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Rethinking the World -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Great Power Ideas and Change -- 2. Explaining Change and Continuity -- 3. The Ebb and Flow of American Internationalism -- 4. Germany, from Outsider to Insider -- 5. Overhaul of Orthodoxy in Tokugawa Japan and the Soviet Union -- 6. The Next Century -- Appendix 1: The Transformation of Economic Ideas -- Appendix 2: Analysis of Presidential Discourse -- Notes -- Index

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Introduction: Making National Strategy in the Twenty-First Century -- Chapter 1. Brazil: Shadows of the Past and Contested Ambitions -- Chapter 2. China: Security Dilemma and "Win Win" -- Chapter 3. Germany: Between Power and Responsibility -- Chapter 4. India: Modernization in a Safe Neighborhood -- Chapter 5. Israel: Strategic Vision Adrift -- Chapter 6. Russia: Geopolitics and Identity -- Chapter 7. Turkey: Populism and Geography -- Chapter 8. United States: Grappling with Rising Powers -- Conclusion: The World They Will Make -- Notes

For at least the past thirty years, scholarship on international relations has been bewitched by a simple proposition: the polarity of the international system is a central cause of great power strategies and politics. The number of "poles" (dominant countries) in the system is like an invisible fence that shapes states as if they were dogs with electronic collars or a Skinner box that conditions national "rats." States can choose to ignore the fence or box, but if they do, they must pay the consequences. The polarity of the international system as defined by the number of great powers - involving more than two (multipolarity), two (bipolarity), or one (unipolarity) - is expected to mold states and international politics in different predictable ways. The central place of polarity in IR theory is such that it is commonly assumed that the appropriate way to study the world is to examine the impact of polarity first and then move on to other lesser factors to mop up any unexplained variance.

Why do national identities usually endure but sometimes radically change? Much of the time, identity socializes or constrains leaders to act in patterned ways. Occasionally, however, leaders are able to dramatically alter those self-images. This article offers a general argument for varying identity plasticity. It brings together organizational theory and social theory to demonstrate how ideas about means to goals can in certain circumstances change how states see themselves. I examine the plausibility of this explanation in cases of continuity and change in Japan's identity in the 19th century and the Soviet Union's identity in the 20th century — in both instances challenging the common wisdom that identity was a direct product of international pressures. The argument suggests the importance of synthetic explanations — i.e. concrete generalizable propositions on how ideas and power interact in specific ways to influence the evolution of national identity.

Bilateralism concerns relations or policies of joint action between two parties. It can be contrasted with unilateralism (where one party acts on its own) and multilateralism (where three or more parties are involved). Typically, the term has applications concerning political, economic, and security matters between two states. Bilateralism has both costs and benefits, and there is a debate on its merits relative to unilateral or multilateral approaches.

We know that China is rising, but what will China do with that power? Distracted by power trends, both American policymakers and political scientists have not paid enough attention to purpose--what states intend to do with their power. Power is critical in international relations, but it is not destiny. The dominant lens for understanding the rise of China has been power transition theory, which insightfully probes the effects of power trajectories between rising and falling countries (e.g., the expected future of China and the United States). Yet what we also need to understand is "purpose transition"--that is, when and why the core intentions of countries in international politics change. This is a critical question because China today is mostly a cooperative participant in the existing international order. Will it remain so? And what can the United States do to shape that trajectory?

It is contended that the original argument offered for variations in the US's conception of security was not functionalist, tautological, or lacking in causal mechanisms. Rather, it was a probabilistic structural explanation that allowed for individual motives while recognizing their inability to account for continuity & change in collective ideas. Jackson & Nexon's alternative explanation is interesting, but as presented here, is analytically insufficient to explain continuity & change in in the US foreign policy episteme. Adapted from the source document.