Suchergebnisse

Hauptbeschreibung: Ausgehend vom Präzedenzfall des Ministererlaubnisverfahrens gem. 42 GWB im Fusionsfall E.ON/Ruhrgas AG im Jahr 2002, stellt sich der Verfasser einer im Laufe des Verfahrens aufgeworfenen verfassungsrechtlich entscheidenden Frage: Wer ist der verfassungsrechtlich rechtmäßig berufene Vertreter eines aus privaten Gründen befangenen Bundesministers als Leiter einer obersten Bundesbehörde in einem Verwaltungsverfahren? Im Gang der Arbeit zeigt Christian Ley das bestehende verfassungsrechtliche Dilemma auf, das sich aus dem Widerstreit von Rechtsstaats- und Demokratieprinzip ergi

Main description: Ausgehend vom Präzedenzfall des Ministererlaubnisverfahrens gem. § 42 GWB im Fusionsfall E.ON/Ruhrgas AG im Jahr 2002, stellt sich der Verfasser einer im Laufe des Verfahrens aufgeworfenen verfassungsrechtlich entscheidenden Frage: Wer ist der verfassungsrechtlich rechtmäßig berufene Vertreter eines aus privaten Gründen befangenen Bundesministers als Leiter einer obersten Bundesbehörde in einem Verwaltungsverfahren? -- Im Gang der Arbeit zeigt Christian Ley das bestehende verfassungsrechtliche Dilemma auf, das sich aus dem Widerstreit von Rechtsstaats- und Demokratieprinzip ergibt, wenn der befangene Bundesminister als Entscheider aus dem Verfahren und dadurch zugleich als Verantwortlichkeitsadressat für das Parlament ausscheidet. Nach ausführlicher Auseinandersetzung mit Lösungsmöglichkeiten de lege lata kommt der Autor zu dem Ergebnis der Unauflösbarkeit dieses Konflikts nach geltendem Recht und entwickelt einen abschließenden Vorschlag für eine Behebung des verfassungsrechtlichen Dilemmas.

AbstractFollowing the 2021 Marshall Fire in Colorado, this study was conducted to better understand private well and plumbing damage and to develop public health guidance. More than 20 post‐fire drinking water well guidance documents with varied recommendations were found. Approximately 227 wells were located in the fire footprint. Seventeen properties were visited, and a subset of wells were sampled for organic and inorganic contaminants. Property debris was also collected. Benzene, toluene, and 19 semi‐volatile organic compounds (SVOCs) were detected in water extracts of property debris. No wells contained volatile organic compound contamination. Two shallow wells (12 and 15 ft) had debris contamination; one well contained notable SVOC contamination. One multi‐home unregulated well system was extensively damaged, lost pressure, and had not been repressurized 11 months after the fire due to financial and technical challenges. Study results highlight the need for follow‐up work to understand well system damage and household response.

AbstractToday, controlling the photopolymerization process during the 3D printing in vat photopolymerization is a key challenge. In this work, it is shown that using a relatively limited set of parameter, it is possible to estimate key factors involved in such process. On the basis of 16 formulations containing different concentrations of photoinitiator and UV filter, attempt was made to rationalize the photonic parameters used in the 3D printing process, that is, the depth of penetration Dp and the critical energy Ec. It is shown that the experimental Dp values can be correlated with calculated ones from Bouguer–Beer–Lambert law. Real‐time Fourier‐transform infrared spectroscopy (RT‐FTIR) experiments were performed under similar conditions as in 3D printing. The conversion profiles were used to estimate the Ec values. The limits of this approach was discussed as a function of the UV filter concentration. Finally, the RT‐FTIR curves are exploited to predict the in‐depth conversion of the different 3D printed layers and compared to experimental results obtained by confocal Raman microscopy.

AbstractThe 2021 Marshall Fire was the costliest fire in Colorado's history and destroyed more than 1,000 homes and businesses. The disaster displaced over 40,000 people and damaged six public drinking water systems. A case study was developed to better understand decisions, resources, expertise, and response limitations during and after the wildfire. The fire caused all water systems to lose power. Power loss was sometimes coupled with structure destruction, distribution depressurization, and the failure of backup power systems. These consequences jeopardized fire‐fighting support and allowed for volatile organic compound and semi‐volatile organic compound contamination of water distribution systems. Water system staff, with help from neighboring systems and external technical experts, stabilized the infrastructure, found and removed the contamination, and restored services. Actions were identified for utilities, governments, and researchers that could help communities minimize wildfire impacts, better protect workers and the population, and enable water systems to more rapidly respond and recover.