Suchergebnisse

1.1. Languages and Migrant Networks -- 1.2. The Political Incorporation of Migrants -- 1.3. The Chinese in Central-Eastern Europe -- 1.4. Contributions -- 1.5. Plan of the Book -- 2. A Theory about Languages and Migrant Networks -- 2.1. Importance of Migrant Networks for Political Incorporation -- 2.2. Languages, Subnationalism, and Transnationalism -- 2.3. A Tale of Two Migrant Networks -- 2.4. The Effects of Migrant Network Types -- 2.5. Discussion -- 3. The Chinese of Central-Eastern Europe -- 3.1. Why Central-Eastern Europe? -- 3.2. From China to Central-Eastern Europe -- 3.3. The Chinese Communities in Central-Eastern Europe -- 3.4. Discussion -- 4. Survey Evidence from Central-Eastern Europe -- 4.1. Case Selection -- 4.2. Survey Design -- 4.3. Measurement: Migrant Network -- 4.4. Measurement: Political Incorporation -- 4.5. Measurement: Alternative Explanations -- 4.6. Empirical Evidence -- 4.7. Linguistic-Based Migrant Networks or Networks of a Different Kind? -- 4.8. Discussion -- 4.9. Appendix: How to Survey Migrants -- 5. Political Incorporation amidst Right-Wing Nationalism in Hungary -- 5.1. The Rise of Right-Wing Nationalism -- 5.2. The Chinese Exception -- 5.3. Political Incorporation across Three Waves -- 5.4. Alternative Explanations -- 5.5. Discussion: Observable Implications for Chinese Identification -- 5.6. Appendix: Coding for the Chinese in Newspapers -- 6. Tax Collection and Political Incorporation: A Natural Experiment in Romania -- 6.1. Treatment Effect: The ANAF Tax Fraud Sweep -- 6.2. The Moderating Effects of Migrant Network Type -- 6.3. Isolating the Causal Mechanism -- 6.4. Implications -- 7. Beyond the Chinese: The Muslims in Central-Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective -- 7.1. The History of Muslims in CEE -- 7.2. Case Selection -- 7.3. Bonding Networks among Migrants from the Middle East and North Africa -- 7.4. Effects of Migrant Network Types on Political Incorporation -- 7.5. Comparing Migrants from the Middle East and North Africa to the Chinese -- 7.6. Discussion -- 8. Beyond Central-Eastern Europe: The Chinese in Western Europe in Comparative Perspective -- 8.1. The Chinese in Western Europe -- 8.2. Research Design: Portugal -- 8.3. Political Incorporation: Bridging versus Bonding Networks -- 8.4. Comparing the Chinese in Portugal and Central-Eastern Europe -- 8.5. Discussion -- 9. Implications: Local Attitudes towards the Chinese (and Other Out-Groups) -- 9.1. Explaining Local Attitudes towards the Chinese -- 9.2. Public Attitudes across Central-Eastern Europe in 2014 -- 9.3. Beyond the Chinese: Attitudes Towards Other Out-Groups -- 9.4. Discussion -- 10. Implications: Best Practices -- 10.1. Promoting Lingua Francas -- 10.3. Incentivizing Dispersed Settlements -- 10.4. Maintaining Regularized, Positive Channels of Communication.

Using a newly assembled dataset and drawing on fieldwork data from Malaysia and Singapore, Liu finds that how linguistic power is distributed-specifically whether a lingua franca is recognized exclusively or above all others-can generate social trust, attract foreign investment, and therefore indirectly promote economic growth

Using a newly assembled dataset and drawing on fieldwork data from Malaysia and Singapore, Liu finds that how linguistic power is distributed—specifically whether a lingua franca is recognized exclusively or above all others—can generate social trust, attract foreign investment, and therefore indirectly promote economic growth.

AbstractHow can the growing personalization of power be identified and measured ex ante? Extant measures in the authoritarian literature have traditionally focused on institutional constraints and more recently on individual behaviour – such as purging opposition members from (and packing allies into) government bodies. This article offers a different strategy that examines leaders' individual rhetoric. It focuses on patterns of pronoun usage for the first person. The author argues that as leaders personalize power, they are less likely to use 'I' (a pronoun linked to credit claiming and blame minimizing) and more likely to use 'we' (the leader speaks for – or with – the populace). To test this argument, the study focuses on all major, scheduled speeches by all chief executives in the entire Chinese-speaking world – that is, China, Singapore and Taiwan – since independence. It finds a robust pattern between first-person pronouns and political constraints. To ensure the results are not driven by the Chinese sample, the rhetoric of four other political leaders is considered: Albania's Hoxha, North Korea's Kim Il Sung, Hungary's Orbán and Ecuador's Correa. The implications of this project suggest that how leaders talk can provide insights into how they perceive their rule.

AbstractThe Chinese are one of the largest migrant groups in Central‐Eastern Europe. While governments have welcomed these newcomers, we do not know whether locals share this sentiment. This is because we have not had the requisite data. In this article, I address this shortcoming. I draw on two oft‐cited explanations in the migration literature to examine public attitudes toward the Chinese. The first is about competition over scarce economic resources; the second is about conflicts between two distinct cultures. Using two different survey samples, I find strong evidence to corroborate the second hypothesis. Attitudes toward the Chinese are generally negative when the aggregate Chinese population is large. Public discourse (i.e., passive contact) reinforces cultural stereotypes. There is, however, a caveat: An increasing Chinese presence in a person's neighbourhood (i.e., active contact) can offset these negative effects. As the spatial gap between the two cultures closes, the social ones correspondingly narrow.