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The recent accession of Sweden by NATO as its 32nd member is a consequential political event for the Arctic. The new alignment at the top of the world has long-term geopolitical and security implications. Today, seven of the eight Arctic states, all who have sovereign territorial rights in the region ~ Canada, Denmark (for Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States ~ are bound together by the collective security and deterrence commitments of NATO; the largest Arctic state, Russia, with more than half the Arctic Ocean's coastline under its control, remains the outlier. The reality is that any current or anticipated 'Arctic state engagement' for future deliberations will include around the table seven NATO members and the Russian Federation. Finland's joining NATO in April 2023 (and bringing its 830-mile border with Russia into the fold), and now Sweden's joining after more than two centuries of neutrality, are unintended consequences for President Putin and Russia's invasion and continuing war in Ukraine. The actions of Finland and Sweden are notable and unambiguous, and have key impacts on the Arctic's future.Clearly inconceivable is Arctic military cooperation during Russia's continued aggression in Ukraine and threatening its Arctic neighbors. But how can the complex suite of Arctic issues, such as climate change, Indigenous concerns, marine safety, and environmental protection, be addressed within this new geopolitical framework? The Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum established in 1996 and led by the Arctic states, has been the leading forum for cooperation focusing on sustainable development and environmental protection. The Council is not a science body but a user of scientific knowledge to make policy decisions. The Council includes Indigenous Peoples organizations (named the Permanent Participants), and observers from non-Arctic states, and governmental and non-governmental organizations. The Ottawa Declaration specifically prohibits the Council from dealing with 'matters of military security' (fishing and marine mammal issues have also not been addressed). Major Council assessments have been conducted on climate change, shipping, oil and gas, biodiversity, human development, and pollution. However, the Council's work has been paused by seven of the Arctic states (less Russia) since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Since by charter the Arctic Ministers of the eight states must approve major new initiatives, the current lack of diplomatic engagement with Russia limits the way forward for constructive dialogue on a range of critical issues.With a diminished Council role as an influential and effective forum on key challenges, the responsibility for addressing specific Arctic issues remains in a group of international organizations where the Arctic states have relevant expertise, influence, and broad national interests. For example, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) can address Arctic safety, climate change, environmental protection, and data exchange. Other bodies can address telecommunications, human health, economic development, investment, and more. The national delegations and technical experts within these multinational bodies, which include Russia, are key avenues of engagement and cooperation in Arctic affairs. Another potential strategy for engagement is to address the implementation and requirements for existing Arctic treaties: search and rescue, oil pollution, scientific cooperation, and the conservation of polar bears (dating from 1973). The parties (six Arctic states including Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and the European Union) to the 2021 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean are moving ahead in just this manner to implement the terms of the treaty; recent meetings have addressed the establishment a scientific body to steer the research and the creation of a long-term program on future management and conservation measures. This illustrates the possibilities of treaty engagement and cooperation despite the changing geopolitics and national security interests of Arctic stakeholders.An era of uncertainty prevails in the Arctic for future cooperation and stability. The addition of Finland and Sweden in NATO adds clarity to regional security, but also creates tension and deep concern for a way forward in engaging Russia on a host of challenging Arctic climate, human use, and scientific issues. Notably, despite rising stresses in the Arctic, the region (along with the Antarctic) remains the most peaceful place on Earth. Maintaining the peace will require the difficult task of creating more trust among the Arctic eight and proactive enagement within international bodies and among treaty parties.

The recent accession of Sweden by NATO as its 32nd member is a consequential political event for the Arctic. The new alignment at the top of the world has long-term geopolitical and security implications. Today, seven of the eight Arctic states, all who have sovereign territorial rights in the region ~ Canada, Denmark (for Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States ~ are bound together by the collective security and deterrence commitments of NATO; the largest Arctic state, Russia, with more than half the Arctic Ocean's coastline under its control, remains the outlier. The reality is that any current or anticipated 'Arctic state engagement' for future deliberations will include around the table seven NATO members and the Russian Federation. Finland's joining NATO in April 2023 (and bringing its 830-mile border with Russia into the fold), and now Sweden's joining after more than two centuries of neutrality, are unintended consequences for President Putin and Russia's invasion and continuing war in Ukraine. The actions of Finland and Sweden are notable and unambiguous, and have key impacts on the Arctic's future.Clearly inconceivable is Arctic military cooperation during Russia's continued aggression in Ukraine and threatening its Arctic neighbors. But how can the complex suite of Arctic issues, such as climate change, Indigenous concerns, marine safety, and environmental protection, be addressed within this new geopolitical framework? The Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum established in 1996 and led by the Arctic states, has been the leading forum for cooperation focusing on sustainable development and environmental protection. The Council is not a science body but a user of scientific knowledge to make policy decisions. The Council includes Indigenous Peoples organizations (named the Permanent Participants), and observers from non-Arctic states, and governmental and non-governmental organizations. The Ottawa Declaration specifically prohibits the Council from dealing with 'matters of military security' (fishing and marine mammal issues have also not been addressed). Major Council assessments have been conducted on climate change, shipping, oil and gas, biodiversity, human development, and pollution. However, the Council's work has been paused by seven of the Arctic states (less Russia) since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Since by charter the Arctic Ministers of the eight states must approve major new initiatives, the current lack of diplomatic engagement with Russia limits the way forward for constructive dialogue on a range of critical issues.With a diminished Council role as an influential and effective forum on key challenges, the responsibility for addressing specific Arctic issues remains in a group of international organizations where the Arctic states have relevant expertise, influence, and broad national interests. For example, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) can address Arctic safety, climate change, environmental protection, and data exchange. Other bodies can address telecommunications, human health, economic development, investment, and more. The national delegations and technical experts within these multinational bodies, which include Russia, are key avenues of engagement and cooperation in Arctic affairs. Another potential strategy for engagement is to address the implementation and requirements for existing Arctic treaties: search and rescue, oil pollution, scientific cooperation, and the conservation of polar bears (dating from 1973). The parties (six Arctic states including Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and the European Union) to the 2021 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean are moving ahead in just this manner to implement the terms of the treaty; recent meetings have addressed the establishment a scientific body to steer the research and the creation of a long-term program on future management and conservation measures. This illustrates the possibilities of treaty engagement and cooperation despite the changing geopolitics and national security interests of Arctic stakeholders.An era of uncertainty prevails in the Arctic for future cooperation and stability. The addition of Finland and Sweden in NATO adds clarity to regional security, but also creates tension and deep concern for a way forward in engaging Russia on a host of challenging Arctic climate, human use, and scientific issues. Notably, despite rising stresses in the Arctic, the region (along with the Antarctic) remains the most peaceful place on Earth. Maintaining the peace will require the difficult task of creating more trust among the Arctic eight and proactive enagement within international bodies and among treaty parties.

Today's announcement by the US Department of State that the US will exercise its rights under customary law to an extended continental shelf (ECS) has long-term, practical implications for the federal bureaucracy and other related maritime organizations. As noted in the announcement, the US has a significant ECS in multiple, far-flung ocean areas: along both the East (Atlantic Ocean) and West (Pacific Ocean) coasts; in the Gulf of Mexico; in the Bering Sea; in the western Pacific off the Northern Mariana Islands (and Guam), and importantly, in the Arctic Ocean north of Alaska. The US ECS Project has estimated that the additional marine areas in question total approximately one million square kilometers. The largest US ECS region is in the Arctic Ocean beyond our 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and extending north into the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO). This is a remote region sandwiched between seabed claims by Russia and Canada. The potential for overlapping claims and the specter of future negotiations require not only effective presence and domain awareness, but also enhanced scientific data on the seabed and subsoils in a potentially contested marine area.Monitoring and surveillance of all the new ECS regions will require enhanced satellite (DOD and NOAA) coverage as well as aerial reconnaissance to fulfill US national security interests. Increased surface ship presence for maritime law enforcement will be required by Coast Guard cutters on routine deployments within all ECS areas; increased operational funding to the Department of Homeland Security will be needed to expand the Coast Guard's global reach. One key challenge for the Coast Guard will providing polar security cutter (polar icebreaker) presence in the Arctic Ocean perhaps initially on a seasonal basis. Coast Guard Cutter Healy is currently the only asset available for extensive operations in Arctic waters that are ice-covered. Recent summer deployments in 2022 to the North Pole and in 2023 along the Eurasian Arctic have proven Healy's robust multi-mission and research capabilities within the CAO. Likely required will be Healy's continued hydrographic and oceanographic operations in the new ECS to further secure the US claim. Notably, Healy has been the primary research platform gathering US seabed and subsoil data during the past two decades. The ECS announcement also provides clear needs and national requirements for the Coast Guard's new polar security cutters (now under construction) that hopefully will be operational by the end of the decade. Domain awareness within the Alaskan EEZ and new ECS will also be provided to the Coast Guard, other federal agencies, and the State of Alaska by the marine traffic information collected by the public-private partnership (and non-profit) Marine Exchange of Alaska (MXAK). Using a network of more than 150 Automatic Identification System (AIS) receivers around Alaska's coasts, MXAK provides vessel tracking, maritime domain management, and a measure of regulatory compliance. MXAK with its newly established Arctic Watch program focused on Arctic marine operations will be an important US asset in monitoring the new ECS areas claimed in the Bering Sea and CAO.Each of the new US ECS areas will require expanded hydrographic surveys and charting by NOAA's National Ocean Service. Continued research by the US Geological Survey (USGS) will be necessary to increase our understanding of the natural resources available in the ECS seabed and subsoils; determination of their future economic viability will also be important for future planning and policymaking. The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) will also be a player in carrying out its responsibilities for offshore safety, environmental protection, and conservation of natural resources. The Commerce Department (for NOAA) and Interior Department (for USGS and BSEE) will need additional funding to respond to these new ECS requirements.In exercising US sovereign rights in its ESC several federal agencies—especially the Coast Guard, NOAA, USGS and State Department—will be key to providing effective domain awareness, deploying physical presence, continuing scientific research (and data collection), and conducting diplomatic outreach to secure US outer limits to its ECS.

Today's announcement by the US Department of State that the US will exercise its rights under customary law to an extended continental shelf (ECS) has long-term, practical implications for the federal bureaucracy and other related maritime organizations. As noted in the announcement, the US has a significant ECS in multiple, far-flung ocean areas: along both the East (Atlantic Ocean) and West (Pacific Ocean) coasts; in the Gulf of Mexico; in the Bering Sea; in the western Pacific off the Northern Mariana Islands (and Guam), and importantly, in the Arctic Ocean north of Alaska. The US ECS Project has estimated that the additional marine areas in question total approximately one million square kilometers. The largest US ECS region is in the Arctic Ocean beyond our 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and extending north into the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO). This is a remote region sandwiched between seabed claims by Russia and Canada. The potential for overlapping claims and the specter of future negotiations require not only effective presence and domain awareness, but also enhanced scientific data on the seabed and subsoils in a potentially contested marine area.Monitoring and surveillance of all the new ECS regions will require enhanced satellite (DOD and NOAA) coverage as well as aerial reconnaissance to fulfill US national security interests. Increased surface ship presence for maritime law enforcement will be required by Coast Guard cutters on routine deployments within all ECS areas; increased operational funding to the Department of Homeland Security will be needed to expand the Coast Guard's global reach. One key challenge for the Coast Guard will providing polar security cutter (polar icebreaker) presence in the Arctic Ocean perhaps initially on a seasonal basis. Coast Guard Cutter Healy is currently the only asset available for extensive operations in Arctic waters that are ice-covered. Recent summer deployments in 2022 to the North Pole and in 2023 along the Eurasian Arctic have proven Healy's robust multi-mission and research capabilities within the CAO. Likely required will be Healy's continued hydrographic and oceanographic operations in the new ECS to further secure the US claim. Notably, Healy has been the primary research platform gathering US seabed and subsoil data during the past two decades. The ECS announcement also provides clear needs and national requirements for the Coast Guard's new polar security cutters (now under construction) that hopefully will be operational by the end of the decade. Domain awareness within the Alaskan EEZ and new ECS will also be provided to the Coast Guard, other federal agencies, and the State of Alaska by the marine traffic information collected by the public-private partnership (and non-profit) Marine Exchange of Alaska (MXAK). Using a network of more than 150 Automatic Identification System (AIS) receivers around Alaska's coasts, MXAK provides vessel tracking, maritime domain management, and a measure of regulatory compliance. MXAK with its newly established Arctic Watch program focused on Arctic marine operations will be an important US asset in monitoring the new ECS areas claimed in the Bering Sea and CAO.Each of the new US ECS areas will require expanded hydrographic surveys and charting by NOAA's National Ocean Service. Continued research by the US Geological Survey (USGS) will be necessary to increase our understanding of the natural resources available in the ECS seabed and subsoils; determination of their future economic viability will also be important for future planning and policymaking. The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) will also be a player in carrying out its responsibilities for offshore safety, environmental protection, and conservation of natural resources. The Commerce Department (for NOAA) and Interior Department (for USGS and BSEE) will need additional funding to respond to these new ECS requirements.In exercising US sovereign rights in its ESC several federal agencies—especially the Coast Guard, NOAA, USGS and State Department—will be key to providing effective domain awareness, deploying physical presence, continuing scientific research (and data collection), and conducting diplomatic outreach to secure US outer limits to its ECS.

The author argues that the world's Arctic resources will likely be partitioned among the five countries that can claim them, but due to uncontested international treaties it will not be on a first-come-first-served basis. The article notes that fishing activity has increased in the Arctic not necessarily because of global climate change, but because fish stocks in more temperate waters have been badly depleted. The Arctic's resources will not be used in the future to further enrich and empower the Arctic states, but the energy-hungry developing economies, such as those of China and India, that will consume these resources. The author notes that navigable Arctic passages will not be a reality until at least the next century, thus failing to transform the current shipping routes in the near future. Current legal instruments are sufficient to manage the Arctic and the growing economic importance of the region helps insure peace and does not act as a catalyst for war. K. Cargill

This volume brings together multiple perspectives on both the changing Arctic environment and the challenges and opportunities it presents for the shipping sector. It argues for the adoption of a forward-looking agenda that respects the fragile and changing Arctic frontier. With the accelerated interest in and potential for new maritime trade routes, commercial transportation and natural resource development, the pressures on the changing Arctic marine environment will only increase. The International Maritime Organization Polar Code is an important step toward Arctic stewardship. This new volume serves as an important guide to this rapidly developing agenda. Addressing a range of aspects, it offers a valuable resource for academics, practitioners, environmentalists and affected authorities in the shipping industry alike.

The Northern Sea Route (NSR) through Russia's ice-infested Arctic waters can potentially halve sailing distances between Europe and Northeast Asia. It also passes by some of the world's largest oil and gas reserves. As we enter the 21st century, technological, political and even climatic developments are again making the NSR an interesting possibility. Is international, commercial shipping on NSR feasible - economically, technologically and environmentally? This has been the topic of six years of research within the International Northern Sea Route Programme (INSROP), enlisting the expertise of 450 researchers from 14 countries. Acknowledging the complexity of the problem, the research programme used a uniquely multi-disciplinary approach, with 104 sub-projects mapping and investigating relevant ship technology, the costs and benefits versus other transport routes, potential impacts on the environment and local indigenous peoples, the cargo potential, political and administrative obstacles, the availability of insurance, aspects of security, jurisdiction and environmental law, as well as other aspects. The results and conclusions of the 104 studies have been integrated and is presented in this book - the first book ever to address the Northern Sea Route in such a comprehensive manner.It is truly a reference work, which should be on the desk of all commercial and political decision-makers concerned with the commercial potential and future development of Northern Sea Route shipping - as well as other stakeholders and interested experts