Suchergebnisse

I examine the problem of relational hazards between repeat exchange partners and the contingent roles of trade uncertainty and future exchange prospects in moderating the potentially conflicting effects of past exchanges on these hazards, thereby facilitating or restraining the formation of relational embeddedness. On the data of advisory relationships in U.S. mergers and acquisitions from 1981 to 2004, I find that firms that repeatedly hire the same investment banks as financial advisors tend to overpay for acquisition targets, as reflected by negative investor reactions measured in the cumulative abnormal return. In addition, the degree of overpayment increases with the frequency of prior exchanges. This adverse effect of exchange history grows if the uncertainty regarding the target firm rises. However, better prospects for future business with acquiring firms help mitigate this negative effect, although this moderating effect varies across the types of exchange experience. The findings suggest that a potentially complex and nuanced process underlies repeat exchanges, which are an oft-claimed precursor of relational embeddedness, to deliver tangible economic benefits. This study contributes to the emerging literature on the "dark side" of embeddedness and, more broadly, to the sociology of markets and organizations by substantiating the contingency mechanisms that shape the value of a repeat relationship in market exchanges.

In this study, I examine how past performance influences the relative positions of actors in a network and how the actor-level heterogeneity in quality mediates the often-demonstrated association between brokerage and performance. On the collaboration network of U.S. biotech inventors during 1976–1995, I find that inventors with superior track records are more apt to form collaboration ties that enhance brokerage, thereby occupying positions that allow them to broker across network boundaries. Controlling for past performance significantly weakens the positive relationship between brokering position and innovative performance. Furthermore, when inventor-level heterogeneity is controlled for through inventor fixed effects, the position-performance correlation disappears. These findings suggest that, at least for collaborative inventors, actor-level heterogeneity such as performance history largely drives the asymmetry in brokerage, explaining most of the position–performance association.