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Extreme levels of inequality have drawn increasing attention to those at the top of the income and wealth distributions, and the United States is home to some of the world's most affluent and influential households. A robust literature on economic elites in the United States documented details about their incomes and wealth prior to 2019, but it is unclear how recent economic shocks affected their financial resources and the distribution of income and wealth among U.S. households more broadly. We contribute to the literatures on elite households and global political economies by exploring the association between the global economic shock that accompanied the coronavirus 2019 disease (COVID-19) pandemic and U.S. income and wealth. We use data from the 1989 to 2022 of Consumer Finances (SCF) to provide details regarding changing inequality and the incomes and wealth of the top one percent of households. We explore changes in income sources (e.g., wage, business, capital) and wealth components (e.g., real estate, financial assets) to identify reasons for changing resource composition. We study how the demographics—age and education—of the one percent have changed, and we also explore whether the double-rich—those with both top incomes and top wealth—have changed. Our results are among the first to document the current concentration of economic resources in the United States and underscore the need to incorporate global processes in understanding inequalities in major economies.

The one percent, those at the top of the income and wealth distributions, are fundamental to understanding social and economic inequality and mobility, but sociologists rarely focus research attention on this group. This article presents updated evidence showing that both income and wealth are very highly concentrated in the United States but that the concentration of wealth, particularly financial wealth, is extremely high. We focus on the one percent of wealth owners and identify patterns in asset ownership, liabilities, and demographic traits that are relevant to sociological research. Findings show, for example, that those in the one percent have unique asset and debt portfolios that, to some extent, insulated them from the ill effects of the recent recession; however, patterns reported also highlight inheritance and suggest that mobility into the one percent is possible. The article concludes with suggestions for future research.

One of the enduring conclusions of political economy is that the government's share of the economy tends to grow over time and with a rising gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Yet, from the late 1980s through to 2008, government spending as a percentage of GDP declined in the typical year in affluent democracies. Synthesizing and building on literatures on the welfare state, state size and neoliberalism, we evaluate three explanations for the expansion and retrenchment of government spending as a percentage of GDP. We estimate fixed effects models of three measures of changes and cuts in government spending. In the full sample 1971–2008, changes and cuts were driven by the structural pressures of unemployment and trade openness, and the institutional factor of the adoption of the Euro. However, this conceals important historical variation. In the earlier period of expansion, the power resource of unionization was the most robust influence. In the later period of retrenchment, changes and cuts were shaped by the adoption of the Euro and a set of structural pressures. In contrast to previous research, changes and cuts in government spending are not associated with a country's GDP per capita after the mid-1980s. We conclude by discussing implications for the welfare state and neoliberalism, and by encouraging caution for universal theories of state size. ; Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG-geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz frei zugänglich / This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation).

One of the enduring conclusions of political economy is that the government's share of the economy tends to grow over time and with a rising gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Yet, from the late 1980s through to 2008, government spending as a percentage of GDP declined in the typical year in affluent democracies. Synthesizing and building on literatures on the welfare state, state size and neoliberalism, we evaluate three explanations for the expansion and retrenchment of government spending as a percentage of GDP. We estimate fixed effects models of three measures of changes and cuts in government spending. In the full sample 1971–2008, changes and cuts were driven by the structural pressures of unemployment and trade openness, and the institutional factor of the adoption of the Euro. However, this conceals important historical variation. In the earlier period of expansion, the power resource of unionization was the most robust influence. In the later period of retrenchment, changes and cuts were shaped by the adoption of the Euro and a set of structural pressures. In contrast to previous research, changes and cuts in government spending are not associated with a country's GDP per capita after the mid-1980s. We conclude by discussing implications for the welfare state and neoliberalism, and by encouraging caution for universal theories of state size.

The one percent are extremely powerful in the United States, and business assets are an important component of the wealth of these households. The authors show that business assets are an important component of the wealth portfolios of the one percent. In 1989, approximately 40 percent of households in the one percent had sufficient business assets to be in the one percent on the basis of those assets alone. By 2019, about 50 percent of households in the one percent had sufficient business assets to be in the one percent on the basis of those assets alone. For nearly 20 percent of households, business assets are necessary to be in the one percent. The findings suggest that business assets are critical to creating and maintaining wealth inequality in the United States and underscore the important role that starting and growing businesses can play in pushing households into top wealth positions.

BACKGROUND: The percentage of female dermatologists has increased from 6.9% in 1970 to 48.9% in 2017. Despite the changing gender composition of the dermatologist workforce, it is unknown whether there are gender-based differences in dermatology practice locations. OBJECTIVE: This study aimed to characterize gender-based differences in dermatology practice locations across the United States. METHODS: A cross-sectional study of all dermatologists in the 2020 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Physician Compare Database was performed. The number of self-identified female dermatologists and total dermatologists in each county and state was tabulated, and Spearman's correlation coefficients between county-level demographic and socioeconomic characteristics and female practices were calculated. RESULTS: Among 11,911 dermatologists, 5945 (49.9%) self-identified as female and 5966 (50.1%) as male. Of the 1052 counties with a dermatologist, 291 (27.7%) had no female dermatologist and 149 (14.2%) had no male dermatologist. The percentage of female dermatologists in each state ranged from 18.4% to 62.2%. Female dermatologists practiced more in areas with a higher percentage of democratic voters (r = +0.22) and higher median household income (r = +0.18), and less in rural counties (r = –0.18) or counties with higher uninsured rates (r = –0.11). CONCLUSION: Female dermatologists remain significantly underrepresented in some regions in the United States, particularly in the Mountain states and rural counties. As women continue entering the dermatologist workforce, these results can inform workforce planning strategies to improve the distribution and accessibility of dermatologists across the United States.

PurposeThis study aims to examine the relationship between organizational capacity, slack resource, platform strategic choice and firm performance. It also tackles the endogenous issues regarding the strategic choice of platform types.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses Heckman's two-stage procedures to examine the relationship between the variables. The sample in this study comes from Compustat annual company and segment files. The sample used in the main analysis consists of 252 individual corporations globally and 3,528 firm-year observations from 2004–2017.FindingsThe empirical results suggest that: (1) firms are more likely to develop physical platforms than virtual platforms when they possess higher levels of available slack, potential slack, research and development (R&D) capacity and marketing capacity; (2) in general, firms developing physical platforms perform better than firms developing virtual platforms after the endogeneity bias are controlled; and (3) firms that choose to develop physical platforms perform better than if they had chosen to develop virtual platforms.Research limitations/implicationsThis study contributes to the platform research literature by proposing the endogenous role of platform type choice in firm performance in the context of the retail industry. Prior conceptual and theoretical platform studies have seldom focused on the retail industry through a strategic choice perspective. Furthermore, one of the contributions of this study is the derivation of empirical support for the research's prediction using data from actual firms carried out by global physical and virtual platform companies. This study also presents many opportunities for further explorations on the relationship between firm strategic choice and firm performance in the context of platform retail industry.Practical implicationsThe findings of this study suggest that firms must realize that their performance is not necessarily affected by these platform type choice determinants in terms of potential slack, available slack, R&D capacity and marketing capacity. By contrast, they should pay more attention to developing physical platforms if it is possible. The study findings indicate that although virtual platforms have grown rapidly because of the development of technology, firm performance is at all times superior when firms choose to develop physical platforms.Originality/valuePrior platform studies have focused on the topic of network structure, platform architecture, pricing strategy, platform leadership and platform design and governance within the context of video game industry, software industry, hardware industry and telecommunications industry. Seldom of them focus on other industries through a strategic choice perspective. Furthermore, one of the contributions of this study is the derivation of empirical support for the research's prediction using data from actual firms carried out by global physical and virtual platform companies.