Suchergebnisse

Deliberate non-enforcement of the law has been analyzed as a policy tool to redistribute income. I show that it also responds to political incentives for the provision of insurance, resembling two well-known dimensions of social policy design. I analyze data from a large informal program of social insurance in the world: informal access to electricity service. Transmission and distribution losses (TDL) in the electricity sector are counter-cyclical because non-compliance and theft increase during economic crises. By exploiting variation in political institutions, I capture political motivations for the provision of informal insurance. Using a panel of 110 developing countries (1970–2014) and instrumental variables for business cycles and regime type, I show that unlike highly entrenched autocrats, democracies tolerate increases in electricity losses during negative income shocks. This paper expands the literature on "forbearance" showing how the provision of informal insurance varies across the developing world.

The existing literature often assumes that the target of global interstate economic competition is the overseas market, that is, the markets in third, export-destination countries. However, in many countries, domestic industries compete fiercely for domestic market share with imports from other countries. Such import competition creates policy diffusion between a country and its import-competitor countries. Such policy diffusion can be observed in policy areas that affect production costs of domestic industries. We focus on import competition's effect on social welfare policies in developing countries and test our theory in two broad types of policies: social insurance spending and progressive social spending. We find strong evidence for import-competition-induced policy diffusion in both policy areas. Moreover, in the case of social insurance, the effect of policy diffusion is mediated by the strength of labor, suggesting that strong labor is more capable of blocking welfare retrenchment policies.

ResumenLa perspectiva insider‐outsider, dominante en el discurso sobre la regulación laboral, sostiene que las disposiciones protectoras se mantienen vigentes en interés de sus beneficiarios (insiders), aunque perjudican a otros trabajadores menos acomodados (outsiders). Si la contraposición entre ambas categorías fuera tal como se formula en el modelo, los outsiders se opondrían rotundamente a la regulación. Sin embargo, nuestras evidencias de que los outsiders en los países en desarrollo están mayoritariamente a favor de las medidas regulatorias obligan a replantear la tajante dicotomía insider‐outsider. Sugerimos distintas líneas de investigación, como los procesos redistributivos, las transiciones, la equidad y el poder del empleador en los mercados de trabajo.

RésuméSelon l'approche «insiders‐outsiders», qui domine le discours sur le droit du travail, la législation protectrice de l'emploi favorise les travailleurs dotés d'un emploi stable, les insiders, au détriment des outsiders, moins bien lotis. Les outsiders devraient de ce fait être favorables à la déréglementation. Les auteurs observent pourtant que, dans les pays en développement, ceux‐ci sont au contraire très majoritairement attachés à la protection de l'emploi. Ils plaident donc pour une remise en question de l'opposition traditionnelle entre insiders et outsiders et pour une meilleure prise en compte d'aspects comme la mutualisation des gains, les transitions professionnelles, l'équité ou le pouvoir de l'employeur.

The "insider–outsider" perspective, which dominates the discourse on labour regulations, argues that protective regulations hurt the less well‐off outsiders but are kept in place in the interests of the insiders, who are covered by the regulations. Thus, if the insider–outsider divide were as depicted in the standard representation, outsiders would be strongly against regulations. Our evidence that a large majority of outsiders in developing countries in fact support protective labour regulations calls for a rethink of the sharp insider–outsider divide. We suggest a number of avenues for exploration, including income‐sharing, transitions, fairness and employer power in labour markets.

Contrary to the predictions of the insider–outsider model, we show that the large majority of outsiders in developing countries support, rather than oppose, protective labour regulations. This evidence holds across countries in different regions, across different types of protective labour regulations (i.e. severance payment, minimum wages, working time), and for different categories of outsiders (i.e. unemployed workers and employees without access to legally mandated labour benefits). We revise the economic and political assumptions of the insider–outsider model, discussing their empirical relevance in a developing country context.

Contrary to the predictions of the insider-outsider model, we show that the large majority of outsiders in developing countries support, rather than oppose, protective labour regulations. This evidence holds across countries in different regions, across different types of protective labour regulations (i.e. severance payment, minimum wages, working time), and for different categories of outsiders (i.e. unemployed workers and employees without access to legally mandated labour benefits). We revise the economic and political assumptions of the insider-outsider model, discussing their empirical relevance in a developing country context.