Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Half- title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Dedication -- Acknowledgements -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Does Economic Theory Work? -- 3. Why Is the World so Irrational? -- 4. Does Economic Theory Fail? -- 5. You Can Fool Some of the People… -- 6. Behavioral Theories I: Biases and Irrationality -- 7. Behavioral Theories II: Time and Uncertainty -- 8. Learning and Friends -- 9. Conclusion: Psychology, Neuroscience and Economics -- References -- Index.

La economía moderna examina una variedad de temas que abarca desde la política económica hasta la teoría de las organizaciones. La economía del comportamiento (behavioral economics) propone ser instrumental para comprender estos temas. El objetivo de este artículo es responder la pregunta sobre qué es lo que aporta la economía del comportamiento a la ciencia económica. El hombre (o mujer, con más frecuencia en estos tiempos) moderno paradigmático de la economía moderna difiere de la máquina calculadora y fría que se utiliza como instrumento de trabajo. El tomador de decisiones de la economía moderna está rodeado de incertidumbre por todos lados. Nuestro interés central es medir qué tan exitosos somos en la comprensión de la incertidumbre. Mi objetivo en este artículo no es detallar la teoría tal como se encuentra en la mente de los críticos que no están familiarizados con ella, sino como se encuentra en la mente de los economistas que la utilizan. Esta teoría es mucho más exitosa de lo que la mayoría imagina —pero no carece de debilidades que la economía del comportamiento tiene el potencial de remediar.

'Intellectual property' - patents and copyrights - have become controversial. We witness teenagers being sued for 'pirating' music - and we observe AIDS patients in Africa dying due to lack of ability to pay for drugs that are high priced to satisfy patent holders. Are patents and copyrights essential to thriving creation and innovation - do we need them so that we all may enjoy fine music and good health? Across time and space the resounding answer is: No. So-called intellectual property is in fact an 'intellectual monopoly' that hinders rather than helps the competitive free market regime that has delivered wealth and innovation to our doorsteps. This book has broad coverage of both copyrights and patents and is designed for a general audience, focusing on simple examples. The authors conclude that the only sensible policy to follow is to eliminate the patents and copyright systems as they currently exist

First published online: 07 May 2021 ; Models of two contestants exerting effort to win a prize are very common and widely used in political economy. The contest success function plays as fundamental a role in the theory of contests as does the production function in the theory of the firm, yet beyond the existence of equilibrium few general results are known. This paper seeks to remedy that gap. ; This article recieve funding from the EUI Research Council and MIUR PRIN 20103S5RN3 for financial support. This article was published Open Access with the support from the EUI Library through the CRUI - Springer Transformative Agreement (2020-2024)

We introduce a model where social norms of voting participation are strategically chosen by competing political parties and determine voters' turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advantaged. Our model shares features of the ethical voter model and it delivers novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results. (JEL D72, Z13)

First published online on Oct 2020 ; We introduce a model where social norms of voting participation are strategically chosen by competing political parties and determine voters' turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advantaged. Our model shares features of the ethical voter model and it delivers novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results.

Abstract
Intervention often does not lead to peace, but rather to prolonged conflict. Indeed, we document that it is an important source of prolonged conflicts. We introduce a theoretical model of the balance of power to explain why this should be the case and to analyse how peace can be achieved: either a hot peace between hostile neighbours or the peace of the strong dominating the weak. Non-intervention generally leads to peace after defeat of the weak. Hot peace can be achieved with sufficiently strong outside intervention. The latter is thus optimal if the goal of policy is to prevent the strong from dominating the weak.

We re-examine the theory of rational voter participation where voting is by two collusive parties enforcing social norms through costly peer punishment. The model nests both the ethical voter model and the pivotal voter model. In the unique mixed strategy equilibrium the advantaged party gets all surplus. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low and the benefit of winning/nthe election is the same for both parties, the larger party is always advantaged. When instead the enforcement of social norms is costly we have a result reminiscent of Olson, and the smaller party may be advantaged. ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.

How can a small special interest group successfully get an inefficient transfer at the expense of a much larger group with many more resources available for lobbying? We consider a simple model of collusive organizations that provide a public good in the form of effort and have a fixed cost per member of acting collusively. Our key result is that the willingness of such a group to pay for a/ngiven prize depends on whether the prize is fungible - that is, whether the prize can be used to pay for itself. If the prize is fungible, as in the case of a transfer payment, a smaller group always has an advantage. If the prize is non-fungible - civil rights for example - willingness to pay first increases then decreases with the size of the group. We use the theory to study agenda setting/nboth with and without blackmail by the politician showing that in general the small group is not too greedy: when it wins it optimally chooses to pre-empt the large group by choosing a prize small enough to equal the large group participation cost. ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.