Suchergebnisse

The agri-environmental policy of the European Union strongly relies on financial incentives provided through Agri-envrionmental Schemes (AES) to stimulate farmers' adoption of pro-environmental practices. A rational economic assumption is that farmers enroll if they are paid enough to cover their opportunity costs. However, behavioral economics consider that psychologic factors may be involved in this decision. The first aim of this thesis is to determine the role of behavioral factors in AES adoption. Chapter 1 uses a social-psychology model, the Theory of Planned Behavior, to measure the weight of behavioral factors in farmers' decision to enroll in a pesticide-reduction AES. The survey reveals that farmers are both driven by traditional economic motivations and norms (social and personal). Chapter 2 studies in more details the role of norms. A theoretical model reveals that social norms may either hamper or facilitate the participation in AES and a web-survey, confirms the importance of social injunctive norms and personal norms. In the second part of the thesis, we analyze the performance of innovative designs and how it may be affected by behavioral factors. In chapter 3, to address cases of environmental threshold, we test with an economic experiment a contract in which payment is conditioned to collective farmers' participation. This contract appears to be more effective and efficient than traditional AES. The two last chapters analyze a new application of AES: biodiversity offsets. Based on a survey, chapter 4 highlights factors that influence the participation in such contracts as well as issues of effectiveness and efficiency. In chapter 5, we show with a choice experiment that farmers, especially the most environmentally sensitive, are influenced by the contracts' goal framing: they prefer contracts that aim at biodiversity conservation rather than at the compensation of biodiversity losses. We conclude by insisting on the complementarity between traditional and behavioral environmental policy ...

The agri-environmental policy of the European Union strongly relies on financial incentives provided through Agri-envrionmental Schemes (AES) to stimulate farmers' adoption of pro-environmental practices. A rational economic assumption is that farmers enroll if they are paid enough to cover their opportunity costs. However, behavioral economics consider that psychologic factors may be involved in this decision. The first aim of this thesis is to determine the role of behavioral factors in AES adoption. Chapter 1 uses a social-psychology model, the Theory of Planned Behavior, to measure the weight of behavioral factors in farmers' decision to enroll in a pesticide-reduction AES. The survey reveals that farmers are both driven by traditional economic motivations and norms (social and personal). Chapter 2 studies in more details the role of norms. A theoretical model reveals that social norms may either hamper or facilitate the participation in AES and a web-survey, confirms the importance of social injunctive norms and personal norms. In the second part of the thesis, we analyze the performance of innovative designs and how it may be affected by behavioral factors. In chapter 3, to address cases of environmental threshold, we test with an economic experiment a contract in which payment is conditioned to collective farmers' participation. This contract appears to be more effective and efficient than traditional AES. The two last chapters analyze a new application of AES: biodiversity offsets. Based on a survey, chapter 4 highlights factors that influence the participation in such contracts as well as issues of effectiveness and efficiency. In chapter 5, we show with a choice experiment that farmers, especially the most environmentally sensitive, are influenced by the contracts' goal framing: they prefer contracts that aim at biodiversity conservation rather than at the compensation of biodiversity losses. We conclude by insisting on the complementarity between traditional and behavioral environmental policy ...

The agri-environmental policy of the European Union strongly relies on financial incentives provided through Agri-envrionmental Schemes (AES) to stimulate farmers' adoption of pro-environmental practices. A rational economic assumption is that farmers enroll if they are paid enough to cover their opportunity costs. However, behavioral economics consider that psychologic factors may be involved in this decision. The first aim of this thesis is to determine the role of behavioral factors in AES adoption. Chapter 1 uses a social-psychology model, the Theory of Planned Behavior, to measure the weight of behavioral factors in farmers' decision to enroll in a pesticide-reduction AES. The survey reveals that farmers are both driven by traditional economic motivations and norms (social and personal). Chapter 2 studies in more details the role of norms. A theoretical model reveals that social norms may either hamper or facilitate the participation in AES and a web-survey, confirms the importance of social injunctive norms and personal norms. In the second part of the thesis, we analyze the performance of innovative designs and how it may be affected by behavioral factors. In chapter 3, to address cases of environmental threshold, we test with an economic experiment a contract in which payment is conditioned to collective farmers' participation. This contract appears to be more effective and efficient than traditional AES. The two last chapters analyze a new application of AES: biodiversity offsets. Based on a survey, chapter 4 highlights factors that influence the participation in such contracts as well as issues of effectiveness and efficiency. In chapter 5, we show with a choice experiment that farmers, especially the most environmentally sensitive, are influenced by the contracts' goal framing: they prefer contracts that aim at biodiversity conservation rather than at the compensation of biodiversity losses. We conclude by insisting on the complementarity between traditional and behavioral environmental policy ...

The agri-environmental policy of the European Union strongly relies on financial incentives provided through Agri-envrionmental Schemes (AES) to stimulate farmers' adoption of pro-environmental practices. A rational economic assumption is that farmers enroll if they are paid enough to cover their opportunity costs. However, behavioral economics consider that psychologic factors may be involved in this decision. The first aim of this thesis is to determine the role of behavioral factors in AES adoption. Chapter 1 uses a social-psychology model, the Theory of Planned Behavior, to measure the weight of behavioral factors in farmers' decision to enroll in a pesticide-reduction AES. The survey reveals that farmers are both driven by traditional economic motivations and norms (social and personal). Chapter 2 studies in more details the role of norms. A theoretical model reveals that social norms may either hamper or facilitate the participation in AES and a web-survey, confirms the importance of social injunctive norms and personal norms. In the second part of the thesis, we analyze the performance of innovative designs and how it may be affected by behavioral factors. In chapter 3, to address cases of environmental threshold, we test with an economic experiment a contract in which payment is conditioned to collective farmers' participation. This contract appears to be more effective and efficient than traditional AES. The two last chapters analyze a new application of AES: biodiversity offsets. Based on a survey, chapter 4 highlights factors that influence the participation in such contracts as well as issues of effectiveness and efficiency. In chapter 5, we show with a choice experiment that farmers, especially the most environmentally sensitive, are influenced by the contracts' goal framing: they prefer contracts that aim at biodiversity conservation rather than at the compensation of biodiversity losses. We conclude by insisting on the complementarity between traditional and behavioral environmental policy ...

Accompagner les agriculteurs vers des pratiques plus respectueuses de l'environnement nécessite une meilleure compréhension des motivations qui guident les prises de décision individuelles. Ce papier s'intéresse à une des dimensions des motivations non-monétaires, les normes personnelles. Etudier les normes personnelles revient à s'intéresser au sentiment d'obligation morale (Schwartz, 1977) que les agriculteurs peuvent ressentir lors d'un choix de pratiques. En se basant sur les théories développées par la psychologie sociale pour expliquer l'adoption de comportements pro-environnementaux, l'économie comportementale intègre de plus en plus le concept de norme personnelle dans les modèles économiques. Cependant, cette synergie entre les disciplines reste souvent limitée à l'étude du comportement du consommateur. Une étude de cas réalisée à partir d'un questionnaire interrogeant 51 viticulteurs montre l'influence de la norme personnelle dans la décision de participer ou non à un dispositif agro-environnemental exigeant en termes de réduction des pesticides. La discussion proposée ici vise l'amélioration des recommandations faites par l'économie comportementale aux politiques publiques, en proposant d'améliorer l'impact de l'intervention publique par des incitations non-monétaires s'appuyant sur l'activation des normes personnelles.

Accompagner les agriculteurs vers des pratiques plus respectueuses de l'environnement nécessite une meilleure compréhension des motivations qui guident les prises de décision individuelles. Ce papier s'intéresse à une des dimensions des motivations non-monétaires, les normes personnelles. Etudier les normes personnelles revient à s'intéresser au sentiment d'obligation morale (Schwartz, 1977) que les agriculteurs peuvent ressentir lors d'un choix de pratiques. En se basant sur les théories développées par la psychologie sociale pour expliquer l'adoption de comportements pro-environnementaux, l'économie comportementale intègre de plus en plus le concept de norme personnelle dans les modèles économiques. Cependant, cette synergie entre les disciplines reste souvent limitée à l'étude du comportement du consommateur. Une étude de cas réalisée à partir d'un questionnaire interrogeant 51 viticulteurs montre l'influence de la norme personnelle dans la décision de participer ou non à un dispositif agro-environnemental exigeant en termes de réduction des pesticides. La discussion proposée ici vise l'amélioration des recommandations faites par l'économie comportementale aux politiques publiques, en proposant d'améliorer l'impact de l'intervention publique par des incitations non-monétaires s'appuyant sur l'activation des normes personnelles.

Accompagner les agriculteurs vers des pratiques plus respectueuses de l'environnement nécessite une meilleure compréhension des motivations qui guident les prises de décision individuelles. Ce papier s'intéresse à une des dimensions des motivations non-monétaires, les normes personnelles. Etudier les normes personnelles revient à s'intéresser au sentiment d'obligation morale (Schwartz, 1977) que les agriculteurs peuvent ressentir lors d'un choix de pratiques. En se basant sur les théories développées par la psychologie sociale pour expliquer l'adoption de comportements pro-environnementaux, l'économie comportementale intègre de plus en plus le concept de norme personnelle dans les modèles économiques. Cependant, cette synergie entre les disciplines reste souvent limitée à l'étude du comportement du consommateur. Une étude de cas réalisée à partir d'un questionnaire interrogeant 51 viticulteurs montre l'influence de la norme personnelle dans la décision de participer ou non à un dispositif agro-environnemental exigeant en termes de réduction des pesticides. La discussion proposée ici vise l'amélioration des recommandations faites par l'économie comportementale aux politiques publiques, en proposant d'améliorer l'impact de l'intervention publique par des incitations non-monétaires s'appuyant sur l'activation des normes personnelles.

Accompagner les agriculteurs vers des pratiques plus respectueuses de l'environnement nécessite une meilleure compréhension des motivations qui guident les prises de décision individuelles. Ce papier s'intéresse à une des dimensions des motivations non-monétaires, les normes personnelles. Etudier les normes personnelles revient à s'intéresser au sentiment d'obligation morale (Schwartz, 1977) que les agriculteurs peuvent ressentir lors d'un choix de pratiques. En se basant sur les théories développées par la psychologie sociale pour expliquer l'adoption de comportements pro-environnementaux, l'économie comportementale intègre de plus en plus le concept de norme personnelle dans les modèles économiques. Cependant, cette synergie entre les disciplines reste souvent limitée à l'étude du comportement du consommateur. Une étude de cas réalisée à partir d'un questionnaire interrogeant 51 viticulteurs montre l'influence de la norme personnelle dans la décision de participer ou non à un dispositif agro-environnemental exigeant en termes de réduction des pesticides. La discussion proposée ici vise l'amélioration des recommandations faites par l'économie comportementale aux politiques publiques, en proposant d'améliorer l'impact de l'intervention publique par des incitations non-monétaires s'appuyant sur l'activation des normes personnelles.

Improving water efficiency is a growing challenge for the Common Agricultural Policy. In this article, we test whether social comparison nudges can promote water-saving behavior among farmers. We report on a pilot Randomized Controlled Trial, in which information on individual and group water consumption were sent every week to farmers equipped with smartmeters. We do not detect an effect of nudges on average water consumption. We however find that the nudge decreases water consumption at the top of the distribution while it increases consumption at the bottom. This study highlights the potential of nudges as an agricultural policy tool.

Improving water efficiency is a growing challenge for the Common Agricultural Policy. In this article, we test whether social comparison nudges can promote water-saving behavior among farmers. We report on a pilot Randomized Controlled Trial, in which information on individual and group water consumption were sent every week to farmers equipped with smartmeters. We do not detect an effect of nudges on average water consumption. We however find that the nudge decreases water consumption at the top of the distribution while it increases consumption at the bottom. This study highlights the potential of nudges as an agricultural policy tool.

Improving water efficiency is a growing challenge for the Common Agricultural Policy. In this article, we test whether social comparison nudges can promote water-saving behavior among farmers. We report on a pilot Randomized Controlled Trial, in which information on individual and group water consumption were sent every week to farmers equipped with smartmeters. We do not detect an effect of nudges on average water consumption. We however find that the nudge decreases water consumption at the top of the distribution while it increases consumption at the bottom. This study highlights the potential of nudges as an agricultural policy tool.

Improving water efficiency is a growing challenge for the Common Agricultural Policy. In this article, we test whether social comparison nudges can promote water-saving behavior among farmers. We report on a pilot Randomized Controlled Trial, in which information on individual and group water consumption were sent every week to farmers equipped with smartmeters. We do not detect an effect of nudges on average water consumption. We however find that the nudge decreases water consumption at the top of the distribution while it increases consumption at the bottom. This study highlights the potential of nudges as an agricultural policy tool.

Improving water efficiency is a growing challenge for the Common Agricultural Policy. In this article, we test whether social comparison nudges can promote water-saving behavior among farmers. We report on a pilot Randomized Controlled Trial, in which information on individual and group water consumption were sent every week to farmers equipped with smartmeters. We do not detect an effect of nudges on average water consumption. We however find that the nudge decreases water consumption at the top of the distribution while it increases consumption at the bottom. This study highlights the potential of nudges as an agricultural policy tool.