Suchergebnisse

Do citizens reveal their valid preferences when asked about a potential foreign threat? This study presents the results of two list experiments implemented in Taiwan, a democratic and independently ruled island that leaders in China have long vowed to reunify with the mainland. Our two experiments—conducted in March 2019 and September 2021—focus on the percentage of Taiwanese who perceive China as a "friend" and those who regard China as an "enemy." The findings reveal that, first, the proportion of Taiwanese citizens who harbored hostile feelings toward China grew by 30% points between the two dates. In comparison, those with a more friendly perception of China declined by 18% points. Second, we detected significant misreporting or preference falsification when comparing the list experiment estimates with answers to a direct question. Third, we found evidence that the hypothesized China-ambivalent respondents are most likely to have switched their perceptions of China.

After the Covid-19 pandemic began to wreak havoc around the world in January 2020, Taiwan managed to stay mostly Covid-free due to swift and efficient action taken by the government to contain the outbreak. However, after the country experienced its first significant wave of domestically transmitted cases in May 2021, vaccines became a highly salient issue because Taiwan did not have enough doses to immunize all its citizens. In this study, we investigate how Taiwanese appraise the government's overall efforts to acquire vaccines. We hypothesize that, apart from a partisan divergence of opinions, some citizens would hold ambivalent attitudes toward the way the government handled the vaccine procurement process. Results from multivariate regression analysis indicate that the effect of party identification on evaluations of government is conditionally dependent on citizens' level of ambivalence. Specifically, increased ambivalence offsets the strong effect of party affiliation on government evaluation, especially for political independents and supporters of opposition parties.

Abstract
If conflict breaks out between Taiwan and China, would the United States come to the island's defense? China's growing assertiveness in the region and aggressive military activities around Taiwan have renewed interest in this decades-old question. This study examines the issue by employing two surveys, one conducted in Taiwan and another in the United States. Results of the Taiwan survey indicate that while a majority of Taiwan citizens do indeed believe the United States would help defend Taiwan if it were attacked by China, five types of respondents—idealists, pragmatists, democracy skeptics, political realists, and pessimists—can be discerned, each with a distinctive pattern of reasoning. Findings from the US survey reveal that while Americans mostly hold positive views of Taiwan, there is little consensus on the preferred US military response in the event of a Chinese attack. These analyses contribute to the existing literature on evolving public opinion in Taiwan and the United States concerning the possibility of armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

The election of Donald Trump has injected new uncertainties into the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs in Asia. For Taiwan, regional security is challenging because it must simultaneously deal with an increasingly belligerent China and an America led by the unconventional Trump. Based on public opinion data, this study analyzes how the Taiwanese public perceives the state of U.S.–Taiwan relations, and how certain they are about America's overall commitment to Taiwan in this era. Results indicate that people in their 20s, pan‐Green partisans, and those favoring Taiwan independence perceive U.S.–Taiwan relations to be better under President Trump. Moreover, supporters of the pan‐Green coalition and of Taiwan independence, together with the more "ambivalent" respondents, likewise feel more certain about America's commitment to Taiwan's security. On the contrary, pan‐Blue partisans and Taiwanese citizens with mainland Chinese ethnicity are generally more pessimistic and skeptical about U.S.–Taiwan ties and partnership with Trump in the White House.

As an emerging first-tier world power, China is exerting an important influence on countries in the Asia-Pacific region, especially Taiwan, with which it has a long history of often contentious relations. This study investigates the impact of "intergenerational value change" on impressions of China in 2017 among three political birth cohorts of Taiwanese. Based on a representative survey of Taiwanese citizens, the study finds that cohort impressions can be classified according to the extent to which they relate to the economic–political and the social–environmental dimensions, suggesting that Taiwanese perceptions of China are not unidimensional and are more nuanced than they first appear. The data by and large confirm the validity of cohort differences; members of the first and oldest cohort hold more positive impressions of China with respect to social and environmental issues than members of the second and middle cohort, while the third and youngest cohort would regard China in a more positive light if their economic and political concerns were addressed. A few variables remain statistically significant, including party identification and unification versus independence preference, even after controlling for aging effects.

AbstractIn this study, we examine whether strategic voting – in which a voter seeks to maximize the expected payoff from casting a ballot – occurred among late voters in the 2018 Taipei City mayoral election. This multi-candidate mayoral contest was noteworthy because ballot-counting started before all the votes had been cast, with preliminary results being leaked to the media. Theoretically, having access to real-time updates of voting figures could have influenced the decision of voters who were still in line waiting to cast their ballots. Analysis and reconstruction of aggregate polling data, however, demonstrate that there was very little (if any) strategic voting among these late voters on election day, even if they had information that might have induced them to vote strategically.