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This study analyzes the incentives for process innovations under different conditions determined by the competition policy for intellectual property rights (IPR) and particular features of markets and technologies. Competition policy is defined by the presence or absence of compulsory licensing, markets are characterized by technological leadership or technological competition. The results of modelling show that the uncertainty engendered by technological competition may lower the intensity of innovative activities, if there are no mechanisms of coordination between participants. Voluntary licensing generally improves social welfare but does not guarantee an increase in innovative efforts. Compulsory licensing can impede innovations due to the opportunistic behaviour of market participants but certain measures of state policy can prevent this negative effect.

The article considers the problem of correspondence between antitrust policy and intellectual property rights protection in terms of their goals, methods and mutual influence. This question provokes discussions: on the one hand, innovative development requires strong intellectual property rights protection to stimulate entrepreneurs, even if it leads to anti-competitive consequences. On the other hand, maintenance of market competition requires limiting property rights. The context of the problem changes significantly when emerging markets economies are concerned. Basing on the formal model, the authors analyze possible hostile effects of antitrust policies under the conditions of poor intellectual property rights protection, which is typical for some developing countries, and propose ways of overcoming the unfavorable situation. The research shows that antitrust policy needs careful consideration of the existing institutional environment.

The article considers the main changes taking place in modern economics and economics education. Authors believe that the most important of them are: (1) strengthening of the applied nature of economic research work; (2) declining popularity of purely theoretical economics. Our analysis revealed a dual trend. On the one hand, the notion that neoclassical economics still prevails the academic dis­course seems to be less and less justified. On the other hand, economic education is still based on neoclassical foundations. This adds more urgency to the debate on the state of economic education. In particular, on how to train students to view big socio-economic issues from different theoretical perspectives and to strengthen the practical component of economic education. The authors prove the idea that up-to-date Russian economic education should be based on three main principles: (1) teaching students in a wide range of empirical methods; (2) development of pluralism of economic thinking manifested in the acquaintance of students with various currents of modern economic thought as well as the views of their representatives on solving topical economic and social challenges; (3) delivering to students the most comprehensive picture of the performance of the Russian economy. The potential for incorporating of these principles in the educational process is considered on the example of the bachelor's of economics curriculum of the Faculty of Economics of Lomonosov Moscow State University.

Reforms of natural monopolies need clear delineations between the industries where market mechanisms contribute to social welfare and those where the costs of a transition to a market economy outweigh the benefits. In this article, we emphasise the difficulty of finding the optimum modes of governance within industries as a whole. Using the tools of the transaction cost economics, we show that, alongside the problem of market boundaries and the resultant position and behaviour of a company — an object of antimonopoly regulation — it is necessary to consider the hypothesis about the market being a special mechanism for coordinating interactions between economic entities. In particular, such determinants of transactions as asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency can create a basis for abandoning the price mechanism. Williamson's heuristic models suggest that if an activity is characterized by high specificity, uncertainty, and frequency, the very organisation of this activity precludes transaction cost minimisation through the price mechanism employed either in full or in part (hybrid institutional agreements). This can be explained by excessive risks and ensuing high transaction costs. A more efficient solution is the organisation of interactions within a group of legal entities in control (within a single economic entity). In order to compare the practical implementation of institutional alternatives, we examine the modes of governance in the gas supply industry. A major focus is the Baltic region where two interconnected pipelines — the Nord Stream and the OPAL — were constructed. Different ways to handle transactions relating to gas supply were employed at the time. We compare these ways and conclude that it is necessary to consider the determinants of a transaction to select the best structural alternative and to avoid choosing a wrong governance structure.

Private property exists in Russia for almost 25 years. However, the legitimacy of established property rights and the legitimacy of private property as an institution remain ambiguous. Despite the change of generations and the improvement of living standards, numerous opinion polls show that the majority of Russians refers negatively not only to the privatization of the 1990s and its results, but also to private property in general. Positive forecasts on the adaptation of people to new reality do not come true. The authors analyze the reasons and consequences of private property illegitimacy and compare alternative ways of its legitimating. The main conclusion is the uselessness of any discretionary state intervention in this long-lasting process, while the focus should be put on the mitigation of inequality and the enforcement of formal institutions without any exceptions or privileges.

The coordination of economic activity at the global level is carried out through different mechanisms, which regulate activities of companies, states, international organizations. In spite of wide diversity of entrenched mechanisms of governance in different areas, they can be classified on the basis of key characteristics, including distribution of property rights, mechanisms of governance (in the narrow sense according to O. Williamson), mechanisms of expansion. This approach can contribute not only to classifying existing institutions but also to designing new ones. The modern aggravation of global problems may require rethinking mechanisms of global governance. The authors offer the universal framework for considering this problem and its possible solutions.

The importance of digital ecosystems in the economy is growing rapidly as more and more companies and consumers are involved in their circuit. At the same time, the regulation relevance is growing too, as evidenced by many antitrust cases involving companies such as Yandex, Google, Microsoft, which constitute the core of the respective ecosystems. The very concept of digital ecosystems does not have a generally accepted definition. However, national and supranational regulators must resolve disputes between the leader of the ecosystem and the complementary companies, as well as protect the interests of an indefinite number of persons (with the application of antitust law). Such disputes resolution leads to the fact that the regulator has to make decisions about the rules of interaction within the complex structure of relationships between all participants in ecosystems, de facto defining a framework for establishing institutional agreements. This paper proposes to apply the concept of "meso-institution" for some ecosystems rules, separating them from both hybrid institutional agreements (micro-level rules) and the institutional environment (macro-level rules). It is assumed that meso-institutions are a key element for digital ecosystems successful development. Using the example of companies and antitrust cases, the formation and evolution of meso-institutions, the capability of their design, and the regulator's role are shown. The application of the meso-institutions concept makes it possible to justify the shift of focus of antitrust regulation in the field of digital ecosystems towards their self-regulation rather than strengthening legislative regulation.

The article is based on the research in mobile applications markets. The distribution of market power in these markets depends on the ability of a digital ecosystem's owner to control the handling of mobile applications inside the ecosystem. The degree of this control is determined by the substitutability of different application stores as necessary facilities for the access to mobile applications. The authors provide the survey-based empirical estimates of such substitutability for Apple's mobile application store — App Store. The results of further tests for market boundaries delineation confirm the embeddedness of final users in Apple's ecosystem in absence of feasible opportunities to change the operating system and, consequently, the application store. The findings explain the degree of Apple's market power and provide grounds for antitrust intervention.

Digital antitrust is at the forefront of all expert discussions and is far from becoming an area of consensus among researchers. Moreover, the prescriptions for developed countries do not fit well the situation in developing countries, and namely in BRICS: where the violator of antitrust laws is based compared to national firms becomes an important factor that links competition and industrial policy. The article uses three recent cases from Russian antitrust policy in the digital sphere to illustrate typical patterns of platform conduct that lead not just to a restriction of competition that needs to be remedied by antitrust measures, but also to noteworthy distribution effects. The cases also illustrate the approach taken by the Russian competition authority to some typical problems that arise in digital markets, e.g. market definition, conduct interpretation, behavioral effects, and remedies. The analysis sheds light on the specifics of Russian antitrust policy in digital markets, as well as their interpretation in the context of competition policy in developing countries and the link between competition and industrial policies.

The article analyses the main features of the intellectual activity results market through the lens of the product boundaries definition. Frequently the pirated copy is not considered as a substitute for original products in legal cases. However, unlicensed computer programs should be included in the product market boundaries regardless of its legal status if the consumer considers them as substitutes. The difference between these types of products (original and pirated) are hidden not in transformation but in transaction characteristics. It is also important to take into consideration the possible complementarity between pirated and original products expressed in the information and network effects. In order to assess the buyers' choice it is necessary to adjust the methods evaluating product market boundaries prescribed by «The Procedure of market competition analysis» of the Russia's Federal Antimonopoly Service.