. The author points out that the main difference between cyberterrorism and other cyber attacks, such as hacking and cracking, is that cyberterrorists are politically motivated, while other cyber attackers have non-politic motives.

Cyberwarfare is a very real threat to the security of the nation. Yet there is confusion and disagreement as to which government body is most appropriate to assume the cyberwar mission. The Strategy to Secure Cyberspace treats the threat primarily as a criminal issue, and assigns responsibility to the Department of Homeland Security. The National Defense Strategy implies that cyberwarfare is a military issue. Both documents may be correct, depending on the case. The cyberspace terrain transcends boundaries, quickly blurring the line between civil or criminal action and an act of war, leaving the government with the issue of assigning an agency to deal with the threat. This paper will look at the various organizations within the federal government that have some cyber-component, and compare their abilities with applicable law to determine which agency or agencies have the ability to legally engage in cyberwarfare. This paper will also examine whether current methods for determining the rules of engagement for conflicts is relevant or if new procedures need to be drafted.

Cyberwarfare is a very real threat to the security of the nation. Yet there is confusion and disagreement as to which government body is most appropriate to assume the cyberwar mission. The Strategy to Secure Cyberspace treats the threat primarily as a criminal issue, and assigns responsibility to the Department of Homeland Security. The National Defense Strategy implies that cyberwarfare is a military issue. Both documents may be correct, depending on the case. The cyberspace terrain transcends boundaries, quickly blurring the line between civil or criminal action and an act of war, leaving the government with the issue of assigning an agency to deal with the threat. This paper will look at the various organizations within the federal government that have some cyber-component, and compare their abilities with applicable law to determine which agency or agencies have the ability to legally engage in cyberwarfare. This paper will also examine whether current methods for determining the rules of engagement for conflicts is relevant or if new procedures need to be drafted.

This Comment focuses on the Executive's power to target American citizens who are believed to be terrorists abroad and the due process implications of such attacks. Part II provides background information pertaining to the rise

This Comment focuses on the Executive's power to target American citizens who are believed to be terrorists abroad and the due process implications of such attacks. Part II provides background information pertaining to the rise

Robert O'Harrow, Jr., a reporter on the financial and investigative team of the Washington Post, recipient of the 2003 Carnegie Melon and Cyber Security Reporting Award, and Pulitzer Prize finalist, lectures on topics from his recent book, No Place to Hide. He discusses how data mining began as a way for marketing companies to gain information about consumers and, as technology evolved, developed into a way for the government to monitor its citizens. O'Harrow contends that since the government is using private companies to collect this data, it skirts regulation and accountability for privacy infringements. After discussing the problems concerning the data aggregation progression, he offers suggestions on safe-guarding one's personal autonomy.

Robert O'Harrow, Jr., a reporter on the financial and investigative team of the Washington Post, recipient of the 2003 Carnegie Melon and Cyber Security Reporting Award, and Pulitzer Prize finalist, lectures on topics from his recent book, No Place to Hide. He discusses how data mining began as a way for marketing companies to gain information about consumers and, as technology evolved, developed into a way for the government to monitor its citizens. O'Harrow contends that since the government is using private companies to collect this data, it skirts regulation and accountability for privacy infringements. After discussing the problems concerning the data aggregation progression, he offers suggestions on safe-guarding one's personal autonomy.

In a recent, high-profile ruling, a federal court finally recognized that a substantial delay in executing a death row inmate violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments. Courts have repeatedly rejected these so-called "Lackey claims," making the federal court's decision in Jones v. Chappell all the more important. And yet it was deeply flawed. This paper focuses on one of the major flaws in the Jones decision that largely escaped attention: the application of the non-retroactivity rule from Teague v. Lane. By comprehensively addressing the merits of the Teague bar as applied to Lackey claims, and making the case for applying the bar, this paper adds to, and challenges, the existing literature on capital punishment, Lackey claims, and Teague doctrine. This paper dissects the Jones ruling on the application of Teague, examining the Supreme Court's "new rule" case law and concluding that Lackey claims, when viewed at the appropriate level of generality, propose a new rule. It then addresses the more complicated aspect of applying Teague in this context, recognizing that the first Teague exception poses the most likely basis for avoiding the Teague bar on a Lackey claim. At a minimum, Lackey claims (like Miller v. Alabama claims, now the subject of substantial Eighth Amendment litigation on collateral review) sit at the intersection of procedural and substantive rules. Nonetheless, this paper makes the case for viewing the claim as procedural and therefore Teague-barred. Ultimately, then, this paper emphasizes a point that could substantially influence existing litigation: litigators and federal judges should take the Teague bar more seriously when considering Lackey claims on federal habeas review, particularly when viewed in light of modern habeas rules and doctrine that limit relief and protect the interests of the states. But the paper also emphasizes an important point about death penalty policy and politics: if the state is to have a death penalty at all, it should be prepared, and willing, to ensure that death sentences are actually carried out.

In a recent, high-profile ruling, a federal court finally recognized that a substantial delay in executing a death row inmate violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments. Courts have repeatedly rejected these so-called "Lackey claims," making the federal court's decision in Jones v. Chappell all the more important. And yet it was deeply flawed. This paper focuses on one of the major flaws in the Jones decision that largely escaped attention: the application of the non-retroactivity rule from Teague v. Lane. By comprehensively addressing the merits of the Teague bar as applied to Lackey claims, and making the case for applying the bar, this paper adds to, and challenges, the existing literature on capital punishment, Lackey claims, and Teague doctrine. This paper dissects the Jones ruling on the application of Teague, examining the Supreme Court's "new rule" case law and concluding that Lackey claims, when viewed at the appropriate level of generality, propose a new rule. It then addresses the more complicated aspect of applying Teague in this context, recognizing that the first Teague exception poses the most likely basis for avoiding the Teague bar on a Lackey claim. At a minimum, Lackey claims (like Miller v. Alabama claims, now the subject of substantial Eighth Amendment litigation on collateral review) sit at the intersection of procedural and substantive rules. Nonetheless, this paper makes the case for viewing the claim as procedural and therefore Teague-barred. Ultimately, then, this paper emphasizes a point that could substantially influence existing litigation: litigators and federal judges should take the Teague bar more seriously when considering Lackey claims on federal habeas review, particularly when viewed in light of modern habeas rules and doctrine that limit relief and protect the interests of the states. But the paper also emphasizes an important point about death penalty policy and politics: if the state is to have a death penalty at all, it should be prepared, and willing, to ensure that death sentences are actually carried out.

Any discussion of European policies is a complicated one, in part because the word "Europe" means different things to different people. At the present time, the European Union has expanded to twenty-five countries and more countries may become provisional members within the next years. These countries represent a multitude of cultures, languages, and legal traditions so talking about a "European" approach to a given matter is to risk making inherently flawed generalizations about diverse peoples, cultures, and systems. However, one generalization is rather safe to assert: the traditional regulatory model in Europe has been based on a state-run monopoly structure that has concretely changed only within the past ten years while private ownership of telecommunications networks is a very new concept, as is the growth and consolidation of equipment providers. The article starts with covering aspects of developing laws within the European Union, as well as discusses member countries' attempts to coordinate their regulatory efforts in a relentless move away from telecommunications monopolies and towards free markets. This concept of spectrum management at the European Union level has begun only recently because frequencies have traditionally been allocated, allotted, and assigned by the individual states. It then provides an overview of the important technology-related actions taken by the European Union in past years, including the implementation of technology promotion programs such as the RACE program and the passage of the "new framework" for telecommunications and its associated Radio Spectrum Decision. By analyzing past actions and based on the success of European lawmaking in spite of distance, language and cultural differences as well as the radical change of telecommunications management from a process of coordination among government telecommunication ministries to a more complicated consensus-building procedure among private industries the author predicts that the trends toward the continued privatization of telecommunications and the transfer of responsibility from the public to the private realm will become stronger in the future, especially since a strong communications framework is not only a matter of importance to the public, but it is also critical to the European Union's ability to function smoothly as an economic community.

Any discussion of European policies is a complicated one, in part because the word "Europe" means different things to different people. At the present time, the European Union has expanded to twenty-five countries and more countries may become provisional members within the next years. These countries represent a multitude of cultures, languages, and legal traditions so talking about a "European" approach to a given matter is to risk making inherently flawed generalizations about diverse peoples, cultures, and systems. However, one generalization is rather safe to assert: the traditional regulatory model in Europe has been based on a state-run monopoly structure that has concretely changed only within the past ten years while private ownership of telecommunications networks is a very new concept, as is the growth and consolidation of equipment providers. The article starts with covering aspects of developing laws within the European Union, as well as discusses member countries' attempts to coordinate their regulatory efforts in a relentless move away from telecommunications monopolies and towards free markets. This concept of spectrum management at the European Union level has begun only recently because frequencies have traditionally been allocated, allotted, and assigned by the individual states. It then provides an overview of the important technology-related actions taken by the European Union in past years, including the implementation of technology promotion programs such as the RACE program and the passage of the "new framework" for telecommunications and its associated Radio Spectrum Decision. By analyzing past actions and based on the success of European lawmaking in spite of distance, language and cultural differences as well as the radical change of telecommunications management from a process of coordination among government telecommunication ministries to a more complicated consensus-building procedure among private industries the author predicts that the trends toward the continued privatization of telecommunications and the transfer of responsibility from the public to the private realm will become stronger in the future, especially since a strong communications framework is not only a matter of importance to the public, but it is also critical to the European Union's ability to function smoothly as an economic community.

National Information Infrastructure, the Information Superhighway and the Electronic Superhighway are no longer discussions of the past but are omnipresent vocabularies of the day -- envisioning a promise of universal access to the international networks of information and electronic communications. As the nation and the world embrace this concepts and goals, the authors in this issue discuss the need for a roadmap for such infrastructure and the level of governmental oversight as we travel along this superhighway into the future.

National Information Infrastructure, the Information Superhighway and the Electronic Superhighway are no longer discussions of the past but are omnipresent vocabularies of the day -- envisioning a promise of universal access to the international networks of information and electronic communications. As the nation and the world embrace this concepts and goals, the authors in this issue discuss the need for a roadmap for such infrastructure and the level of governmental oversight as we travel along this superhighway into the future.

In an increasingly inward-looking world governed by populist governments, existing theories of rights are struggling to protect and expand individual rights. This failure can be attributed both to the present conception of rights as well as the absence of a unifying theme to address the existence and conflict of rights. In the present paper I argue that this unifying theme, which is necessary for protection and expansion of individual rights, is provided by "meaning" in an existential and linguistic sense. I assert that the greatest challenge faced by individual rights is in form of a faceless populist doctrine called "public interest." As long as the issue of conflict of rights will be addressed in a numerical manner, individual rights will stand defeated. We need to come up with a new model for resolution of conflict of rights, which does not examine right holders as integers but as human beings. This paper, which is a continuation of my previous effort on the subject, elaborates upon the existential role of rights and seeks to construct an inviolable nucleus of rights by examining the essence and core meaning of rights. The paper's final contribution lies in developing a semantical framework for resolution of conflict of rights.