Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Purpose
To examine whether trajectories of health (depressive symptoms, psychological wellbeing, self-rated health, and body mass index) and health behaviors (smoking, heavy alcohol consumption, physical inactivity, and cannabis use) changed for individuals who first reported at least monthly religious attendance and then in subsequent study waves reported no active religious attendance.

Methods
Data were from four cohort studies from the United States collected between 1996 and 2018: National Longitudinal Survey of 1997 (NLSY1997); National Longitudinal Survey of Young Adults (NLSY-YA); Transition to Adulthood Supplement of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID-TA); and Health and Retirement Study (HRS) with a total n = 6592 individuals and 37,743 person-observations.

Results
None of the 10-year trajectories of health or health behaviors changed for the worse after the change from active to inactive religious attendance. Instead, the adverse trends were observed already during the time of active religious attendance.

Conclusion
These results suggest that religious disengagement is a correlate—not a cause—of a life course characterized by poorer health and health behaviors. The religious decline caused by people leaving their religion is unlikely to influence population health.

AbstractMultiple factors can influence the rates of residential mobility flows between different regions of a country. Studies have often focused on demographic and economic factors, but social conditions may be relevant as well. We examined whether different indicators of social capital (i.e., social support, loneliness, social trust, community participation, cultural activities, and meeting other people) were associated with population migration rates across 299 municipalities of Finland. Data for the social characteristics were derived from the Regional Health and Wellbeing study (n = 100,750 respondents) aggregated to the level of municipalities using multilevel regression with post‐stratification (median number of participants was 115 individuals per municipality, range from 5 to 10,616). Residential mobility rates were derived from census data. Municipalities with higher levels of social support, higher social trust, more cultural activities, and more frequent social contacts had higher net migration rates, that is, more people moving in than out of the municipality. Social support, cultural activities, and community participation were associated with higher in‐migration. Social trust and frequency of meeting people were associated with lower out‐migration. The findings provide empirical support for the hypothesis that regions with stronger social capital are more attractive destinations for within‐country residential mobility.

AbstractThe ongoing conversation on AI ethics and politics is in full swing and has spread to the general public. Rather than contributing by engaging with the issues and views discussed, we want to step back and comment on the widening conversation itself. We consider evolved human cognitive tendencies and biases, and how they frame and hinder the conversation on AI ethics. Primarily, we describe our innate human capacities known as folk theories and how we apply them to phenomena of different implicit categories. Through examples and empirical findings, we show that such tendencies specifically affect the key issues discussed in AI ethics. The central claim is that much of our mostly opaque intuitive thinking has not evolved to match the nature of AI, and this causes problems in democratizing AI ethics and politics. Developing awareness of how our intuitive thinking affects our more explicit views will add to the quality of the conversation.

Changing collective behaviour and supporting non-pharmaceutical interventions is an important component in mitigating virus transmission during a pandemic. In a large international collaboration (Study 1, N = 49,968 across 67 countries), we investigated selfreported factors associated with public health behaviours (e.g., spatial distancing and stricter hygiene) and endorsed public policy interventions (e.g., closing bars and restaurants) during the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic (April-May 2020). Respondents who reported identifying more strongly with their nation consistently reported greater engagement in public health behaviours and support for public health policies. Results were similar for representative and non-representative national samples. Study 2 (N = 42 countries) conceptually replicated the central finding using aggregate indices of national identity (obtained using the World Values Survey) and a measure of actual behaviour change during the pandemic (obtained from Google mobility reports). Higher levels of national identification prior to the pandemic predicted lower mobility during the early stage of the pandemic (r = −0.40). We discuss the potential implications of links between national identity, leadership, and public health for managing COVID-19 and future pandemics.